

THE INTER-ALLIED MILITARY COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND THE MILITARY CONTROL OF HUNGARY BETWEEN 1921 AND 1927

Hungary was controlled by a Commission of Military Control after the 1st World War. The supervision was done by an international military commission of control, which got involved in both military decisions and issues of foreign policy. While the commission was originally planned to be a neutral and politically independent, the political attachment of the involved nations essentially made the organization a lobby group stationed in Hungary. The analysis of how conflicts of interest were dealt with during crisis situations should be especially interesting for academics. The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control (hereinafter IMCC) was lead by three consecutive Italian officers, who not only managed to keep IMCC together, but even found a way to use their connections to improve Italian positions in Hungary. This study aims to explain the structure and the function of IMCC in addition to showing its influence on the Army's improvement.

Hungary, like most of the defeated countries after World War I, was under direct military control between 1920 and 1927. The supervision was done by an international military commission of control, which got involved in both military decisions and issues of foreign policy. While the commission was originally planned to be a neutral and politically independent, the political attachment of the involved nations essentially made the organization a lobby group stationed in Hungary. The analysis of how conflicts of interest were dealt with during crisis situations should be especially interesting for academics. The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control (hereinafter IMCC) was lead by three consecutive Italian officers, who not only managed to keep IMCC together, but even found a way to use their connections to improve Italian positions in Hungary.

The definitive history of this quintessential organization still needs to be written by Hungarian historians, since the international discourse has started to publish more articles about these military commissions of control working in parallel.¹

This study aims to explain the structure and the function of IMCC in addition to showing its influence on the Army's improvement.

THE FOUNDING AND STRUCTURE OF IMCC

The military-themed sections from the Treaty of Trianon weren't just focused on the regulations of the Royal Hungarian Army, but they also made the first mention of the controlling organization that was meant to oversee the transformation. The original version still maintained separate commissions for issues concerning the army, the navy and aeronautics (§133). These were meant to be based in Budapest, but could also dispatch commissions to the entire area of the country (§134). They could ask for any documentation during their work and they had to maintain personnel for the interpretation of these texts as well as the communication with Hungarian authorities (§135). All financial expenses, payments and work-related costs had to be paid by the State of Hungary (§136).

The following sections of the treaty listed the tasks for the three commissions overseeing the military, the airships² and the navy³ (§137-139), but they didn't discuss their relation to each other, the methods of founding the commissions and how many soldiers should make up each organization. Neither the definite steps about the commissions' founding,

1 See Vagnini, Alessandro, "La Commissione Interalleata Militare di Controllo per l'Ungheria e la ricostruzione della Honvédség nelle carte dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito" in Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, *Bollettino dell'Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico*, 2009 n. 17-18. p. 229–240.

2 Inter-Allied Aeronautics Commission of Control, hereinafter IACC

3 Inter-Allied Navy Commission of Control, hereinafter INCC

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nor the exact functions were articulated in the treaty, which also failed to mention when and under what circumstances would these commissions be recalled. This goes to show that the treaty's provisions lead to a great freedom for further interpretations and the Allied powers got free hand concerning the commissions' disbanding. On the one hand, this allowed the Allied forces to expand the supervision to an indefinite time through the Ambassadors' Council. On the other hand, the Hungarian State could loosen up on the military supervision's strictness. Since the supplementation of these missing details was left to the Ambassadors' Council, their decision weren't as severe as the sections of the Trianon Treaty. The disregard or sabotage of these points could grant the Hungarian government more reasonable conditions in several sections.

The setup of IMCCs lead to the unification of military control in Hungary and the four-member international commission organized during the Rumanian occupation had to be disbanded.⁴ The Ambassadors' Council addressed the issue in their decree C.A.99/III. issued on 27 December 1920. This decision liquidated all military commissions of control except the ones based in Sopron and Pécs and also accepted the operation manual of IMCC, which were contained in Report No, 1254/2, issued on 23 December 1920 by the Allied Military Committee of Versailles (hereinafter AMCV). Because ratified copies of the Trianon Treaty were exchanged only on 26 July 1921, the three commissions of control could only begin their operation on 5 August 1921. The navy commission worked on its own, the regulations of the AMCV didn't even mention the organization. After finishing its job, it folded in the mid-October 1921.⁵ The aeronautical commission was shared by Austria and Hungary and since its center was in Vienna, its Budapest branch was partially subordinated to the IMCC.⁶

Since this study isn't concerned with the works of the navy and aeronautical commissions, I'll only discuss their involvement to the degree they are linked with the IMCC.

The IMCC was part of a larger network, which was controlled by the AMCV whose president was Marshal Ferdinand Foch. Since the presidential position of IMCC was filled by an Italian general and later a field officer,⁷ most of the commission's reports were not submitted to Foch's headman, but to the Italian delegate of AMCV; Brigadier General Giovanni Marietti then had to circulate these reports among the other AMCV delegations.

As the IMCC presidential offices were divided among several nations all across Europe, the IMCCs themselves were divided alongside different nationalities. The nationalities of the officers in each position remained unchanged and as can be seen from the chart in Appendix 1, the two structural reforms of IMCC managed to keep more or less the same percentage. As the number of officers decreased within IMCC and the national divide ceased to exist within the sub-commissions and sections, these positions gradually grew to serve the Italian, English and French interests and the leaders of different delegations were awarded with an unofficial military attaché position.⁸ This lead each delegation file

4 This commission was constituted of an American, an English, a French, and an Italian general. On the creation and the initial inefficient activity of the commission see Ormos, Mária, *Padovától Trianonig. 1918-1920*, Budapest, 1983, p. 335-353.

5 Magyar Országos Levéltár, Külügyminisztériumi levéltár, Külügyminisztérium, Politikai osztály általános iratai (hereinafter: MOL K 63), bundle n. 301, 1927-35/4-2366. Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter MFA) about the military control and investigation, 1st January 1927, 2366/pol.-1927.

6 Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Affari Politici (1919-1930). (hereinafter ASDMAE AP (1919-1930)), 1759, 8153. Commission Militaire Interalliee de Controle en Hongrie (hereinafter CMIC, see IMCC) Rapport de fin d'operations (1921-1927)

7 Lieutenant General Luigi Zuccari (5th August 1921 – 31th August 1922), Colonel Alfredo Guzzoni (1st September 1922 – 30th May 1924, 15th June 1925 – 31st March 1927) and Colonel Giuseppe Campana (31st May 1924 – 14th June 1925).

8 Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, A magyar kormány megbízottja a katonai szövetségközi ellenőrző bizottságnál. 1. box. Összefoglaló jelentés és napló (hereinafter: HL Rapaich's Diary) 3rd July, 30 August, 18th, 22nd, 25th, 28th September, 8th November 1922, 6th October 1925; ASDMAE, AP (1919-1930), 1747, 8087. Pagliano (Italian Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, hereinafter MFA) 9th September 1922, telegram n. 3063/37, attached Gaetano Caracciolo di Castagneto (Italian Minister at Budapest) to the Chief of the Army Staff (hereinafter CArMS), 6th September 1922., Secret telegram n. 357.; *Documents on British foreign policy, 1919-1939*, ser. 1., vol. XXIV., Ed. Medicott, W. N., Dakin, Douglas, London, 1983. (hereinafter DBFP I/24) n. 240; This was valid for the other IMCC too, See Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Addetti militari (hereinafter: AUSSME, G-29), 119, 9. List of the Italian military, naval and aeronautical attaches, 1st August 1923.

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reports to their homeland Ministries of War⁹ and the myth of an international and politically neutral IMCC was soon forgotten.

The AMCV considered employing a rather large apparatus when they decided about the foundation of the Hungarian IMCC. They wanted to solve everything with their own people and were prepared for several parallel missions. The concept of internationality demanded that these missions should use officers from several different nations, each with their own interpreters, transportation capacity and a reliable staff for officer duties as well as security. This latter function was largely left to the Italian carabinieri, the operation of the courier service was divided between the Italians and the French. Telecommunication (that is, the operation of telephone centers) was again a job for the Italians. Every delegation had considerable transport capacity and logistical background except the Japanese.

The IMCC operation manual expected the foundation of two sub-commissions which dealt with questions of armory, headcount and training. This was expanded with a department for intelligence which operated within the presidency. The Budapest branch of the Aeronautical Commission of Control was also partially connected with the IMCC. This latter organization was subordinated to the presidency, but operated under its own terms.

The ratio of nationalities also strengthened the Italian presidency's positions. The IMCC's operation manual only guaranteed the position of generals to the Italian delegation. In addition to the presidency, the intelligence department was also reserved for them and the armory sub-commission also operated under Italian leadership. The French delegation could only get leading positions in the sub-commissions for headcount and training while the English remained in the background, organizing occasional control groups. The role of the Japanese delegation was reduced to protocol duties.

The IMCC hadn't even started its actual job when its Presidential Council ordered 92 people (26 officers + 66 soldiers) to the area of Western Hungary. This contingent contained military personnel of Italian, English and French nationalities and the dispatch was later expanded with 3 more officers and 2 more soldiers a few days later.¹⁰ The evacuation of the Baranya district was given to two English officers, Colonel Gosset and Major Foster. The sub-commissions were disbanded by the second half of December 1921 and resumed under the direct command of IMCC. Since the formation of IMCC was still under way when these officers and soldiers were transported, the decision only slowed the establishment of different commissions, but it didn't stop them in their work. The command of IMCC officers in Burgenland mostly held up the work of the headcount commission, since this section could only begin its work on 30 November 1921.

The return of officers from the Pécs and Sopron sub-commissions to the center in Budapest raised the question of cutting back the crew of IMCC. This happened in two steps. The first part was completed by 1 April 1922 and its legal basis was Decree C.A.171/VII. of the Ambassadors' Council, issued on 22 March 1922. Since the number of terminated positions was barely more than the number of people sent out to Pécs and Sopron between August and December 1921, it is very likely that the cutback only involved the excess capacity of personnel. The cutback also resulted in a structural reform, since the Aeronautical Commission was disbanded on 1 April 1922. The only relevant person to be left behind was French Major Cesari who was a special aeronautical consultant,¹¹ but this change didn't influence the operability of IMCC.

There was another cutback of personnel on 1 September 1922, but this time the structure of the Budapest IMCC was also radically altered. This change also occurred in a good number of European IMCCs, since the Austrian and Bulgarian

9 Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Registro della Commissione interalleata di Parigi (hereinafter: AUSSME, E-8), 116, 5, Guzzoni. Colonel Luigi Tappi, officer of the Italian Delegation of the AMCV to Guzzoni, Paris, 21st January 1923., private letter.

10 For the nationality of these officers see the 4th Appendix.

11 HL Rapaich's Diary 30th March 1922.

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IMCC also transformed from commission of control to liquidation commission. Since the peace treaty only discussed commissions of control and made no mention of liquidation commissions, both the Austrian and Bulgarian governments had their work because their operations couldn't be supported by the treaty's sanctions. By learning from these experiences, the IMCC at Budapest retained its original name, but its structure made it nothing more than a liquidation commission.¹² The radical cutback in personnel made the armory and headcount sub-commissions lose their structural independence and now only the intelligence and aeronautical departments were differentiated. Since both were lead by French officers, the French got a larger role within the IMCC.

One of the reasons for the second structural reform was to decrease of Hungary's financial burdens. The payments didn't change, only the list of "kept" people got shorter.¹³ The partial liquidation of its own crew made the IMCC more vulnerable to Hungarian state authorities, since now there was a chance of filling up some positions with local people and thus have a better control over IMCC's operations. The original apparatus had to be refilled or occasionally amended by outsiders.

The work of IMCC lasted until the spring of 1927, the missions lasted until the end of 1926, but the IMCC became much more vulnerable against Hungarian authorities after 1 September 1922. It's no coincidence that when the delegation lead by Lieutenant-Colonel Jean le Bleu marked a high point of differences with the Hungarian authorities, the French delegation only gave chauffeur positions to individuals who were considered unreliable for Hungarian authorities. This decision eventually backfired, because it justified said people's harassment, eventual arrest and expulsion.¹⁴ The interpreters provided for IMCC also tried to do their job with Hungarian interests in their mind, but their activities also raised the interest of IMCC's president.¹⁵

This relative vulnerability was made even the worse by the fact that IMCC could never set up its own operational and reliable intelligence service.¹⁶ The costs of intelligence gathering had to be proportionally paid by the countries that made up IMCC, for which each country was promised the same percentage of income from the selling of the discovered war material.¹⁷ The IMCC's intelligence department was in constant need of money,¹⁸ their informers were heavily punished by the Hungarian authorities,¹⁹ which lead to the IMCC relying on intelligence coordinated by the military attachés of the Little Entente. They often abused this power and caused more problems between the relationships of the Hungarian government and the IMCC, the IMCC and the Little Entente as well as Hungary and the Little Entente countries.

The Trianon Treaty maintained the operations of the IMCC were financed by Hungary's state budget. Accommodation had to be provided by the state and the payment of the IMCC soldiers also added to Hungarian expenses. According to The Ambassadors' Council decree C.A.167/III. issued on 22 February 1922, the fees paid in currencies had to be amended by korona too.²⁰ The summary report sent to the Hungarian Legation in Rome²¹ also shows that the payments weren't assessed by the current situation in Hungary, since the group commander's fee

12 HL Rapaich's Diary 30th August 1922.

13 For the pays and the expenses weighed on Hungary because of the IMCC see the 2nd and the 3rd Appendices.

14 HL Rapaich 1st January 1924. [1925.], final report n. 1710/1924.

15 HL Rapaich's Diary 22nd July 1924.

16 L. AUSSME, E-8, 116, 5, Guzzoni, Guzzoni to Tappi, 5th February 1923., private letter; AUSSME, E-8, 119, 6, Guzzoni to Brigadier General Giovanni Marietti, Chief of the Italian Delegation of the AMCV, 12th March 1923., reminder

17 For the percentage to divide the incomes from the selling of located munitions see the 5th Appendix. Guzzoni was willing to resell the discovered munitions to the Hungarian Government, and he then divided the income between the delegations of the IMCC, because the income was more valuable, than the munitions' destruction. AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 3. Guzzoni to the Operations Section (hereinafter OS) of the Army Staff (hereinafter AS) and to Marietti, 16th July 1923., n. 732.

18 AUSSME, E-8, 116, 6. OS of AS to the Italian MFA, to the Ministry of Finance, to the Administrative Section of Ministry of War (hereinafter MW) and to the Italian Delegation of the IMCC, 1st December 1924., n. 7562.

19 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 6. Reminder of Guzzoni to Marietti, 12th March 1923., without a number; ASDMAE, AP (1919-1930), 1749, 8083. Castagneto to Mussolini, 5th May 1923., telegraph post n. 1145/338.

20 For the payments and the compensations, see the 1st and 2nd Appendices.

21 Magyar Országos Levéltár, Külügyminisztériumi levéltár, Római követség (hereinafter: MOL K 99), 3. Hungarian MFA to the Legation at Rome, 19th July 1922., n. 23.143/1922.

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surpassed the royalties of Governor Miklós Horthy. Yet it's interesting to examine if this amount was more or less than what the delegating countries could offer. Without the amends in korona, the monthly payment for the president of IMCC equaled the annual wage of a Lombardian worker. The allowance in koronas raised the payment in currency with more than fifty percent. This amount was enough to let Colonel Alfred Guzzoni get his son an education in München and have a large household in Hungary.²² The same way 200 pengős marked the amount of money with which people could "hardly spend", 1000 liras was the dream of an average Italian civil servant.²³ Together with the korona allowance, even the average soldier's payment surpassed this sum, so Guzzoni wasn't telling the truth in October 1923 when he wrote to the leader of the Operational Department of the Land Division's General Staff that no Italian member of the IMCC wishes to stay in Budapest if the IMCC will be restructured, since the costs in Hungary are too big for them.²⁴

The drastic decrease of IMCC's staff was partially supported by the mitigation of the financial burden and eventually the same burdens became the primary reason why the Hungarian government eventually disbanded the IMCC. This reasoning became moot after 1 September 1922 since IMCC's staff got cut back and after 1 January 1924, the costs of IMCC were deducted from the reparation instead of the state budget, so this wasn't a valid reason for the recall of IMCC either.²⁵

In the beginning, members of the IMCC were hosted in hotels. The extra services were paid by the members, and the Council of Ministers' resolution of 10 June 1921 allowed the gratification of the officers, probably to win the kindness of those who's demands were satisfied.²⁶ It's likely that they wanted to avoid the member's final settlement in the country since 90% of them were still housed in hotels by the middle of July 1922 with the officers receiving first class hotel rooms.²⁷ The rather disorganized accommodation was only solved after the second restructuring, when the remaining crew was housed in the Palace of Military Products, while the relieved Albrecht barracks were given to the customs officers.²⁸ The presidency of IMCC remained at the Palace of Military Products under 10 Szalay Street for the whole time.²⁹

THE OPERATION OF IMCC

The IMCC hadn't even been formed yet when a letter from the Ambassadors' Council, dated 14 February 1921, specified Hungary's tasks in keeping the military sanctions of the treaty. The letter, signed by the council's president Briand summarized the following points:

- I) take measures in making the recruitment only voluntarily
- II) decrease the number of soldiers according to Section 104 of the Trianon Treaty
- III) preparation in fulfilling the demands of Section 140, especially the following points
 - a) reform military jurisdiction according to the treaty's fifth part
 - b) abolish the current law of mobilization
 - c) organize the new army based on the treaty's Sections 103 and 119

22 HL Rapaich's Diary 3rd February 1922.

23 BRACALINI 2008 76.

24 AUSSME, E-8, 141, 6, 1. Guzzoni to Gen. Amantea, Head of the OS of AS, to Marietti and to Castagneto, 29th October 1923., n. 857.

25 HL Rapaich's Diary 15th March 1924, 7th January 1925.

26 Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Magyar Királyi Honvédelmi minisztérium 1919-1945 (hereinafter HL HM) 1921. Eln.D.o.Bév.tétel 12354. alap és 19223. iktató szám

27 MOL K 99, 3. Hungarian MFA to the Legation at Rome, 19th July 1922., n. 23.143/1922.

28 HL Rapaich's Diary 1st September 1922.

29 Archivio dell'Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito, Commissioni militari interalleate di controllo (hereinafter: AUSSME, E-15), 127, 12. Amantea to Campana, 14th June 1924., telegram n. 4167.

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IV) after the founding of the commissions of control, the presidents should be provided with the necessary statistical data.³⁰

Since the IMCC that got together on 5 August 1921 didn't see these demands' effect, it started capillary supervision and tried to solve all the problems in small steps or through a cutthroat diplomatic competition.

The first half of the inspection, which roughly corresponds to the presidency of Lieutenant-General Zuccari, was largely spent with the formation of basic rules. At the same time, the regulations could at least reform the structure of the army as well as public safety corps in addition to starting a new method of recruitment. They also managed to calculate the amount of war material that could be kept and the rest was given to IMCC at least on a theoretical level. During the second section, which corresponds to the presidency of Guzzoni and Colonel Giuseppe Campana, the commission's main concern was the reformation of the troops and factories of war material (1923-1924), then the control of the army's numbers (1925) This was the most problematic time period, since the petty offences that came to light during this era could rebut the official Hungarian opinion, which claimed that the IMCC had no further business in Hungary and the military control is just a waste of money and energy. The years 1923 and 1925 saw the most incidents, while 1926 was mostly spent with last inspections and talks needed for the commission's liquidation.

Finding a solution to the following problems kept the IMCC busy for nearly six years:

– The IMCC's operations were constrained by how the Hungarian authorities didn't allow the inspections in privately owned homes. Only the aftermath of the Kecskemét-incident allowed the missions to receive licenses with which the appointed solicitors could hand out a permission for any building's inspection.³¹ In addition to getting these permissions, the officers' safety also became an issue, but the exaggeration of the 1925 incident at Pécs only lead to more conflicts.³² Looking at the results of these conflicts in the long run, it seems that the Hungarian authorities won since after the most severe incident at Szombathely, the IMCC retreated its position on the missions and the commission constrained its own operations in order to avoid further incidents.

– One of the main functions of IMCC was locating war materials. These types of missions lasted until 1925, but they were only marginally successful after 1923.³³ Handing over the discovered war material to the IMCC wasn't always smooth³⁴ and in one case the Ambassadors' Council had to get involved.³⁵ It's rather ironic that the only problematic situation resulted in the IMCC handing back the war material to the state after getting paid, since the amount of money gained during this deal was much more substantial than what they would have gotten for the destruction of the arms – the income was then spent on the intelligence department of IMCC.³⁶

– The structure and the reformation of the Army caused further problems. The inspections noticed several oddities in this area, but the IMCC only raised its voice because of three different issues, such the refillment of the officers' ranks and the long termination process of liquidating commissions. The third occasion asked for the termination of district headquarters for the mixed brigades, since these background institutions could be used for mobilization and because the Hungarian Army was supposed to be reformed into a contractual army, these types of troops weren't even needed. The

30 ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1759, 8153. CMIC Rapport de fin d'operations (1921-1927)

31 AUSSME, E-8, 136, 13, 1. Resolution n. C.A.223/II. of 27th July 1923 of the Ambassadors' Council about the incident of Kecskemét. Copy for Marietti and Guzzoni, n. 1822.

32 HL Rapaich's Diary 27th March and 2nd April 1925.

33 DBFP I/24 n. 265; AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 2. Campana to Marietti, 6th June 1923 14:30, telegram n. 704; AUSSME, E-8, 116, 6. IMCC to Foch, 28th October 1924., n. 730.; AUSSME, E-15, 128, 1. Major Cesare Nosedo to the OS of AS, 18th April 1925., n. 72 R.

34 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 3. Guzzoni to Marietti, 5th February 1923., folder n. 757., containing IMCC to Foch, 3rd February 1923, n. 755.; DBFP I/24 n. 276; AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 3. Marietti to Romano Avezzana, Italian Ambassador at Paris, 24th April 1923., reminder n. 948, complementing the report n. 398/2 of 14th April 1923 of the AMCV.

35 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 3. Pál Hevesy, the Hungarian charge affairs at Paris to the President of the Council of Ambassadors, 23rd June 1923., note n. 803/1923.

36 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 3. Guzzoni to the OS of AS and to Marietti, 16th July 1923., n. 732.

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district headquarters should have been liquidated based on Decree C. A. 187bis/XXXI of the Ambassadors' Council, issued on 19 September 1922, but the resistance of the Hungarian government led to a compromised solution. Director-general János Schreiner, Advocate Dominber, Colonel Campana and Major Wilson formed a mixed commission, that assessed what kind of changes should be made to Act XI. 1922 and the changes were agreed upon by April 1923.³⁷ The liquidation commissions were originally set up for the division of funds within the Monarchy's successor states, but in many cases they turned into covert operations for military missions. The Hungarian government even waited for the orders of the Ambassadors' Council before it made its first move in the issue, but the summer of 1923 finally saw a resolution after months of procrastination.³⁸ Recruiting new officers was problematic because only Ludovika-students could be incorporated into the Army, but old officers weren't allowed to be reactivated. The IMCC wanted to avoid the appearance of a hidden branch – this meant that the officers laid off during the control were promoted even as civilians and could be reactivated when needed.³⁹ The IMCC was often vocal about the surplus officers⁴⁰ while they avoided a much bigger issue of involuntary recruitment. This was most likely done because they were well aware of the irresolvable problem and after the intense exchange of notes⁴¹ in the first few years, this situation was tacitly accepted.⁴² In light of this problem, the army's refilling was dealt with only on a superficial level because shortly before the IMCC's liquidation, the Ambassadors' Council only published a meaningless order that both parties knew to be useless and solved nothing.⁴³

– According to the Trianon Treaty, the central war material factory had to be set up under a unified leadership at one site, but the Hungarian authorities were already late by February 1922.⁴⁴ On 5 December 1921, the IMCC ordered the Hungarian government to write up a buying contract for the buildings of the war material factory based on Section 115 of the treaty, since the sites were only rented up until that point. The IMCC sent another notice in August 1922 together with a note to the AMCV and even though the Hungarian government told the IMCC on 28 October 1922 that parts of the factory had started production on 25 August 1922, the commission sent another notice in December 1922. At the end of March 1923, the government sent over the draft of a contract according to which they'll buy everything apart from the site's ownership. They left out this part because they maintained the possibility of moving the factory in case a better place was found. The IMCC found this condition reasonable and the entire draft acceptable.⁴⁵ The cannon factory at Diósgyőr was scheduled to move to Csepel by 15 November 1923, the Frommer factory of hand arms had a deadline for 31 December 1923, while the gun powder factory at Balatonfűzfő was scheduled to move by 1 October 1923. While these works started, only the spring of 1924 looked like a feasible deadline and since the government couldn't set up a centralized war material factory by 31 December 1923 due to its tough financial situation, Minister of War Csáky sent

37 Vagnini, 2009, p. 238-239.

38 ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1759, 8153. CMIC Rapport de fin d'operations (1921-1927)

39 Árokay, Lajos, „A rejtett magyar katonai attasé szolgálat tevékenysége 1923–1928 között” in *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 30 (1983) p. 588.

40 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 11, 2. Protocol n. 73 of AMCV, 23rd May 1922.; *Documents on British foreign policy 1919-1939*. ser. 1., vol. XXVII., Ed. Medicott, W. N., Dakin, Douglas, London, 1986 (hereinafter DBFP I/27) n. 13; *Documents on British foreign policy 1919-1939*. ser. 1/a., vol. II., Ed. Medicott, W. N., Dakin, Douglas, Lambert, M. E., London, 1968 n. 306.

41 This was not about numbers, or about the way of recruitment, but about the laws regulating the conscription. ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1759, 8153. CMIC Rapport de fin d'operations (1921-1927)

42 The inefficiency of the controls was in part caused by the persistent opposition of the Hungarian authorities, as they denied every administrative measure, which could facilitate the control of the soldiers' identity. We shouldn't forget, that the IMCC had never asked for help by the Parisian authorities to eradicate this obstruction, and when the IMCC's English delegation suggested that the issue of involuntary recruitment should be mentioned to the Ambassadors's Council, the Italian authorities prevented the report. ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1749, 8083. The message of count Albert Nemes, the Hungarian Ambassador at Rome to Mario Arlotta, 2nd November 1923.; ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1749, 8083. Mussolini to Romano Avezana and Castagneto, 17th November 1923 14:30, telegram n. 3978.

43 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1927-35/4-2366. Information of MFA about the military control and investigation, 1st January 1927, 2366/pol.-1927.

44 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 11, 2. Foch to Zuccari, 4th February 1922., telegram n. 192/2.

45 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 11, 2. Marietti to OS of AS, 12th April 1923., n. 410 BTU.

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notice 15.560/Eln.D.-1923 to the IMCC on 27 August 1923, asking the quintessential question. The Csepel solution would have cost too much at roughly 30-46 billions of korona and since the Weiss company proved to be problematic, establishing the factory at a new site could have cost the quoted amount just to fulfill the formalities of a contract.⁴⁶ Because the production facilities would be still under one management, couldn't the unification process be solved on a virtual plane and have the units be concentrated on two sites, Csepel and Balatonfűzfő?

The Hungarian point was supported by the fact that Austria could run a war material factory of five different units. The IMCC's parenthetical addition claimed that they would have accepted the proposition if the Ambassadors' Council agreed with it, but their official claimed that this was just another excuse to exclude Hungary from the orders.⁴⁷ This point marked the issue's transformation into a political matter, since the IMCC couldn't have agreed to these terms without authorization from Paris. Hungary was only ready to finalize the unification of war material factories according to the contract if they could deduct the costs from the financial reparations specified in the Trianon Treaty. The Hungarian viewpoint was steadily supported by the high commissioner of the League of Nations appointed after the 1924 state loan, and they could also count on the Reparations Commission to rebuff the Hungarian calculations as impracticable. Finally, as part of the talks around the liquidation of IMCC, Note 216 of the Ambassadors' Council dated 18 December 1926 accepted the extant situation with one minor condition.⁴⁸ In the end, the Hungarian viewpoint won and the separate sites could be maintained in exchange for a reasonable sum.

– Another set of issues was strongly linked with the war material factory. By the end of 1922, the IMCC found that there was a large difference between the allowed and the officially owned war material. The missing war material couldn't be produced due to the irresolvable situation around the factories, while the import from outside was banned by the peace treaty. At the end of 1922, Guzzini's calculations already expected that the factory's problem wouldn't be resolved within another year and it would take yet another year to get the missing amount produced, meaning that even by the end of 1925, the Army would have less potential than what the Trianon Treaty described, indirectly or directly this would also have an affect on the political situation. This didn't match the Italian Ministry of War's plans in the matter, so Guzzoni asked the Roman Ministry of Foreign affairs to inform the Italian ambassador of Paris so that he could support the Ministry of War's positions in the Ambassadors' Council. After seeing the surveys, Guzzoni started to lobby for insuring the missing war material.⁴⁹ The issue was made all the more colorful by one of the remaining unfinished businesses of the INCC. The commission allowed four more scout sloops to the number of allowed vessels guaranteed by the peace treaty⁵⁰ and Commodore Grixon, president of the INCC promised that these ships could be equipped with weapons. The weapons could only be obtained from the successor states sharing the Danubian flotilla, which Guzzoni considered to be a hopeless venture, thus with the support of the Ministry of War and the Italian delegation of the AMVC, he linked the problem of the sloops' weapons with the missing war material and tried to petition for the production of the remaining weapons through the IMCC.⁵¹ The weapons of the ships became a victim of the compromises during the factory's case, because the IMCC delegates moved the 31 December 1923 deadline for the unified factory by a year⁵² in exchange for dropping the issue of the weapons and the production of these pieces was prohibited until the entire issue was resolved.

46 In fact it wasn't only a formal question, because the production could have been controlled easier.

47 AUSSME, E-8, 136, 11, 2. Major Quinto Mazzolini, an officer of the Italian Delegation of the AMCV to Foch, 27th September 1923., n. 963 BTU, attached IMCC to AMCV, 15th September 1923, n. 1579.

48 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1927-35/4-2366. Information of MFA about the military control and investigation, 1st January 1927, 2366/pol.-1927.

49 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 11, 1. Major General Giuseppe Vaccari CarnS to the MFA, 22nd November 1922., n. 9952.

50 See the 120th article of the Treaty of Trianon.

51 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 12. Campana to Marietti, 2nd July 1923., n. 717.; AUSSME, E-8, 136, 12. Guzzoni to Marietti, 18th July 1923., n. 739.

52 AUSSME, E-8, 136, 11, 2. Mazzolini to Foch, 27th September 1923., n. 963 BTU., attached IMCC to AMCV, 15th September 1923, n. 1579.

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- The IMCC was also involved in a number of different cases which appeared in the apparatus' range of vision quite accidentally. One of the more frequently recurring questions concerned the anti-gas appliances of the Army, which went against the peace treaty's relevant points. The IMCC made a complaint to the AMVC,⁵³ but this problem never turned into an incident. The IMCC also dealt with the leventes per the wishes of Foch, since the operation of this youth organization also promised a kind of preliminary training for the army, but Guzzoni's efficient involvement removed every questionable element from the leventes' code, so the IMCC could send a relaxed report to Paris. The note implies that these premilitary training operations masquerading as sports clubs weren't considered as threat.⁵⁴ Hungarian officers participated in the grand practice during the fall of 1926 in Germany, which was reported by the 3 October 1923 Issue of Pesti Hírlap on a full page article illustrated with photographs, which also mentioned the technically non-existent Hungarian military attache of Berlin alongside the Hungarian officers.⁵⁵ The volume of the case didn't allow it to be swept under the rug, because according to the Section 142 of the Trianon Treaty, Hungary wasn't allow to send military delegations on study tours, couldn't command soldiers in other armies and the section's spirit also forbade the dispatching of military attaches. Due to the insistence of the French delegate, Guzzoni, who openly tried to disband the IMCC by this point, reported the events to the AMVC and asked the question if the IMCC or the AMVC should make steps in the matter.⁵⁶ The case went unrecognized because the Ambassadors' Council had already suggested a new interpretation for Section 142 of the Trianon Treaty, as well as the other, similar sections of each defeated nations' individual peace treaties. Although the legal commission had exempted the military attaches from the prohibitions of Section 142 by the spring of 1926,⁵⁷ the Ambassadors' Council wanted to discuss the entire issue as a whole and Marshal Foch's reply on 2 December said that he didn't think the IMCC should make any steps in the matter.⁵⁸

– One of the special fields of IMCC's operations concerned the Hungarian aeronautics because the IACC had already disbanded a year before the Hungarian government signed the aeronautical agreement,⁵⁹ so IMCC still had to have a commissioner for aeronautics. This position was first held by Major Cesari, then Captain Lorient. Lorient's function was mostly restricted to the supervision of war materials, which really fitted the functions of IMCC's other members, but Lorient also attempted to expose covert military flight operations. These attempts however weren't strongly supported by the principal organization even in cases of successful exposures. It's very telling that the IMCC had exchanged several letters with the Hungarian authorities about the illegal airplanes imported to Hungary through a British citizen named John Makinson,⁶⁰ yet the IMCC did nothing about the secretly operated Hungarian airplanes even though they had

53 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 11, 2. The protocol of the IMCC's seance at 12th December 1922.; AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 1. IMCC to Marietti, to be transmitted, 23rd May 1923., n. 1189., attached IMCC to Foch, 23rd May 1923., n. 1184.; AUSSME, E-8, 119, 12. Campana to Marietti, 2nd July 1923., n. 717.; HL Rapaich's Diary 15th February 1926.

54 L: AUSSME E-8, 140, 3. IMCC to Foch, 22nd June 1926, n. 219, response to Foch's letter n. 27/2., 22nd January 1926.; HL Rapaich's Diary 11th January, 15th and 24th February 1926.

55 AUSSME, E-8, 140, 4. Grandi to the Italian Ambassador at Paris and at Berlin, to the Minister at Vienna, to the Consul-General at Munich and to the MW, 13th November 1926., telegram n. 246142/c. The mentioned article is attached.

56 AUSSME, E-8, 140, 4. Nosedà to Marietti, to be transmitted, 25th October 1926., n. 409. Attached IMCC to Foch, 3rd October 1926., n. 407.; AUSSME, E-8, 140, 4. Grandi to the Italian Ambassador at Paris and at Berlin, to the Minister at Vienna and at Budapest, to the Consul-General at Munich and to the MW, 22nd November 1926., telegram n. 247498.

57 AUSSME. E-8, 140, 4. Romano Avezana to MFA, 18th November 1926., telegraph post n. 4293/1513.

58 ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1764, 8167. Lieutenant Colonel Giovanni Battista Oxilia, military and air attaché at Budapest to Ercole Durini di Monza, Italian Minister at Budapest and OS of AS, 15th October 1928., n. 404. 3rd appendix: Foch to IMCC, 2nd December 1926., n. 368/2.

59 ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1749, 8083. Salvatore Contarini, permanent deputy of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to advocate Finzi (Ministry of the Interior), 31st May 1923., telegram n. 224879/498. Transmits Castagneto to Mussolini, 9th May 1923., n. 1188/350.; HL Rapaich's Diary 30th March 1922.

60 It is quite possible that Makinson was only a stooge, because the Ministry of National Defence had imported other aircrafts as well, but the IMCC had discover only his. In the end, the Hungarian Government had one of the aircrafts successfully legitimized, while three had to be dismantled. Since only two of the four aircrafts were functional, this resolution wasn't severe at all. AUSSME, E-8, 141, 2. 5th appendix of the 91st protocol, 24th October 1924., London, Ministry of Air, n. S/18596/A.1.1; AUSSME, E-8, 141, 2, 1. IMCC to the Hungarian Aeronautical Office (hereinafter HAO), 9th December 1924., 6th appendix of the protocol n. 800. A 91; AUSSME, E-8, 141, 2. IMCC to HAO, 7th March 1925., n. 113.; AUSSME, E-8, 141, 2, 2. Foch to Marietti, 29th July 1925., folder n. 385/2.: contains Briand's (as the President of the Council of Ambassadors) letter to Frigyes Korányi, Hungarian Minister at Paris, 6th

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access to the pieces of information checked by Loriot about the personnel of HAO and their real function, the exact nature of the operations at the airports of Szeged, Szombathely, Miskolc and Mátányásföld, or the anti-aircraft measures of the Ministry of National Defence.⁶¹ Captain Loriot eventually returned home in September 1926 and since nobody filled in his position, the formal closure of aeronautics control was left to the IMCC officers working on the final reports.

All of these issues show that the IMCC was ready to make compromises if it met with a minimum amount of cooperation and it only turned to higher authorities (such as the AMVC or through them to the Ambassadors' Council) when it was absolutely necessary. Many smaller questions could have been easily resolved through force, but the IMCC avoided unnecessary conflict in these cases. This permissive, rather tolerant behavior was coupled with an attitude that only let the confirmed breaches of contract to be submitted towards the higher authorities. This difference is especially noticeable when we compare it to the central's response to the French delegation's hard-line approach, since the Italian presidency's attempts to give more freedom to the French delegation within the commission was exchanged for a more correct behavior at the delegates. The English opinion about the IMCC's Italian members being pro-Hungarian was simplified and only partially true, since we can not forget that the IMCC's operations were also influenced by an outside factor: the Little Entente. The more or less permissive handling of topical issues and problems was partially a response to balancing out the overt influence of Little Entente countries, an objective which the IMCC's Italian leadership could carry out with the support of the English delegation. To understand this special relationship, we must first discuss the relationship of the IMCC and the Hungarian representatives of the Little Entente states.

The IMCC set up these relationships in the first few months of its existence. This seemed like a logical step, since the diplomats already had access to well-functioning intelligence network which could have been useful for the IMCC as well. Yet it's undeniable that the Ambassadors' Council and the AMVC had already expected the dangers of the Little Entente delegates trying to overrule the IMCC and attempting to influence its operations, so they officially settled the relationship of the Little Entente and the IMCC between the end of October and the beginning of November 1921. The Ambassadors' Council issued its orders on 29 October 1921: the Little Entente delegates in Hungary could pass on information to the IMCC, but its validity had to be checked by the commission. Reporting on the results of these check ups wasn't obligatory, this right was asserted by the Ambassadors' Council.⁶²

Yet the relationship of the Little Entente and the IMCC was riddled with conflicts. The order of the Ambassadors' Council didn't deter the Little Entente Ministers and military attaches in Budapest from manipulating the IMCC and criticizing its operations. Yet their most important aim was getting the Little Entente delegates more involved in the IMCC's work by constantly bringing up past examples of injustice. The French delegation of the IMCC frequently handed out inside information to Little Entente delegates. This couldn't be stopped during the presidency of Lieutenant-General Zuccari and only a leak with scandalous results gave Guzzoni the chance to openly go against this practice.⁶³ His efforts to stop these unwanted collaborations as the president of IMCC were only partially successful, because while he trimmed

August 1925, n. 288; AUSSME, E-8, 141, 2. Nosedà to Marietti to transmitted, 22nd September 1925., n. 514., contains IMCC to Foch, 22nd September 1925., n. 505.; HL Rapaich's Diary 29th September 1924 and 3rd March 1925.

61 AUSSME E-15, 90, 2. Loriot to Guzzoni, 31st January 1923., n. 2.188.; Loriot to Campana, 1st October 1924., n. H.O. 2.581.; AUSSME E-15, 90, 2. IMCC to Colonel Stanissavlievitch, Serbo-Croat-Slovenian Military Attaché at Budapest, 20th February 1925., n. 76.; AUSSME E-15, 90, 2. Loriot's report about the Secret „Pro Domo” document n. HM.37.927/VI-1.-1923. signed by Lieutenant Colonel Vilmos Nagy of a Nagybaczon, of 15th September 1923, 28th March 1925.

62 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 6. Instructions of the Ambassadors' Council to the IMCC about the execution of their resolution of 29th October 1921. Project about the execution of the resolution.

63 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 6. Guzzoni to the MW and to Marietti, 19th February 1923., n. 552.; The representatives of Little Entente countries received information by other delegations too, but this wasn't regular and were often done by mistake. AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Guzzoni to Marietti, 17th January 1923., n. 508.; to be transmitted: Guzzoni to OS and to Intelligence Department (hereinafter ID) of AS, 17th January 1923., n. 507.; AUSSME, E-8, 119, 6. Mussolini to Romano Avezzana, 10th March 1923., telegram n. 211439/333.

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the wildlings of this relationship, the special comradery between the French delegation and the Little Entente delegation in Hungary was still in effect until the end, albeit with varying levels of intensity.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF IMCC WITH HUNGARIAN AUTHORITIES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF COOPERATION AND OPPOSITION

Colonel, later General Richárd Rapaich was the Hungarian delegate for to the IMCC. His assistant and liaison officer for the aeronautics commission of control was Major Henrik Szentkeresztzessy.⁶⁴ A good number of other liaison officers also helped Rapaich's work.

The Hungarian authorities knew about the reality that financial gains could influence the members of IMCC, but they also aimed for their complete social isolation.⁶⁵ After Gyula Gömbös accepted the English delegation's lunch invitation for n 6 March 1922, the consent of the Minister of National Defence allowed Rapaich to order his liaison officer Captain Bódog Nagy to find out whom the IMCC officers wanted to invite and let them know one-by-one that they had to refuse the invitation for some reason. An open order was avoided so as not to make the attempts for disabling social life too obvious.⁶⁶ Rapaich and the officers who were in daily contact with the IMCC didn't resign from the invitation, but Rapaich usually selected which invites to accepts and which to decline with the help of his "health condition".

In addition to controlling the social life, every other connection was also heavily supervised. The English and Italian missions received Hungarian chauffeurs while the selection of drivers resulted in a state of war between the French delegation and the Hungarian authorities. The French's first choice for chauffeuring duties was József Bikki, a Czechoslovakian citizen with no residence, then Viktor Nagy was selected because the Hungarian citizen born in Arad was compromised during the Rumanian occupation of Budapest. Both people were mired by the authorities,⁶⁷ so Lieutenant-Colonel Le Bleu⁶⁸ and Major Huard showed their strictest form during the inspections in exchange. Huard also had a conflict with the Hungarian authorities about his residence, since his original accommodation was a room booked at the Ritz, but he immediately switched to another suite, then arbitrarily moved to the house under 4 Semmelweis Street.⁶⁹ Petty offenses and more serious incidents laced the conflict, but this hostile conduct wasn't directed at the French delegation, only towards the two officers. Rapaich had a good rapport with Major Lameillère, the predecessor of Major Huard and he also had a really amiable relationship with Colonel Baratier. Furthermore, the French interpreter Waitz could also have some of his more personal wishes fulfilled because he was said to have "Hungarian sentiments"⁷⁰

The English delegation's only problematic member was Colonel Gosset. His successor, Lieutenant-Colonel Selby could build a better relationship, but this couldn't compete with the rapport of Guzzoni. Both Guzzoni and Selby were

64 ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1765, 8178. Raffaele Guariglia to Gaetano Manzoni, the Italian Ambassador at Paris, 16th March 1929., telegram n. 213751/275. Attached Durini to MFA, 2nd March 1929., telegraph post n. 583/251/A50, which transmits Oxilia to Durini, to AS, to MW and to OS of Air Staff, 2nd March 1929., n. 73.

65 HL Rapaich 1st January 1924. [1925.], final report n. 1710/1924.

66 HL Rapaich's Diary 7th and 8th March 1922, 11th November 1925.

67 HL Rapaich's Diary 21st May, 15th and 22nd October 1924.; HL Rapaich 1st January 1924. [1925.], final report n. 1710/1924.

68 Originally Le Bleu showed quite a pro-Hungarian attitude. According to the gossips inside the IMCC, this way he wanted to prepare the liquidation of the Commission, mostly because he had been promised to become French Military Attaché to Budapest. By August 1922 it became obvious that the IMCC was going to continue its work as a liquidation commission without changing its name. Moreover, the Hungarian press had already published some criticisms about him, so Le Bleu became the uncompromising protector of IMCC's raison d'être, and as permissive he was before, he became very inflexible with the Hungarians. He mistreated his substitutes already at the beginning of his mission, Major Lameillère went home because he couldn't cooperate with Le Bleu. However he worked well, he had good observations and in the first half of 1925 he was on the right track while searching among the Social Security Records to prove the preparations of the Hungarian Army for the mobilisation. However without appropriate diplomatic skills, flexibility and the support of the IMCC's Italian Presidency the work of Le Bleu only resulted in fruitless conflicts. AUSSME, E-8, 116, 5, Guzzoni. Guzzoni to Marietti, 2nd August 1923., privat letter; DBFP I/24 n. 498. and 529.; HL Rapaich's Diary 31st December 1925, final report n. 2150/1925.

69 HL Rapaich's Diary 3rd April and 28th May 1924.

70 HL Rapaich's Diary 19th April 1922.

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named unofficial military attaches during the second cutback at IMCC. The Hungarian authorities didn't even react to Selby's idea of exchanging information; his offer to share his data about the Soviet Army⁷¹ went unanswered because Rapaich and the Hungarian authorities didn't want to treat Selby as a military attaché without the official documents of his appointment.⁷²

Compare this to the regular news exchange with Guzzoni,⁷³ which resulted in a successful cultural collaboration,⁷⁴ even providing internal information was a regular occurrence despite this being barely compatible with Guzzoni's position. This great friendship could easily co-exist with Guzzoni's every move being monitored by investigators and when Guzzoni noticed this, he just made a brief note of the problem.⁷⁵

Personal observation and constant control was necessary for the IMCC officers' job, because they could have easily found compromising things during their missions. To avoid this problem while the IMCC was set up, the heads of the competent institutions were briefed on what they could and could not talk about⁷⁶, a dual administration was set up,⁷⁷ the positions and trainings that were banned in the peace treaty were hidden behind meaningless names⁷⁸ and a capillary monitoring network was established. It wasn't obligatory to announce the destination of the missions, but even in the case of surprise inspections, certain restrictions could theoretically provide the basic details about the nature of the inspection. One of these restrictions was that nobody could speak to the IMCC officers without the presence of a Hungarian liaison officer. Searching private homes had to be supervised by a police court prosecutor from Budapest, because the posterior dispatch of a prosecutor was not always allowed at the place of the mission and since no prosecutor meant no injunctions, privately owned houses couldn't be searched. The mission of Major Cesare Nosedo on 19 May 1924 wasn't the only unsuccessful one when the inflexibility of Hungarian authorities the officers tasked with the inspection had to return to Budapest without their job done.⁷⁹ If the IMCC officers followed the rules to the letter, the preparations let Rapaich and his men know the following data about the mission a day before the inspection: will there be a house search,⁸⁰ will it be within or outside Budapest,⁸¹ will there be a headcount.⁸² Because the IMCC officers weren't so naïve, they didn't give the exact destinations at the beginning of the secret inspections, just told the chauffeur on which road to start. This was more than enough as the starting point because the vehicles were followed by bicycles

71 HL Rapaich's Diary 18th September 1922.

72 HL Rapaich's Diary 8th November 1922.

73 For example for being informed about the points of the treaty of Marienbad between the Czechoslovakian and the Serb-Croat-Slovenian Army, Guzzoni gave the Hungarian Authorities a report about the military installations near Bratislava. HL Rapaich's Diary 22nd, 23rd, 28th September 1922.

74 For example, it was Rapaich to draw Guzzoni's attention on the book of Colonel Ferenc Nyékhegyi about the Armistice of Padua. HL Rapaich's Diary 25th April 1922.; Guzzoni sent in Hungary the book of Colonel Attilio Vigevano about the Hungarian legion in Italy, which was reviewed by Albert Berzeviczy, the President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in the 5-6th number of the *Katonai Közlöny* [Military Gazette] of 1925. HL Rapaich's Diary 16th, 18th and 23rd February 1925.; and Guzzoni maintained contact with the Military History Archive of Budapest to have maps and the copies of the Hungarian troops' war diaries, which fought in Italy in 1st World War. HL Rapaich's Diary 14th February 1924 and AUSSME, E-8, 116, 10.

75 HL Rapaich's Diary 19th October 1925.

76 The information didn't work every time, because during one of the first controls, the Chief of Police of Budapest had mentioned the existence of the Army Staff and the Defensive Department to an English Major, and even the controlling officers found strange written comments like „Munkakör és szerepe entente ellenőrzés esetén” [To dos and functions in case of Entente control]. HL Rapaich's Diary 2nd December 1921., 16th and 25th January 1925.

77 Kádár, Gyula, *A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig*, vol. I., Budapest, 19782, p. 167.

78 The covert officers were called “class ranking administrative staff”, abbreviated in Hungarian „roska”. As the reserve officer training was forbidden, the traditionally name of “one-year volunteer” was changed in “individuals with right to bear officer candidate's band”. As Hungary couldn't have either an Army Staff or staff officers, the Army Chief of Staff was called the Chief of the Section VI of the Ministry of Defence, and the staff officers were only “acting as staff officers”. The Military Academy's name became “Rules Course Guide of Budapest”. Kádár, 1978, p. 156, 157, 233, 238.

79 HL Rapaich's Diary 19th May 1924.

80 This could be deduced by the presence of a prosecutor.

81 This could be calculated by the quantity of petrol drawn.

82 Whether the officers brought documents, time sheets, registers, which served to compare the current status with the values estimated before.

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within Budapest,⁸³ then the observers were alarmed alongside the possible routes outside Budapest. The liaison officers could provide further details about their destination on the scraps of paper they threw out during the trip.⁸⁴

The gendarme could check the vehicles several times,⁸⁵ which gave the possible target institutions enough time to prepare for the inspection. The directors were ordered that they could only communicate with the inspection officers in the presence of a liaison officer. Non-commissioned officers couldn't do anything on their own, they could only be present at the talks if they were the interpreters.⁸⁶ In the case of aeronautical establishments, such as an airport, the IMCC officers were held back with the following method: every airport had a stock of personnel, partially under fake names or pretending to be gendarmes to guarantee security and insurance operations. If the inspecting commission appeared at an airport, the gate guards couldn't let them in until the airport's commander gave him permission. He was naturally very hard to reach at this point. During the time won with these machinations, the "surplus-crew" could leave the airport through designated exits and the unauthorized aircrafts were hidden under the tent-hangars prepared for unusable planes. When everything was done, the commander was suddenly found and he apologetically welcomed the inspecting commission.⁸⁷ Being late was a general feature of every site, since the banned materials had to be placed at their designated hiding places. The inspection also had to be reported to the garrison's commander so that he could assign an accompanying officer to the commission. This was done so that the Hungarian authorities could check upon the inspection commissions and won't let other countries' intelligence officers enter the site while pretending to be them.⁸⁸ The number of unannounced inspections was highest during the earliest years of IMCC's operations and was then raised again when Guzzoni left the commission and since Campana was far less partial and charismatic IMCC president, Le Bleu started a private campaign against the Hungarian authorities between the end of 1924 and the first half of 1925.

The IMCC's work was sabotaged in different ways; the "overt" rigor and abuse of power was often drummed up in the press as well. Because the costs of IMCC's missions had to be paid by the state, they used every possible surface of attack for the less sympathetic officers. In order to achieve these goals, the deceased weren't given a break either.⁸⁹ The bothersome officers got personal attacks from the press through occasionally offensive articles. When Rapaich had to answer to Guzzoni after each attack without batting an eyelid, he said that he didn't know who leaked the confidential information to the press. We mustn't forget that the tone of the attacks in the press often resulted in conflicts between Rapaich and the Presidential Department D of the Ministry of National Defence, since Rapaich often motioned for a more restrained approach to the press officers. It wasn't Rapaich's goodness that made him so careful, rather he had a better grasp on what was acceptable or unacceptable, because some of the more vitriolic articles were often followed by counterattacks from the IMCC's part, who then forwarded a case to AMCV.⁹⁰

The operations to sabotage IMCC evolved in a programmatic fashion within the first six months of the commission's establishment. In January 1922, the participants of a talk at the Ministry of National Defence agreed on that Hungary had

83 HL Rapaich's Diary 24th July 1924.

84 HL Rapaich's Diary 30th July 1924.

85 The officers of the IMCC broached how many times they were asked to prove their identity on the journey to the inspections, but never on the return trips. HL Rapaich's Diary 12th July 1924.

86 This was another way to reduce the number of the possible inspections at the same time. AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. French Delegation of the AMCV to the other delegations, 14th August 1925., n. 408/2.

87 Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Tanulmánygyűjtemény 3024, *Kistelegdy Ernő*: Adatok a repülőtisztképzés történetéhez 1920-tól 1945-ig, p. 10.

88 Kádár, 1978, p. 166.

89 See the case of the wives of the French warrant officers, who died in a tragic car crash at Kerepes. Their tragedy was used to mock the high number of vehicles used by the French delegation. HL Rapaich's Diary 22nd, 23rd, 27th May and 1st June 1922.

90 Pl. I: AUSSME E-8, 119, 10. IMCC to Foch, 7th August 1925., n. 416.

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(professedly) followed the peace treaty's rulings, thus they will show the maximum amount of resistance, since when would the IMCC be stricter with Hungary than with Austria?⁹¹

In addition to hampering them in their duties, there were other conflicts with IMCC.⁹² While these issues weren't very flagrant when compared with the events that took place in other defeated countries,⁹³ the constant obstruction, the press attacks and the bigger scandals had severe consequences. The first bigger incident took place in Kecskemét on 28 March 1923⁹⁴ because a commission was barred from searching a home three consecutive times, then officers had to face a rebelling crowd with the police only making an appearance some 45 minutes too late. The inspection couldn't be completed and the French delegates car was pelted upon his leaving. Naturally the IMCC immediately asked for the punishment of the liable people and expected a formal apology from Hungarian authorities by 31 March.⁹⁵ Since the obstruction of the investigations had made the IMCC's work impossible by this point, Guzzoni wanted immense diplomatic pressure on the Hungarian authorities, considering the involvement of the Ambassadors' Council and fining the country, but he left the initiative role to Marietti, who only received some impersonal reports and private suggestions.⁹⁶

After lengthy cross-organization and temporization, in which the English got interested in addition to the Hungarians and Italians,⁹⁷ perhaps the former even more so than the latter, the competent organizations only lost their patience by the end of May. The IMCC had sent its first full list of complaints to the AMCV⁹⁸ on 23 May, then relayed the results of the first Hungarian investigation on 26 May.⁹⁹ This could be called anything but severe, which irritated the Ambassadors' Council where now even the English were partial to the harsher resolutions.¹⁰⁰ Seeing how things turned for the worse, the Hungarian government forwarded a notice to the Ambassadors' Council through the Parisian Embassy in which they promised to punish the liable personnel.¹⁰¹ Unfortunately nobody believed them by this point especially in light of discovering a weapon depot at Hajmáskér (larger than the one at Kistétény) on 6 July 1923.¹⁰² The English ambassador to Paris was then ordered to side with a more hard-line resolution, one which promised the Hungarian government's punishment.¹⁰³

Bethlen had no other choice but to make peace at home, silence the ÉME, get Horthy's help to influence Gömbös and his faithful followers who would soon secede from the Unified Party, depose the compromised Belitska from the

91 HL Rapaich's Diary 5th January 1922.

92 For example, Sergeant Lattanzio's chauffeur drove too fast on one occasion. His car was stopped by a policeman, they exchanged some comments, Lattanzio seriously insulted the policeman, who then shot his gun. There wasn't any serious injury and the case was arranged with mutual consent. AUSSME E-8, 119, 5.; Another typical case was when according to the French version, somebody shot at a car of the French delegation, while according to the investigation of the Hungarian authorities, the car was thrown with a stone. Whatever happened, the Hungarian Government refused to apologize. DBFP I/27 n. 13; HL Rapaich 1st January 1924. [1925.], final report n. 1710/1924.

93 See *Documents on British foreign policy, 1919-1939*, ser. 1., vol. XX., Ed. Medlicott, W. N., Dakin, Douglas, Lambert, M. E., London, 1976. (hereinafter DBFP I/20) n. 273, DBFP I/20 n. 293, DBFP I/20 n. 318, DBFP I/20 n. 349, DBFP I/24 n. 184

94 For the non-official description of the incident see Kádár, 1978, p. 167.

95 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. IMCC to Bethlen and to Belitska, 29th March 1923., n. 972.

96 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. Guzzoni to Marietti and to OS of AS, 31st May 1923., n. 614.

97 The Italian representatives – without appropriate instructions from the MW and the MFA – represented conflicting lines. And the English representatives wouldn't take sides before the European travel of István Bethlen, the Prime Minister of Hungary, so they were interested in the complete delaying of the commissions' works. AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. Marietti to OS of AS and to Guzzoni, 11th April 1923., n. 408 BTU.; AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. Unknown number of appendix of Protocol n. 892 about the session n. 95 of 13th April 1923. of the AMCV.; The Hungarian Authorities found out that Marietti wasn't instructed properly either, so they complained by Nemes. The MW had naturally rejected the allegations, but further decisions reveal that the Hungarians' request was accepted. AUSSME, E-8, 116, 5, Marietti. Arlotta to MW, to Romano Avezzana and to Castagneto, 26th October 1923., telegram n. 245413/1141.; DBFP I/24 n. 362

98 AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 1. IMCC to Marietti, to be transmitted, 23rd May 1923., n. 1189., attached IMCC to Foch, 23rd May 1923., n. 1184.

99 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. IMCC to Foch, 26th May 1923., n. 1213.

100 DBFP I/24 n. 406.

101 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. Korányi to the President of the Council of Ambassadors, 4th June 1923., note n. 710/1923.

102 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 2. Campana to Marietti, 6th June 1923. 14:30, telegram n. 704.

103 DBFP I/24 n. 415

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Ministry of National Defence and put an end to the Kecskemét incident because now the receiving of a state loan got jeopardized.¹⁰⁴ Assistant PM Daruváry informed the IMCC about the first Hungarian investigation, so Bethlen could easily distance himself from this report and asked for the possibility of conducting a second investigation,¹⁰⁵ then delivered the same message to the Allied power's and Ministers at Budapest, asking for their patience until he got back the results of the second investigation.¹⁰⁶ On 20 June 1923, the Ambassador's Council got tired of this willy-nilly situation and based on the IMCC's suggestion, they were ready to accept the results of the first Hungarian investigation. Yet Bethlen made his decision at the right time, because he not only got rid of the entire case, but could come away as the winner of this lengthy argument. The French section of the AMCV¹⁰⁷ asked for the suspension of the Ambassadors' Councils' ruling issued on 20 June 1923,¹⁰⁸ then when Bethlen reported on the findings of the second investigation,¹⁰⁹ Guzzoni suggested that the Kecskemét incident should be closed.¹¹⁰ The result of this decision is decree C.A.223/II.¹¹¹

The incident at Kecskemét was the first serious incident with the IMCC alongside an immensely confusing international situation, made even worse by the issue of Hungarian state loan. The incident was blown so out of proportion that the IMCC lost its credibility and the Ambassadors' Council had to step up against the Hungarian government, but the concessions reached on Hungary's part didn't last for long and the trauma caused by the incident was useful for the Hungarian authorities in the long run. The only concession to be made, in addition to punishing the liable people, was accepting the decision in C.A.223/II. which said that the police court's prosecutors had to issue search warrants for privately owned properties, while the Bethlen government used the foreign pressure to sort its political lines, get a better control of ÉME, blamed everything on the already compromised Minister of National Defence Sándor Belitska and got the IMCC's permission for payment of the state loan.

The obstruction was reignited pretty soon, which was inevitable due to a lockdown situation. The Little Entente constantly wanted to get involved in the military control, which had to be avoided since the IMCC would have lost all of its credibility and any sense of political neutrality. The criticisms of the Little Entente could be answered by claiming that the IMCC did its job well and fulfilled all of its functions. This wasn't necessarily true, because the Hungarian authorities' obstruction grew even greater by 1924. This could only be responded through diplomatic pressure, which would have also meant accepting the Little Entente's criticisms. The other response could have been economical sanctions, but this would have jeopardized the ongoing reorganization of Hungarian economy. This stand-off remained in effect until the summer of 1924, when Guzzoni took over the IMCC and managed to make a balance between the French, English and Italian delegations.¹¹² His successor Campana was less charismatic and energetic, giving Lieutenant-Colonel Le-Bleu free hand in the inspecting operations of the Hungarian IMCC. The Hungarian authorities responded with more incidents against Le Bleu. During an especially sneaky, unannounced mission to Pécs, the Hungarian authorities organized a demonstration which led to throwing stones and the press made fun of the inspecting officers because of the police protection.¹¹³ Learning from the incident at Kecskemét, the authorities immediately apologized, so the events had no further response. Le Bleu however considered this a proclamation of war because he started using even less orthodox

104 DBFP I/24 n. 431, 436, 440, 441 and 444.

105 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. Foch to the President of the Council of the Ambassadors, 24rd June 1923., n. 648/2. attached IMCC to AMCV, 21st June 1923., telegram n. 1301.

106 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. Arlotta to Romano Avezana, 5th July 1923., telegram n. 230329/847., transmits Castagneto's telegram to MFA, 23rd June 1923.

107 Probably they wanted to prove, that they debate the Hungarian case on professional and not on political basis.

108 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. Desticker, Foch's Chief of Staff to the delegations of AMCV, 23rd June 1923., n. 649/2.

109 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. Bethlen to IMCC, 10th July 1923., n. 5208/M.E.1923.

110 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 13, 1. IMCC to Foch, 11th July 1923., n. 1391.

111 AUSSME, E-8, 136, 13, 1. Marietti to OS of AS, 27th July 1923., n. 892 BTU.

112 According to the English Delegation of the IMCC and to the English Minister at Budapest, the Italians showed a very pro-Hungarian attitude, but these criticisms are seriously undermined by the fact that in the last years of the IMCC's activity, the English heatedly assisted this attitude. DBFP I/24 n. 303.

113 HL Rapaich's Diary 22-24th January, 27th March and 2nd April 1925.

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methods.¹¹⁴ The missions of upcoming months were characterized by petty interludes laced with conflicts, but when the Hungarian resistance would jeopardize the operation of IMCC,¹¹⁵ Guzzoni returned in the middle of June 1925 and presided IMCC once again. The change could have lead to consolidation, but a completely regular inspection made Le Bleu almost find what he had been looking for half a year: proof of how the institutions of social insurance could be used for preparing mobilization.

The commission traveled to Szombathely on 28 July 1928 where they wanted to check out the paperwork of social insurance institutions per the wishes of Le Bleu. The competent offices were warned on time by Rapaich's men, but some of the compromising papers weren't hidden on time due to some mistake, so the only solution was hindering the commission. The usual script dictated that some complications should arise about handing out the search warrants,¹¹⁶ while the commission remained at the County Hall at Szombathely, so Rapaich hurried up the preparation of the warrants. In the meantime the compromising papers were smuggled through the roof behind the backs of the commission and a demonstration was also improvised as added distraction. Unfortunately the organizers lost their control over the crowd who broke into the courtyard of the County Hall where the commission was stationed. Even one the inspection officers were threatened when one of the policemen, who was supposed to keep order, advised the crowd to stab the Entente officers in their stomach.

The inspecting officers were reimbursed on the spot, so it was unnecessary to ask for an apology, but this obvious materialization of obstruction couldn't have gone unnoticed, so Guzzoni got the IMCC delegates to agree with the Hungarian government's measures up to that point, but also report the obstruction to the higher authorities in Paris.¹¹⁷ They didn't protest about the press attacks against the delegation, they only asked the Italian and English Ministers at Budapest to intervene against the personal attacks against Le Bleu. The case was thus handed over to civilians, hoping that the envoys wouldn't take the routine case to the Ambassadors' Council.¹¹⁸ Another reason why the events couldn't be swept under the rug was that the Czechoslovakian envoy to Budapest used this offence as an example when he explained why he thought the Little Entente officers should joined the IMCC even though this had been forbidden several times.¹¹⁹

The case could have ended in a satisfactory way by the beginning of September, if a badly worded Hungarian notice¹²⁰ hadn't shown the events at Szombathely in an untrue fashion and praised the IMCC for its work.¹²¹ Eventually the Ambassadors' Council accepted the AMCV's plans with Decree 284 bis/IX issued on 29 September 1925. This asked for the punishment of all liable parties¹²² and this motion was carried out by Hungarian authorities without any resistance.¹²³

The only winner of this confusing situation and letter exchanges was the Hungarian government, because the AMCV had already banned unannounced missions in the middle of August in order to avoid further conflicts¹²⁴ and only six

114 HL Rapaich's Diary 5th and 18th February 1925.

115 DBFP I/27 n. 71

116 The delaying the permission's granting was so successful this time, that it arrived with a delay of 15 days! HL Rapaich's Diary 12th August 1925.

117 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Guzzoni to Mariatti, 29th July 1925. 20:00, telegram n. 150 R; AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Guzzoni to Marietti, 30th July 1925. 16:45, telegram n. 151; AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Noseda to Marietti, 5th August 1925., folder n. 401., contains: IMCC to AMCV, 3rd August 1925., n. 397; HL Rapaich's Diary 31th December 1925, final report n. 2150/1925.

118 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Guzzoni to AS and to Marietti, 7th August 1925., n. 161

119 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Guzzoni to AS, to Durini and to AMCV, 11th August 1925., n. 170.

120 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Summonte to Mussolini, 5th September 1925., telegraph post n. 3548/1192.

121 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Summonte to Mussolini, 12th September 1925., telegraph post n. 3584/1209.

122 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Marietti to AS and to Guzzoni, 5th October 1925., n. 79/29 B. U.

123 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. Korányi to Briand, as President of the Council of Ambassadors, 22nd October 1925., n. 429. Included Csáky to IMCC, note n. 12.773/el.n.D.

124 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 10. French delegation of AMCV to the other delegations, 14th August 1925., n. 408/2.

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announced missions took place until the end of the year. Le Bleu was also ousted, his successor was a lot more pliant, so this change was preferable to both the Hungarian authorities and the IMCC.¹²⁵

Guzzoni wasn't satisfied with the AMCV's decision about the unexpected inspections, so he sent every superfluous members of his staff on a one month holiday¹²⁶ to pour oil on troubled waters. After this, incidents could be averted until the disbanding of the IMCC.

THE IMCC AND FOREIGN POLITICS, OR THE ROAD TO DISBANDING

The operations of the IMCC always were always affected by the international politics shifts in power relations. In many cases the commission was forced to deter from its real opinion when they reported to the higher authorities. One of the reasons for this was that the nations delegating their officers to the commission had no reason to make the Hungarian supervision even more severe. This became even more obvious in the fall of 1922 when Hungary was finally accepted to the League of Nations.¹²⁷ Before this could take place, the Ambassadors' Council had to state their opinion, based on the information they gathered from IMCC and AMCV, whether Hungary had fulfilled the tasks listed in the peace treaty's military clauses.

The day after getting accepted to the League of Nations, Hungary petitioned to get its military control taken over by the League of Nations. Had this petition been accepted, the IMCC would have been automatically disbanded. Since the framework of the requested investigation wasn't cleared and the country was only accepted to the League with some conditions, the Ambassadors Council refused the petition on the advice of the AMCV, claiming that they had already asked the Hungarian government to accept the setup of the Committee of Guarantees.¹²⁸

The Committee of Guarantees wasn't mentioned in the peace treaties, it was an afterthought of the defeated nations' military control, which technically should have lasted only until 30 December 1922.¹²⁹ The Ambassadors' Council knew that they didn't have any documents with which they could force the defeated nations to join in, so they occasionally brought up the idea of setting up the Committee of Guarantees as a condition in other cases. The involved countries usually responded that nothing could force them to accept another perpetually operating military commission of control.

The same way the League of Nations wasn't ready to exert military control until 1925, the consistence of the Committee of Guarantees wasn't set in stone either,¹³⁰ especially because the Little Entente states asked for admittance.¹³¹ Another reason against replacing the IMCC with the Committee of Guarantees was that the IMCC was the only puffer organization between Hungary, the Allies and the Little Entente and the Committee of Guarantees didn't seem to be the best organization for this task. The only thing Hungary could have gained from setting up the new commission was that the delegating countries would have taken over the costs.¹³²

125 HL Rapaich's Diary 31st December 1925, final report n. 2150/1925.

126 HL Rapaich's Diary 11th August 1925.

127 See Sz. Ormos, Mária, „Magyarország belépése a Nemzetek Szövetségébe” in *Századok* 91 (1957) p. 227-269.

128 AUSSME E-15, 124, 4. Marietti to OS of AS and to Romano Avezzana, 13th December 1922., n. 3110.; HL Rapaich's Diary 30th and 31st October 1922.

129 DBFP I/24 n. 213.

130 According to the plans, the Committee of Guarantee would have resider at Vienna with 7 members and would have received an authorisation to control Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. According to Rapaich, each officer of the IMCC at Budapest wished that the Hungarian Government say no for the setting up of the Committee, because they didn't want to move at Vienna. Naturally this enunciation must be considered with criticism, but probably Rapaich assessed the mood well, as the setup of the Committee of Guarantees would have meant another reduction of the personnel, and the “lucky” 7 people wouldn't have been lucky either, because they should have worked three times as much as before. HL Rapaich's Diary 5th December 1922.

131 AUSSME, E-8, 116, 5, Guzzoni. Guzzoni to Marietti, 26th January 1923. 15:00. telegram n. 518 and the same In: AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6.; AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Vassallo, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Romano Avezzana, 29th January 1923. 0:13., telegram n. 229/435.

132 DBFP I/24 n. 292.

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By exploiting fascism's coming to power in Italy, the Little Entente states combined the Hungarian irredentist efforts with the aims of Fascist nationalisms, starting a press campaign against Hungarian-German and Hungarian-Italian collaborations in the last few months of 1922.¹³³ Even though there were real ties between the Bavarian nationalist circles¹³⁴ and Italian fascists,¹³⁵ Hungary couldn't have posed such a threat to either of the Little Entente states. The IMCC officers and the Budapest delegates of the Allied powers knew this already, so when Rumania, with Czechoslovakian assistance, tried to bestride the mood created by previous press campaigns and copy the Ruhr's Belgian-French occupation at Hungary's expense, they met open resistance after the first few indecisive opinions.¹³⁶ While the Allied powers formed their opinion, Foch got interested in the news about Hungarian mobilization,¹³⁷ the AMVC suggested the Ambassadors' Council to entrust the IMCC with clearing up the Hungarian situation.¹³⁸ In the mean time the IMCC had inspected the Rumanian border, or the areas of Debrecen, Békéscsaba, Mezőhegyes, Kiszombor and Szeged to precise. They couldn't find any signs of mobilization or concentration of troops and they reported this to both Belitska and Foch.¹³⁹ In 17 January 1923 the Ambassadors' Council labeled the Rumanian statements as exaggerations and considered the Rumanian preparations as provocation. While admitting that the Hungarians weren't innocent either, the IMCC was tasked with finding out the exact nature of the situation and the incident was thus closed.¹⁴⁰

This episode had been finished in the mind of the Allied powers by this point, but Rumania didn't accept the IMCC's report on 17 January.¹⁴¹ The Rumanian military maneuvers and the Little Entente demands didn't reach their aims because the Hungarian government could feel the support of the Allied powers and the incident slowly evolved into a conflict between the control organizations and the Rumanian authorities.¹⁴² The whole mission's goal was to reach the admittance of Little Entente officers into the Committee of Guarantees,¹⁴³ which the Allied powers opposed¹⁴⁴ so it's understandable that by 1923 their idea of establishing such a commission was deemed untimely by the English ambassador to Budapest.¹⁴⁵

By the end of March the whole conflict died down on its own because the old customs resumed in the information exchange of IMCC and Little Entente,¹⁴⁶ but then the discovery of the Kistétény, then the Hajmáskér weapon depots offered further reasons why the Little Entente should ask for admission into the military control of Hungary. The previously discussed issue became problematic during the negotiations for the Hungarian state loan, because the Little

133 ¹ *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, ser. 7., vol. I., Rome, 1953 (hereinafter DDI VII/1) n. 174, 175, 253, 268, 278, 319; ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1749, 8083. Castagneto to Mussolini, 27th December 1922. 21:00., telegram n. 6603/461.; ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1749, 8083. Barbaro, Italian charge d'affaires ad interim at Prague to Mussolininek, 31st December 1922., telegraph post n. 1749/720.; DBFP I/24 n. 240.; ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1749, 8083. Vassallo to Mussolini, 20th January 1923., telegraph post n. 293241/26.

134 Romsics, Ignác, „Bethlen István külpolitikája”, in: *Századok* 124 (1990) p. 586.; *Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez 1919-1945*, vol. II. *A fasiszta rendszer kiépítése és a népnyomor Magyarországon 1921-1924*. Ed. Nemes, Dezső, Budapest, 1956, p. 328-332.

135 „Feljegyzés egy magyar delegáció római tárgyalásairól 1922. november végén” Published by Ormos, Mária, in *Kutatási füzetek* 9, Pécs, 2002, p. 107-117.

136 DBFP I/24 n. 241, 242, 245, 247, 248, 249, 253; DBFP I/24 n. 261.; DDI VII/1 n. 337, 343, 363.

137 AUSSME E-8, 119, 11, 2. Foch to IMCC, 12th January 1923., telegram n. 26/2.

138 AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. AMCV's French Delegation to the Council of Ambassadors, 16th January 1923., without registration number

139 AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. IMCC to Belitska, 17th January 1923., note n. 678; AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Gerbore to Marietti to be transmitted, 22nd January 1923., folder n. 707, attached: IMCC to Foch, 20th January 1923., n. 698.

140 AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Marietti to Guzzoni and OS of AS. 20th January 1923., n. 136.

141 DBFP I/24 n. 257.

142 AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 5. Marietti to Guzzoni, 31st January 1923., cipher telegram n. 105 BTU; AUSSME, E-8, 116, 5, Guzzoni. Tappi to Guzzoni, 6th February 1923., n. 134 BTU.; AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Colonel Nicolosi to Marietti, 7th February 1923., n. 995., attached report of the Italian Military Attaché at Bucarest, 27th January 1923., n. 39; AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Guzzoni to Marietti and to OS of AS, 7th February 1923., n. 536.; AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. IMCC to Foch, 12th February 1923., n. 787.

143 AUSSME, E-8, 116, 5, Guzzoni and AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Guzzoni to Marietti, 26th January 1923. 15:00., telegram n. 518.; AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Vassallo to Romano Avezzana, 29th January 1923. 0:13. telegram n. 229/435.

144 AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 2. Mussolini transmits to Diaz the transcripts for the Legation at Budapest and for the Embassy of Paris of 11th February 1923, 1st March 1923., telegram n. 209847/292.; DBFP I/24 n. 271

145 DBFP I/24 n. 292.

146 AUSSME, E-8, 119, 6. Vaccari (Chief of the OS of AS) to MFA, 30th March 1923., n. 2688.

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Entente states now had a chance to cause real difficulties for the Hungarian demands. The problem was now perceived as a political issue, because after the IMCC got compensation from the Hungarian authorities for the Kecskemét incident, and the Hungarian government took measures to guarantee the commission's operations, Hungarian authorities could count on the support of England and Italy, so the state loan that became the basis for the monetary reconstruction was granted.

After granting the state loan, the MacDonald government's own foreign policy and economic interests¹⁴⁷ dictated that on 17 June 1924, the Council of the League of Nation's last meeting in May should discuss the methods of investigation per the suggestion of the British delegates. This was accompanied by pleas of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Austria and Hungary because they wanted to be represented during the hearings of this issue. Naturally the interested countries immediately started to lobby to get an invitation,¹⁴⁸ but the Council had not only asked the Permanent Advisory Commission¹⁴⁹ to continue its work and provide a solution to the Council, but also forwarded a question to a legal commission, inquiring whether the involved parties could even be invited into the Council.¹⁵⁰ Meanwhile the Little Entente once again voiced its opinion about getting an active part in the control of demilitarization. The Allied powers didn't accept this¹⁵¹ and the legal commission made the most correct decision in September 1924 when they locked out every interested party from the talks. The Council accepted the legal commission's opinion on 19 September 1924, then started to discuss the proposition of the PAC, which they accepted on 27 September 1924.

According to this decision the investigation was ordered by the Council, but the resolution was prepared by the PAC. This commission presented its investigation program every year. They used dispatches and reports which could be sent to the secretary general by any member. Members of the council could immediately petition this to the Council. During the discussion of the issue at the PAC, every state got a representation which wasn't a member of the Council, but shared a border with the investigated state. The inspection had to be carried out by the Investigation Commission, which the PAC assembled from a list of specialists, but the selected specialists had to equally represent the Council's member states (the list was approved by the Council). Every state was given a president, Hungary in particular received an English general whose mandate could be renewed. The president assembled his own program based on the instructions received from the Council, had free hand in the internal organization of the commission and the congregation of its members. The commission presidents could only stay at the inspected countries during the time of the investigation. The commission was only interested in stating the facts, petitioning them to the Council and the PAC. The commission's costs were paid by the League of Nations.

The Council discussed the issue of investigation in March 1925, then accepted the executive resolutions on 14 March 1925. Going against the decision of the legal commission, Albert Apponyi sent a note of objection to the secretary general on 22 September 1924 and repeated the same thing through the Minister to Rome. He passed on another note of objection to the Council's president on 8 December 1924. In his answer, issued on 12 December 1924, the president of the Council sanctioned the legal commission's decision without any further explanation.¹⁵² The only reason for

147 As soon as the League of Nations had taken the military control, they had reduced the expenses of the Hungarian Government, allowing the re-location of English loans. The further investigation of the League of Nations, after the State loan of 1924, had allowed a further penetration of the English capital in the region. MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1924-35/4-1663 (n. 82.)

148 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1924-35/4-1663 (n. 40.). Kiss from Sofia to Daruváry, Kánya, Khuen-Héderváry and Kuhl, 4th June 1924., telegram n. 40.; MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1924-35/4-1663 (n. 41.). Kiss from Sofia to Daruváry, Kánya, Khuen-Héderváry and Kuhl, 5th June 1924., telegram n. 41.; MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1924-35/4-1663 (n. 3.) Bornemissza from Geneva to from Sofia to Daruváry, Kánya, Khuen-Héderváry, Kuhl and Császár Ministerial Counsellor, 12th June 1924.

149 Hereinafter PAC

150 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1927-35/4-2366. Information of MFA about the military control and investigation, 1st January 1927, 2366/pol.-1927.

151 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1924-35/4-2368. Rubido-Zichy to Daruváry, Kánya, Khuen-Héderváry, and Kuhl, 21st June 1924., telegram n. 169. The MFA transmits to the Department Eln. D of the Ministry of Defence, 22nd July 1924., n. 2368. pol.

152 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1927-35/4-2366. Information of MFA about the military control and investigation, 1st January 1927, 2366/pol.-1927.

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complaint could have been the fact that all the neighbors of the investigated state were represented in the PAC during the discussion of the issue, but this couldn't have been attacked so easily, so the Hungarian government only made the occasional complaints to the League of Nations. This naturally had no effect at all, since the League of Nations' Council named the presidents of the commissions: the Hungarian investigation commission was presided by British Major-General Kirke.¹⁵³

The discussions around the investigation show, that the solution of permanent military control was largely affected by the behavior of Germany rather than the reaction of the smaller states. The involvement of neighboring countries was in the interest of French but not because of the Little Entente, but because of Germany. After the already mentioned conditions were partially fulfilled, the liquidation of Germany's IMCC was prepared in accordance with the signing of the Locarno pact. It's no coincidence that shortly after the settling of Locarno, the German government sent a confidential note to the secretary-general concerning the investigation on 19 January 1926 and these pleas were heard. After Germany was admitted to the League of Nations in September 1926, the December 1926 meeting of the council loosened up on the investigations' stipulations.¹⁵⁴ There's also no coincidence in the fact that the basis of the discussions around the disbanding of the Hungarian IMCC began with the 18 December 1925 collective note of the Allied Powers, which specified the conditions of the liquidations immediately after the signing of the Locarno pact.

Chamberlain had already sent Benes to Mussolini in the second half of October 1925 when he took over the idea of signing an Austrian-Hungarian-Czechoslovakian-Rumanian-Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian security pact.¹⁵⁵ From the end of November, the Foreign Office purposefully tried to set up an Eastern Locarno among these countries with British support and Italian patronage.¹⁵⁶ The plan seemed feasible due to the weakened French positions and it would have expanded the League of Nations' jurisdiction with an increase of British positions as the local IMCC would have been replaced by the investigation commissions of the League of Nations. But the Eastern Locarno based on Italy's concepts seemed unfeasible which Chamberlain realized by February 1925, by the next month he gave up on the strategy of supporting only the Italians against the French in the Middle-European region.¹⁵⁷ The process of liquidating the Hungarian IMCC had already started by this point.

On 15 June 1925, when Guzzoni returned from his service at the Ministry of War to take over the presidency of IMCC from Campana, he asked for an audience at the Minister of National Defence. Rapaich noted that Guzzoni wanted to tell Kocsárd Janky that Badoglio has returned as chief of staff¹⁵⁸ and that he "had the best interest for Hungarians".¹⁵⁹ Pro-Hungarian sentiments notwithstanding, Badoglio's support of an Italian-French agreement and his good relationship with Alexandru Averescu, who became the PM of Rumania in March 1926, made him noted in these times. But the claims had a ring of truth to them, because Italy's successes in Albania had deteriorated the Italian-Yugoslavian relationships by April 1925 and with France pushing the Italians out of Czechoslovakia, it became clear that breaking the French hegemony in the Little Entente's guardianship seemed impossible, thus forming an anti-Yugoslavian network of alliance received top priority. Italy had to break away from his politically correct behavior and had to side with the defeated countries to a greater degree. Right up to the summer of 1925, the Italian foreign policy's favored Hungary only to a

153 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1927-35/4-2366. Information of MFA about the military control and investigation, 1st January 1927, 2366/pol.-1927.

154 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1927-35/4-2366. Information of MFA about the military control and investigation, 1st January 1927, 2366/pol.-1927.

155 DBFP I/27 n. 551.; DBFP Ia/1 n. 39. and 40.

156 DBFP Ia/1 n. 119; Pastorelli, Pietro, *Italia e Albania 1924-1927. Origini diplomatiche del Trattato di Tirana del 22 novembre 1927*, Firenze, 1967, p. 236-259.

157 Pastorelli, 1967, p. 255-256.

158 From 5th May 1925 the General Pietro Badoglio was at the same time Chief of the Army Staff and Joined Chief of Staff.

159 HL Rapaich's Diary 15th June 1925.

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degree that didn't raise the doubt of Little Entente states, so it only tried to keep the peace treaty by making the military control bearable and not so strict.

Because the Locarno procedure had already started, the Italian foreign policy could only choose between two options.

– Either it put together a mutual security pact on the East under its own patronage by exploiting the increased British support

– or polarize the Italian-Yugoslavian disagreement in Albania and use encircling tactics to neutralize the uncomfortable neighbor to the East.

In the first case the IMCC had to be disbanded so that that League of Nations could take over its place, making the organization in British interest much stronger,¹⁶⁰ while in the second case the rearmament of Hungary had to be supported, which also required the cancelling of the permanent commission of control. Both version would have ended with the IMCC disbanding, so Guzzoni was sent back to Hungary with these concepts in mind. The process had to be sped up.

The first option was supported by the British, so it's no wonder that both Britain's and Italy's interests dictated the smothering up of the Szombathely incident in the end of July 1925. The winds of change also reached France, who replaced Colonel Le Bleu as the head of the French delegation in December 1925 after a lot of negotiations. The Budapest delegates of the Entente states wrote a collective note in this "Locarno mood" on 18 December 1918, which specified the conditions under which the control could ended. The Hungarian response on 5 January 1926 agreed with the idea on a theoretical level, but asked for the exact date of a deadline. The Ambassadors' Council only gave an oral response because they made the decision dependant on the Hungarian government's behavior.

The talks of Rapaich and the IMCC began in January 1926 and the resolutions were sent to Paris. The IMCC's own transcript on 31 March 1926 let the Hungarian government know that the control should be continued with the agreement in mind. The government agreed (we're talking about the final, closing inspections here) and the missions restarted on 16 April 1926 with the following intentions:

- to compensate for the missing headcount among the military crew
- the issue of the officers' positions
- and the issue of the unified war material factory.

These problems were settled through the Ambassadors' Council's three notes issued in December 1926, which were based on decree C.A. 305/III. concerning the headcount on 27 November 1926 and C.A. 305/IV. About the war material factory on 27 November 1927.¹⁶¹

The requests were granted before 1927, the recruitment of the recruits already followed the new methods on 1 January 1927, thus the Hungarian government had their Parisian ambassador send the Ambassadors' Council a note in which they requested the IMCC's recall. The Little Entente ambassadors also passed on a note in which they asked the Ambassadors' Council to contact the Little entente states before answering the request. The talks were dragging, but the Ambassadors' Council finally worded its response with British and Italian support 28 March 1927, addressing Frigyes Korányi. The response stated that the IMCC would end its operations on 31 March, but the members of the commission would stay until 31 May to prepare the reports while the issue of the war material factory would be supervised by an assigned Italian officer (Campana).¹⁶²

160 As a sign of this, the AMCV invited at the same time the IMCC at Budapest and at Berlin to compile the general progress report, which was the prologue to the dissolution of the IMCCs. HL Rapaich's Diary 30th June 1925.

161 See the resolutions at AUSSME E-15, 121, 4.

162 MOL K 63, bundle n. 301, 1927-35/4-2366. Information of MFA about the military control and investigation, 1st January 1927, 2366/pol.-1927.

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Each resolution had of a political undertone, because the issue of war material factory was handled with a symbolic gesture, while everybody new that the IMCC's recall would only make the recruitment more open. The reports seem really flippant knowing that the Hungarian government had to accept them just to get rid of the IMCC, the only organization that could supervise the adherence to the points. The real question is that after the failure of the Eastern Locarno became obvious in March 1926, why didn't the English delegation make stricter demands. It was obvious that the League of Nations' inspections would be more permissive than the occasionally criticized IMCC¹⁶³ and the British government, as opposed to the Italians, had no interest in the rearmament of the Hungarian army.

There are no definite answers to this questions, two reasons may be at play here:

– it could have been expected that the Little Entente would still have retentive powers after the League of Nations' inspection started, so Austria could have been the only source of Hungarian weapon imports and the Austrian IMCC was only disbanded in 1929.¹⁶⁴ This meant there was a possibility to keep an eye on the Army's operations even after the liquidation of the Hungarian IMCC, even if this observation could only be carried out from across the border.

– after agreeing to the liquidation of the German IMCC, backing down in Hungary would have jeopardized the credibility of the League of Nations, plus it could have lead to the equal indignation of all smaller countries.

After the Eastern Locarno failed in the spring of 1926, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs returned to the concept of inter-state treaties and began an open race with French to tie more Eastern European countries to itself. Italy had obviously given up on the pro-Yugoslavian foreign policy and initiated a politics of encircling. This turn of events lead to the Italian-Rumanian and Italian-Albanian treaties of friendship and the Italian-Greek trade treaty of 1926, plus the Italian-Hungarian treaty of friendship in 1927.¹⁶⁵ The changes in foreign politics significantly reevaluated the significance of disbanding IMCC. This would have meant giving free hand to the controlled states and re-armament became a possibility without an Eastern security contract. Yet the extent of this issue shouldn't be exaggerated, since the larger, thus more dangerous changes in power only happened in the second half of the 1930 and this was only possible due to the disruption of the entire European balance of power.

The League of Nations took over Hungary from the IMCC in 1 June 1927 with a rather dubious final report just to have its investigation system tested only a mere year later due to the weapon smuggling scandal at Szentgotthárd. But this already happened with a different method of inspection which does not fit into the topic of my study.

CONCLUSION

This study discussed the establishment, the functions and the liquidation of the IMCC. I cleared up the structure of the IMCC, highlighted its relationship to the Hungarian authorities and the framework with which it operated in foreign politics. This latter point begs the question about how successful the IMCC was and what the balance of its operations was.

Guzzoni and the likeminded English delegation correctly assumed that Hungary didn't really accept the Trianon Treaty and it would use every possibility to retain its original borders but it would also refrain from such an adventure until the arrival of the perfect occasion. As the president of IMCC, Guzzoni was sure that Hungary's economic, geographic and military position didn't allow for large mobilization or a war in the short run, plus the IMCC was carefully watching to avoid such a situation. He didn't negate that the Hungarian government showed several signs of a secret and slow preparations for an eventual war in the future and IMCC had a hard time to supervise these steps.¹⁶⁶

163 DBFP I/24 n. 303.

164 MOL K 63 1930-35-II. folder, 1929-35/4-1719 (n. 2351.)

165 Pastorelli, 1967, p. 278-279.

166 DDI VII/1 n. 278.; DBFP I/24 n. 240.; AUSSME, E-8, 118, 3, 6. Guzzoni to Marietti, 17th January 1923., n. 508., attached: Guzzoni to OS and ID of AS, 17th January 1923., n. 507.; AUSSME, E-8, 116, 5, Guzzoni. Guzzoni to Tappi. 26. January 1923., private letter.

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We should appraise the operations of IMCC based on its own declared purposes and in light of the above conditions, it completely fulfilled the original expectations. The string of inspections was meant to guarantee a constant control and they only had to deal with the most extreme cases. Even though the English delegation articulated some criticism about the Italians being overtly pro-Hungarian,¹⁶⁷ the aims mentioned above were completed with the support of the English and the Italian delegation, plus the minor resistance of the French delegation.

But concerning the adherence to the sections of the peace treaty, the IMCC was a complete failure because the army couldn't be disarmed in accordance with the peace treaty's points. It's also true that only the French delegation had such intents, and even they backed off on occasions. We should also remember that for more than half of its existence, the Hungarian IMCC delegation had to work with a deficient apparent and they never build up a proper intelligence service. Even the presidency didn't have the demand to adhere so strictly to the peace treaty according to the orders received from their own Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. This made even Colonel Le Bleu's attempts to prove Hungarian breaches of conduct fundamentally hopeless.

We must also add that members of the commission received generous fees even by their home counties' standards, gathering manifold of the average Hungarian payment that granted them luxurious conditions and not everybody could separate the work from the enjoyment of living in a foreign country.¹⁶⁸ These facts made every officer and worker of IMCC interested in extending the commission's operation for as long as possible. From the perspective of foreign policy, there were no real alternatives to the IMCC until March 1925, when the League of Nations agree on the specifics of conducting investigations. After this point, the IMCC's disbanding was only a matter of time as the process of liquidation was started. While the completion of this task took several years, the process was also hindered by the interference of foreign politics. Despite the British claims,¹⁶⁹ only the French foreign politics had an interest in expanding the IMCC's operations ad infinitum, simply because they were the only ones who wouldn't have had any connections to Hungary after the disbanding of the IMCC.

In conclusion, the IMCC was working for compromised goals and fulfilled its own goals only partially, allowing the Royal Hungarian Army to not waste their time during the years of military control.

Keywords: Treaty of Trianon, military commission of control, Hungary, Little Entente, Italy, foreign policy

167 DBFP I/24 n. 303

168 HL Rapaich's Diary 26th June 1922.; The "drinking-bout" at Budapest of the officers of IMCC was deeply engraved in the public awareness, namely in Antal Szerb novel "Útas és Holdvilág". Written some 10 years after the dissolution of the IMCC, one of the novel's heroes named Eve had a lot of fun with the "Entente officers". See Szerb, Antal, *Útas és Holdvilág*, Budapest, [2005]¹³, p. 75-75.

169 DBFP I/27 n. 23.

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APPENDICES

1st Appendix: Changes in the number of IMCC's members¹⁷⁰

	5th 1921	August Percentage	22nd March 1922	Percentage	Reduction of 1st personnel	of 1st September 1922	Percentage
Italians (interpreters)	129	(+3 55,3%	60	50,8%	-53,5%	17	44,7%
French	60	25,7%	34	28,8%	-43,3%	12	31,6%
English (interpreters)	38	(+2 16,3%	20	16,9%	-47,5%	6	15,8%
Japanese	6	2,6%	3	2,5%	- 50%	3	7,9%
Total	233		118			38	

2nd Appendix: The payments and its compensations¹⁷¹

	English delegation	French delegation	Japanese delegation	Italian delegation
General	-	-	-	5026,38 lira
Colonel	71,7 pound 5 penny	1757 franc centime	50 300 yen (1860 fr. franc)	4100,42 lira
Lieutenant-Colonel	-	-	-	3483,41 lira
Major	54 pound	1732,50 franc	-	3065,25 lira
Captain	-	-	175 yen (1225 fr. franc)	2009,35 lira
Lieutenant	-	-	-	-
2nd Lieutenant	-	800 franc	-	1654,4 lira
Sergeant	22 pound 10 penny	565,50 franc	-	1265,47 lira
Non-commissioned Officer	9 pound	103,50 franc	-	995,88 lira
Soldiers	7 pound 10 penny	50 franc	-	649,59 lira

170 Each source has a different data about the fluctuation of the members, so to compile the chart, I've used the official statements of the IMCC. ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1759, 8153. CMIC Rapport de fin d'operations (1921-1927)

171 MOL K 99, 3. Hungarian MFA to the Legation at Rome, 19th July 1922., n. 23.143/1922.; HL Rapaich's Diary 9th January and 15th March 1924., 7th January 1925.

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1 British pound equaled 5500 Hun. Korona / 100 French francs equaled 10000 Hun. Korona / 100 Italian liras equaled 5000 Hun. Korona

The Ambassadors' Council with the resolution number C.A.167/III. of 22th February 1922 decided that each member of the commission should receive the following compensations:

General as President	209.731 hungarian korona a month
Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel as head of a Delegation	154.539 hungarian korona a month
Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major as head of a Subcommission	110.384 hungarian korona a month
Major	99.345 hungarian korona a month
Captain, Lieutenant, 2nd Lieutenant	93.827 hungarian korona a month
Non-commissioned Officers	50.997 hungarian korona a month
Soldiers	30.920 hungarian korona a month

	The salary in hungarian korona for a month of					
	Of the Italian Delegation	Of the English Delegation	Of the French Delegation	Of the Japanese Delegation	In Hungary	
The President / Governor	460 000 (Gen. Zuccari)	-	-	-	250 000	(Miklós Horthy)
A General	-	-	-	-	10 000	
A Colonel	460 000	545 000	331 000	341 000		
A Captain	194 000	-	-	220 000	5 800	
The Soldiers	63 000	70 000	36 000	-	-	

Since 1st January 1924 all expenses were paid as part of the Hungarian reparations.

3rd Appendix: The expenses of the delegations¹⁷²

	For a month (original value)	For a month (converted to value of 1st January 1925)
At 21st February 1922	25 599 000 korona	1 061 199 306 korona
At September 1922	17 195 000 korona	315 850 000 korona

¹⁷² Kemény, Ferenc, „Harminchárom milliárdba került Magyarországnak a katonai ellenőrzés három és fél alatt” in *Pesti Hírlap* 47 (1925) n. 1. (1st January) p. 1–2. The values are the result of the Hungarian calculations. As a comparison, on 8th March 1923 Hohler, the English Ambassador to Budapest estimated the expenses of the IMCC to be 10 000 pounds a year, which corresponds more or less to 150 000 000 korona. The difference between the two calculations is roughly 50 000 korona. DBFP I/24 n. 292. Probably the dates of Kemény are more truthful, namely Campana acknowledged tacitly the accuracy of the information when he had only one objection, that the article didn't mention, that since 1st January 1924 all expenses were paid as part of the reparations. HL Rapaich's Diary 7th and 9th January 1925.

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At 7th June 1924	687 000 000 korona	687 713 000 korona
Between 1st July 1924 and 1st January 1925	663 500 000 korona	663 460 000 korona

4th Appendix: The composition of the subcommittees sent to the Western border of Hungary¹⁷³

	Nationality	First group	Additional personnel
Officers	Italian	11	2
	French	8	1
	English	7	-
Soldiers	Italian	36	1
	French	16	1
	English	14	-

5th Appendix: How to divide the incomes from the selling of uncovered munitions

United Kingdom:	12%
France:	15%
Japan:	3%
Italy:	70%

173 ASDMAE AP (1919-1930), 1759, 8153. CMIC Rapport de fin d'operations (1921-1927)