

## THE CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD: LESSONS FROM THE PAST RELEVANT TODAY. POLAND, LITHUANIA, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN AN EXTENDED ROKKANIAN PERSPECTIVE

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### Abstract

*This article analyzes the democratization processes in interwar Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in a refined Rokkanian fashion. My work represents a preliminary effort to explain diverse democratic outcomes in Poland, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia (CSR) through Rokkan's explicative factors: economy, culture, territory, and politics. First, Why in Poland and Lithuania did the newly-established institutions collapse while in Czechoslovakia they did not? How does the model work with CEE cases? More functionally, is it possible to properly use this working model outside its defined boundaries? I try to answer these questions according to Rokkan's theoretical traits which define (the timing and the strength of) democratization processes. My findings suggest that some structural characteristics of the polities powerfully impact the chances for democratic survival. In particular, 1) the continuity of representative rule, 2) the style of government of the elites vis-à-vis the counter-elites, 3) the degree of*

*formal/informal protection for religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities, 4) the religious heritage, and 5) the geopolitical dimension of the country clearly arise as the most fundamental elements of my analysis. My work primarily looks at the interwar period, but to a certain extent calls into cause still open aspects. I assume that an in-depth analysis of the events which characterized the CEE polities in the 1920s-1930s and of their historical sources might well provide a good venture point for a more aware understanding of the recent developments and of the current dynamics in post-Communist Europe.*

### 1. Introduction

In order to properly analyze the fate of democracy in the interwar CEE region it is important to have a preliminary look at the state of things in the area and at the dramatic developments which took place there in the early 1920s. Following the political earthquake originated by the end of WWI, a number of old and newly-established states adopted democratic constitutions. In CEE the latter represented the overwhelming majority. The new statehoods directly originated from the breakdown of the four European multinational empires (say, the German, the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires) and from the very

beginning of their independent life parliamentary regimes and democratic political systems were instituted<sup>1</sup>. During the interwar period these states shared some common institutional and political characteristics and faced a number of similar internal and external challenges. First, most of them presented a relevant degree of ethnic segmentation, thereby displaying a significant presence of religious and linguistic minorities within their boundaries. They attempted to forge a sense of common belonging and to foster loyalties towards the new statehood along ethno-territorial or functional lines. It is possible to distinguish between two patterns of nation-building process in interwar CEE. Those national leaderships which struggled to settle an ethnically homogeneous nation by excluding minorities from political life and those which attempted to establish an inclusive pluriethnic polity. Second, the national elites had to fortify the institutional basis of their political legitimacy with regard to both internal and external threats. Therefore they had to secure democratic stability to the young liberal institutions while facing internal political instability and external threats from regional powers and aggressive neighbors. From an institutional perspective, most of the new CEE democracies adopted constitutions inspired by the Third

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<sup>1</sup> Albania adopted a democratic constitution in 1921, Bulgaria in 1921, Czechoslovakia in 1920, Estonia in 1920, Hungary in 1921, Latvia in 1920, Lithuania in 1922, Poland in 1921, and Romania in 1923.

French Republic and the Weimar Republic, thereby vesting most of the authority in the legislature and introducing proportional representation (PR). Given the authoritarian past, the main constitutional aim of the elites concerned the weakening of the executive. Throughout the formative period (from the 1919 Treaty of Versailles to the 1929 World economic crisis) a deep “Weimarization” of the institutional life took place<sup>2</sup>. These political systems proved to be unstable and fragile in most of CEE states, where the democratic regimes did not survive the interwar period. The breakdown generally came in the form of a series of military takeovers<sup>3</sup>. To put it simply, all the CEE states experienced the rise of authoritarian regimes with the relevant exception of Czechoslovakia, which represented the only democratic survivor of the region. My analysis includes Poland, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia and addresses itself to the development and the outcomes of democratic processes in interwar CEE, thereby aiming at explaining why

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<sup>2</sup> Giovanni Sartori, “European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism,” in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton University Press, 1976), 137-176.

<sup>3</sup> In Romania and in Yugoslavia the overthrow were piloted by the Monarchy respectively in 1920 and 1929, in Poland by Marshall Józef Piłsudski in May 1926, in Lithuania by Antanas Smetona again in 1926, in Hungary by Admiral Miklós Horthy, in Estonia by PM Konstantin Päts in 1934, and in Latvia by PM Kārlis Ulmanis in 1934.

democratic institutions in Poland and Lithuania collapsed, while in Czechoslovakia they did not. To do this I rely on several analytical tools provided by Rokkan's conceptual map of Europe, which represents an attempt to match the process of state- and nation-building with conditions for democratic survival by means of four critical barriers modeled by a peculiar mix of factors: economy (E), territory (T), culture (C), and politics (P). Rokkan developed his models with regard to Western Europe. Here I wish to functionally extend its validity beyond its original boundaries. Practically, I will try to expand some of Rokkan's assumptions by adapting his historical and territorial dimensions in an unconventional fashion. Rokkan produced an impressive amount of contributions consistent with my analytical needs. I will therefore rely on four major sources, that is, *The Structuring of Mass Politics in the Smaller European Democracies: A developmental Typology* (Rokkan, 1968), *Nation-Building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass Politics* (Rokkan, 1970), and *Building States and Nations* (Rokkan and Eisenstadt, 1973). In addition a useful reorganization of Rokkan's original works is provided by Peter Flora (1999) *State Formation, Nation-building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan*.

My analytical aim is particularly relevant even with regard to the re-establishment of democracy in the former Soviet bloc and their recent

ever-increasing participation in the European integrative experience. A similar democratic euphoria has already occurred throughout the continent in the aftermath of the WWI. However, twenty years later most of the democratic regimes had collapsed under the impact of authoritarian pressures. What went wrong? A full awareness of the past failures is a vital element for understanding contemporary Europe. In the words of Seymour Lipset

should the western world experience a major crisis, it is likely that national politics will vary along lines that stem from the past, much as they did during the 1930s. Political scientists of the future, who seek to explain events [...] will undoubtedly find important explanatory variables in earlier variations in the behavior of the major political actors<sup>4</sup>.

To put it simply, a number of problems from the past still influence today's dynamics.

Following Lipset, my core questions are therefore even more relevant when we look at the current state of CEE. The consequences of the collapse of the Soviet system and the process of democratization together with the course of European reunification under the EU umbrella made most of the hot dimensions tackled in this work extremely relevant. Although the formal

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<sup>4</sup> Seymour M. Lipset, "Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Working-class Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 77 (1: 1983), 16.

democratic requirements have been generally met, the degree of substantial success varies greatly from country to country. In several CEE countries the passage from theory to practice is still an open matter in terms of political inclusion of the masses, development of the civil society, and definition of minority rights. The analytical questions posed by this article might well offer a helpful interpretative lens for understanding today's difficulties as well. As far as the establishment of inclusive liberal-democracies in CEE, several long-standing issues once again have to be mindfully tackled. They survived the Communist age and - to a certain extent - have been frozen by the authoritarian experience. Following the fall of the Soviet system, these factors found greater room. The most frequently observed seem to be the rise of ethno-nationalism, religious rebirth, extreme political polarization, lack of political accountability and low level of citizens' civil and political awareness. Most of these ingredients conditioned the CEE democratic experiences between the mid-1920s. They seem to denote a long-lasting persistence and a somewhat strong "survival capacity". In the words of Paul Blokker, still relevant factors from the past coupled with post-Communist widespread civic alienation generated "a link between populism as a general phenomenon in modern societies and Eastern European nationalism"<sup>5</sup>. A more precise

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<sup>5</sup> Paul Blokker, "Populist Nationalism, Anti-Europeanism, Post-nationalism, and the East-West Distinction," *German Law*

awareness of the past successes and failures might well improve our capacity of understanding the current dynamics when problems of the same nature are at stake.

Methodologically, this article represents an effort to shift Rokkan's model of democratic development eastwards, thereby aiming at identifying the factors which impacted the outcomes of democratic attempts in CEE. Therefore my goal appears to be twofold. The functional side of the coin concerns the extension of Rokkan's model towards CEE. This step will provide the theoretical lens to carry out the analytical side of the research, that is, the understanding of democratic successes.

The article is structured as follows. In the first part I will conceptualize the object of analysis. I will then move on to Rokkan's geopolitical/territorial, economic, cultural, and religious dimensions together with his four critical *thresholds* which define the timing and the strength of democratization. A few words will be spent on the nature of democratic expansion in the interwar period with particular emphasis on the specificities

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*Journal* 6 (2: 2005): 377; See also Othon Anastasakis, "Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent Trends," *The Hellenic Observatory* Discussion Paper No. 3/2000. Retrieved from: <http://uiforum.uaeforum.org/showthread.php?t=2260>; Attila Agh, *The Politics of Central Europe* (SAGE Publications Ltd., 1998), chap. 1.

of interwar CEE. In the second part I will analyze the fate of democracy in Poland, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia, thereby trying to emphasize the intrinsic motives which determined extremely different democratic performances within slightly similar settings. In the final part, I will develop some general conclusions in this respect.

## I. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

### 1. Rokkan's Model of Democratic Development

Rokkan's concern with the democratization process in Western Europe mainly consists of three *explicanda*: 1) the institutional development of democracy<sup>6</sup>; 2) the rise of authoritarian regimes<sup>7</sup>; 3) the development of party systems<sup>8</sup>. Provided my analytical aims, I will turn my attention to the first and the second dimensions. This implies "a

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<sup>6</sup> Stein Rokkan, "The Structuring of Mass Politics in the Smaller European Democracies: A Developmental Typology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10 (2: 1968): 173-210; and "Nation-building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass Politics," in *Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development*, ed. Angus Campbell, Per Torsvik, and Henry Valen, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), chap. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Peter Flora, *State Formation, Nation-building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan*, (OUP Oxford University Press, 1999), 345-361.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 361-448.

parsimonious description of *the critical steps in the development and structuring of competitive mass politics*"<sup>9</sup> in Europe. I will then attempt to match Rokkan's theoretical concepts with actual political and socio-cultural characteristics of interwar Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland. Rokkan's dependent variable is represented by four institutional thresholds of democratization. Four major factors (economy, territory, culture, and politics) correspond to his independent variables, thereby affecting the timing of democratization and "thresholds interlocking" in each polity. The set of variables which allegedly determine the fate of democracy consists of an economic dimension (E) that regards the timing and the strength of the capitalist rise, a territorial dimension (T) that defines the geopolitical setting, the territorial consolidation and the timing of the national unification, a cultural dimension (C) concerning the outcome of the reformation, the degree of societal differentiation, and the church-state relations, and a political dimension (P) regarding the characteristics of party systems and institutional features. According to Ersson, "among the four sets of independent variables *territory and culture seem to have a greater impact on the dependent variables than economy and politics*"<sup>10</sup>. However,

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<sup>9</sup> Rokkan, "The Structuring of Mass Politics," 174

<sup>10</sup> Svente Ersson, "Revisiting Rokkan: On the Determinants of the Rise of Democracy in Europe," *Historical Social Research* 20 (2: 1995): 178.

considering a number of specific remarks raised by Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, I decided not to take for granted the role of politics as such<sup>11</sup>.

The dependent side of my relationship is defined by the course of democratization in terms of Rokkan's thresholds of legitimation, incorporation, representation, and executive power<sup>12</sup>. Once the first threshold is lowered, new pressures rise for changes in the others (See Appendix 1). The timing of this course differs from country to country. In the words of Sir Lewis Namier, these institutional thresholds "allow the rising socio-cultural forces to flow further through the established channels of system but also make it possible to stem the tide, to keep back the flood"<sup>13</sup>. As far as the development of democratic institutions and the process of mass mobilization are concerned, it follows that "any rising political movement has to pass through a series of locks on its way

inwards towards the core of political system, upwards towards the central arena of decision-making"<sup>14</sup>.

The first two thresholds guarantee the minimal preconditions for democracy. The other steps do not appear to be strictly necessary, however they concur to fortify the democratic process: "in the European context the introduction of PR formulas [and parliamentary regimes] has often been one component in the battle for establishing a democratic regime"<sup>15</sup>. Rokkan identifies two idealtypes of democratization processes: the English model of slow, incremental political enfranchisement without reversal but characterized by long periods of formal inequalities and the French model, marked by sudden universalization of rights and liberties but with frequent reversals.

## **2. The Democratic Wave in Interwar Central and Eastern Europe: Why Poland-Lithuania and Czechoslovakia?**

A clear distinction shall be made between those European countries with a historical tradition of state building and those which originated from the process of dismantling the European empires from 1878<sup>16</sup> to 1919<sup>17</sup> (see

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<sup>11</sup> Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Gisele De Meur, "Conditions of Democracy in Interwar Europe – A Boolean Test of Major Hypotheses," *Comparative Politics* 26 (3: 1994), 253-279.

<sup>12</sup> The first threshold defines the extension of political rights and civil liberties through the introduction of liberal reforms. The second implies the introduction of male (and female) universal suffrage in free and fair elections. The third facilitates the parliamentarization of new political interests through the introduction of PR. The fourth ties parliamentary strength and executive power, thereby formalizing parliamentary democracy.

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<sup>14</sup> Rokkan, "The Structuring of Mass Politics," 180.

<sup>15</sup> Ersson, "Revisiting Rokkan," 172.

<sup>16</sup> In 1878 the Treaty of Berlin (following the Russo-Turkish war) recognized Romania as an independent state. The same year after the Treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria became an autonomous principality.

Figure 1). In his original framework on 18 Western European states, Rokkan mainly considered the former. Finland, which seceded from the ashes of the Russian Empire in 1917, and the Irish Free State, which gained formal independence from the British Empire in 1922, represent the only exception. Most of the newly-established sovereign statehoods adopted democratic constitutions and parliamentary regimes. Among them eleven CEE countries: Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia (seceded from the Russian Empire), Austria, Czechoslovakia (from the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire), Poland (reunified after the 1795 partition), Romania, Greece, and Germany.

### Figure 1 - Spheres of Influence of the Eastern Empires



Adapted from Aarebrot and Berglund, 1995.

A relevant portion of the so-called “first democratic wave” lasting from 1828 to 1926 took place in CEE. According to Huntington’s *The Third Wave* (1993) a relevant number of devolved countries shifted from authoritarian to democratic regimes in the early 1920s. In that

<sup>17</sup> Aarebrot and Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation,” 213.

period no CEE country turned the opposite direction<sup>18</sup>. Yet twenty years later almost all these new democracies collapsed following the path of the first “reverse wave”. Greater attention should therefore be paid to interwar CEE, provided the particularities of democratic attempts in that region. In this respect, Rokkan’s model of democratic development seems to offer a reliable answer.

Rokkan’s model identifies two dimensions as the analytical basis for the mapping of democratization: 1) an East-West axis based on the strength of city networks and political centre formation; and 2) a North-South axis based on church/state relationships<sup>19</sup>. The E-W dimension is characterized by three types of polity: *city-belt states* in the middle, marked by commercial networks and lack of political role of the centre, surrounded by *Eastern* and *Western empires* with strong political centers and weak city networks<sup>20</sup>. The Western Empires (Britain, France and Spain) characterize themselves as political centers of early and strong formation. But what if we move a step ahead towards CEE? According to Aarebrot and Berglund

<sup>18</sup> Bulgaria represents the only exception. The democratic institutions collapsed in 1923 following a military coup led by Alexander Tsankov’s fascist Unity Party (Bulgarian: *Naroden Sgovor*).

<sup>19</sup> Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, *The politics of territorial identity: studies in European regionalism*, (London: Sage, 1982), 30 and Flora, *State Formation*, 210.

<sup>20</sup> Flora, *State Formation*, 205-218

a territorial classification of [the Eastern] empires must take into consideration imperial aspirations and confrontation as a primary criterion. Prussia-Germany and Austria-Hungary we will consider *defense empires*, built up militarily over the centuries to defend Europe against incursions from the Eurasian steppes. Nevertheless both of those defense systems went through a considerable state-building experience at least with respect to their core territories<sup>21</sup>.

It follows that Russia and the Ottoman Empire characterize as *external state-entities* with aspirations to expand their power into Europe. From this perspective the territories seceded from Western empires and defense empires fall into the broader *Charlemagne Heritage*<sup>22</sup>.

Rokkan defines the *devolved states* as those “generated through territorial separation and succession from 1814”<sup>23</sup> up to the early 1920s. I will however focus on those territories that gained statehood in the aftermath of WWI. Aarebrot and Berglund identify two types of CEE devolved states: 1) those generated by the collapse of the eastern

defense empires after the peace treaty of Versailles (i.e. Czechoslovakia and Polish regions of Galicja and Poznan); 2) those seceded from the external empires after the Balkan wars and the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Versailles (i.e. Lithuania and the so-called Congress Poland).

Here I focus on a limited number of cases which – taken together - seem to share many essential characteristics with most of the interwar CEE statehoods. I will say more about this specific point in the next paragraph. In particular, following the rules of the “ladder of abstraction”, I wish to keep my analysis detailed enough, while preserving the possibility of further generalization outside my analytical borders. The features of the cases taken into consideration guarantee a fairly good equilibrium between these essential analytical needs. In this respect Sartori maintains that the more cases, the fewer the properties of each that can be looked at; the fewer cases, the more properties<sup>24</sup>. The following work seems to provide an excellent trade-off between the number of cases analyzed, the speculative accuracy, and the number of attributes taken into consideration.

On the whole, my case selection process followed Rokkan’s original prescriptions accurately. Moreover,

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<sup>21</sup> Aarebrot and Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation,” 213.

<sup>22</sup> According to the *Charlemagne Heritage* identifies those states which have been influenced by the existence of the Holy Roman Empire in the early Middle Ages (Aarebrot and Berglund, 1995).

<sup>23</sup> Rokkan, “The Structuring of Mass Politics,” 182.

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<sup>24</sup> Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparativa Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 64 (4: 1991): 1033-1053.

Poland and Czechoslovakia share a number of common macrotraits which seem to characterize most of the CEE cases as well as similar (exogenous and endogenous) challenges to the young democratic regimes. They experienced long-standing national partition under the Great Powers and protracted periods of absolutism. All in all, despite a number of commonalities in the timing of the state-formation process and provided a comparable degree of ethno-cultural, religious, and political heterogeneity, in fact they adopted far different solutions which eventually produced opposite democratic outcomes. The cases analyzed in this article give the opportunity to assess how the impact of different degrees of liberalization and of political enfranchisement experienced by the area under the domination of the three major Empires determined the future developments of the newly-independent statehoods. The Austro-Russo-Prussian collage in Poland (and Lithuania) together with Austrian Czechia and Hungarian Slovakia present high degrees of structural variability which stem from the different nature of the ruling power. These subunits offer a wide range of endogenous and exogenous factors which seem to properly fit the majority of the democratic experiences in CEE. Borrowing Surazska's arguments on Poland, the three represent "a good case to test such a theory since at the time of the watersheds in European nation building, the countries was divided between three empires of diverse political cultures: Russia, Prussia, and

Austria-Hungary"<sup>25</sup>. Before moving on, the decision to include Lithuania in my analysis deserves a few words. It originates primarily from practical reasons: Polish and Lithuanian national courses went together for a long period, initially within the common framework of the Kingdom of Poland and afterwards under the Russian domination. As a consequence, an analysis of Poland without Lithuania would have been somehow incomplete, thereby presenting a structural lack of comprehensiveness.

Yet, a question appears to be essential: does an extended Rokkan's model of democratic development still hold? And how does it cope with CEE? Rokkan argues that "some elements [of his map] may be built into models for other regions of the world but *the basic structure of the model reflects a uniquely European experience*"<sup>26</sup>. In fact, the effective extension of his analysis is limited by the rigidity of those cultural and religious boundaries defined by the struggles between Reformers and the Roman Church as well as the consequent strains between secular and religious power (N-S dimension). Rokkan therefore distinguishes among Protestant, counter-reformatory, mixed or secularized countries as they emerged after the Treaties of Westphalia and

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<sup>25</sup> Wisla Surazska, "Central Europe in the Rokkanian Perspective," *Historical Social Research* 20 (2: 1995), 235.

<sup>26</sup> Rokkan, "The Structuring of Mass Politics," 175.

Osnabruck<sup>27</sup>. Czechoslovakia will be therefore considered as a fundamental part of the *Charlemagne Heritage*. Interwar Poland and Lithuania seem to share the Roman Catholic legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

## II. THREE COUNTRIES WITHIN ROKKAN'S FRAMEWORK

### 1. Three Historical Paths with an Eye at Rokkan's Factors

In the analysis which follows I am going to take into consideration two interconnected dimensions: 1) the country's position within E-W/N-S map; 2) the interaction between ETCP-factors and the lowering of the thresholds. Following Rokkan's categorization, all the three cases may be labeled as states of recent devolution from External or Eastern Empires. In this section I will define the peculiar traits of the Rokkanian factors which are supposed to have played an essential role in the lowering of the four thresholds and – more in general – in determining the fate of democracy in CEE.

A sense of elite-based national awareness and a territorial dimension of Polishness emerged in the early 1200s. The fundamental ethno-cultural lines of the Polish nation appeared to be already

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<sup>27</sup> For that reason, I decided not to include those states seceded from Russian and Ottoman empires which appear to be *strongly* affected by Orthodox as well as Muslim legacy (like Ukraine and Albania) in order to keep my analysis unbiased.

defined in the early XIII century<sup>28</sup>. Both Polish and Lithuanian historical developments appear to be strongly affected by the legacy of medieval representative traditions under the Piasts and Jagiellons and of the Golden Freedom period, marked by the sovereign power of the Commonwealth Sejm (perpetrated through the procedure of unanimous consent) and by a high degree of local autonomy<sup>29</sup>. The minimal efforts of centralization from the weak centre represented another typical trait of the Polish *city-belt state*. Everything changed after the breakdown of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under successive joint attacks from the three Eastern Empires. From 1795 onwards, the three partitioned areas faced protracted periods of absolutist rule (i.e. impact of Rokkan's *geopolitical dimension*). Congress Poland (the eastern part of the country) and Lithuania – Finland - experienced weak forms of indirect estate representation and pervasive autocratic domination under the Tzarist rule and were deeply marked by Russian political and economic backwardness. Similarly, the region of Wielkopolska turned into the Prussian Duchy of Poznan and willy-nilly followed the Prussian path towards the extension of political rights from the so-

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<sup>28</sup> Brian A. Porter, "Who is a Pole and Where is Poland? Territory and Nation in the Rhetoric of Polish National Democracy before 1905," *Slavic Review* 51 (4: 1992): 639-653.

<sup>29</sup> Each voivodship had its own assembly (*Sejmik*) which exercised semi-independent political power.

called “three-class” system in 1849 to the introduction of universal, *equal*, and secret suffrage for all men of age in 1867. While the thresholds of legitimation and incorporation were therefore lowered in the mid-1800s, the other barriers were maintained as “the people might elect representatives to the Reichstag but the representatives had only minimal influence on the German Executive”<sup>30</sup>. Galicia, subject to the Austrian half of Habsburg dual monarchy, experienced a moderate degree of political enfranchisement after 1867 constitutional reform, thereby having “its own elected parliament and local government. [...] Those representative institutions gave the Poles the first training in political participation”<sup>31</sup>. This provided the region with a relatively developed party politics. Yet the political centre slowed down a fully-fledged mass mobilization since

universal democratization and federalization beyond the *Ausgleich* achieved in 1867 would have represented a major threat to the predominance of the German-Austrians and the Hungarians. The attempt to avoid such a threat led a series of compromises and seriously delayed the democratization process<sup>32</sup>.

Following Rokkan’s conjectures on the *continuity of representative traditions*, the legacy of the long-lasting period of

absolutist rule delayed the incorporation of political opposition and undermined the civic basis of interwar Poland and Lithuania. Moreover, the high status of the dominant powers influenced the timing of the process of national enfranchisement.

After the 1795 Third partition, the counter-reformatory identity had greater room for preserving an ideal sense of bounded national belonging in opposition to Protestant Prussia in the Duchy of Poznan and Orthodox Russia in the Congress Poland and Lithuania. Polish and Baltic experiences resemble the Irish case since “in Ireland the distinctive and pervasive presence of Catholicism helped to preserve a sense of separateness, as did the burning grievances over the land ownership. These were reinforced by the nature of the central British presence, uncaring as much as repressive”<sup>33</sup>. Following the establishment of independent statehoods in the early 1920s, the national Churches gained a strong legitimacy due to their long-lasting role of moral (and political) authority vis-à-vis the civil elites (i.e. role of Rokkan’s *religious heritage*), thereby determining a “dualism between religious and secular authority”<sup>34</sup>. The skeptical stance of national clergy towards the new regimes undermined the basis of democracy and paved the way for the military coups of clerical tendencies in

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<sup>30</sup> Rokkan, “Nation-building,” 87.

<sup>31</sup> Surazska, “Central Europe,” 237.

<sup>32</sup> Flora, *State Formation*, 26.

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 189.

<sup>34</sup> Aarebrot and Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation,” 214.

1926<sup>35</sup>. The attitudes of the Catholic hierarchies appear to follow Rokkan's assumptions on Austria, Italy, and Spain, which are strongly characterized by the legacy of Counter-Reformation "where the Catholic Church [...] proved able to slow down the process of democratization and mass mobilization"<sup>36</sup>.

Unlike in the Polish case, a shared sense of Czechoslovakness beyond Czech and Slovak identities had to be artificially created to provide the state with a basis for national belonging. The definition of a Czechoslovak nation was essential in order to justify the establishment of the state and its legitimation. During the Middle Ages, Moravia, Bohemia, and Slovakia (being part of the *city-belt area*) were characterized by high political release coupled with low centralization and presented a strong commercial network. Since the XVII century both Hungarian Slovakia and Czechia became part of the Habsburg Empire which vigorously curtailed the powers of the local estates, thereby imposing a long-standing period of absolutist rule<sup>37</sup> (focus on Rokkan's *geopolitical dimension*). The

asymmetries between the founding entities of the CSR primarily stemmed from the dissimilar political socialization experienced by Austrian Czechia and Hungarian Slovakia. The differences between the two halves of the Empire increased after the Compromise of 1867. The Slovaks suffered a significant organizational deficit in comparison with the more favorable conditions for political development in Czechia. Consequently, Moravia and Bohemia – like Galicia - achieved a moderate degree of political involvement and a modest form of self-government with the establishment of the Bohemian Diet (1861). After the constitutional compromise they benefited from the increasing extension of political rights "in fact, imperial interests favored containing German nationalism and one way to do this [...] was to tolerate other forms of national expression"<sup>38</sup>. In the words of John Coakley "although Czechs also fought for a re-structuring of the Habsburg monarchy along federal line, they already enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia"<sup>39</sup> experiencing a progressive extension of political rights with the adoption of male universal suffrage in 1907. All in

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<sup>35</sup> Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, *Ethnic Diversity, Democracy, and Electoral Extremism: Lessons from Interwar Poland and Czechoslovakia*, Preliminary Draft, December 18, 2004. Retrieved from: [http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/seminars/wittenberg\\_s05.pdf](http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/seminars/wittenberg_s05.pdf).

<sup>36</sup> Flora, *State Formation*, 27.

<sup>37</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," *World Politics* 18 (3: 1966): 386

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<sup>38</sup> Carol Skalnik-Leff and Susan B. Mikula, "Institutionalizing Party Systems in Multiethnic States: Integration and Ethnic Segmentation in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992," *Slavic Review* 61 (2: 2002): 299.

<sup>39</sup> John Coakley, "Political succession and regime change in new states in inter-war Europe: Ireland, Finland, Czechoslovakia and Baltic Republics," *European Journal of Political research* 14 (3: 1986): 190.

all, on the eve of WWI, both Czechs and Slovaks experienced at least moderate levels of self-government. These levels were higher in Moravia and Bohemia, where the thresholds of legitimation and incorporation were lowered in the early 1900s. Slovakia encountered much more political limitations, as the Hungarian nationalist elites vigorously sustained the process of Magyarization of Slovak lands<sup>40</sup>. Considering Rokkan's arguments on the *status of the "mother country"*, the Hungarians – once they had regained their national dignity – opposed the consolidation of rival ethnic identities both in the electoral arena and institutional life.

Despite the counter-reformatory identity of the Habsburg Empire, the new state characterized substantially as a secularized Catholic country “where the autonomy from religion has given the state an upper hand, albeit that church interests exist with a potential for independent influence on the citizens”<sup>41</sup>. Unlike Polish and Lithuanian cases, the Czech liberal elites were able to temper more devout Catholic Slovaks and to selectively co-opt secularized Slovak personalities<sup>42</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> After 1867 Slovakia was incorporated into the Kingdom of Hungary. The local assemblies were dissolved and the Hungarian legislation came to supersede the Austrian codes.

<sup>41</sup> Aarebrot and Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation,” 214.

<sup>42</sup> Half of Slovak representatives in the constituent National Assembly, chosen in an arbitrary way by the provisional

This actively limited the role of *religious heritage* in Czechoslovak democracy. Furthermore, the clergy was perceived to be aligned with alien authorities under the Catholic Habsburg rule, and it never experienced the level of legitimacy enjoyed by Polish and Lithuanian churches<sup>43</sup>. Hence Czechia resembles Galicja where the local Church largely cooperated with Austrian elites.

## 2. Failure or Success: What Made the Difference?

From their foundation, all the three countries faced internal and external challenges and struggled to preserve their existence (albeit with different levels of intensity). The independent life of the Polish and Lithuanian states began respectively in 1921 and 1922 with the adoption of a democratic constitution patterned after the Third French Republic. Both countries vested most of the authority in an extremely fragmented parliament (Polish *Sejm* and Lithuanian *Seimas*). The process of institutional reconstruction worked similarly in Czechoslovakia following the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Czechoslovakia adopted a French-styled constitution in 1920 and instated a bicameral National Assembly

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government, were Protestants, although Protestants constituted only 12% of Slovak population. See also Skalnik-Leff and Mikula, “Institutionalizing Party Systems,” 292-314; and Coakley, “Political succession,” 187-206.

<sup>43</sup> Skalnik-Leff and Mikula, “Institutionalizing Party Systems,” 305.

(*Národní shromáždění*) elected on the basis of the principle of proportional representation. In the early 1920s the process of institutional “Weimarization” appeared to be fully accomplished. The principle of proportional representation was generally thought to guarantee the highest degree of equality within fragmented political systems marked by significant ethnic heterogeneity and political polarization<sup>44</sup>. According to Rokkan, the greater the ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity among the citizenry, the higher the pressures for PR<sup>45</sup>.

In this respect, the early years of the Polish state were mainly devoted to an arduous work of national reconstruction along *ethno-cultural* lines rooted on the romantic idea of Polishness. Unification of the three formerly partitioned areas represented the greatest difficulty faced by the Polish elites. In addition, the PR system represented an excellent way to overcome the high level of ethnic fragmentation, given that one-third of the Polish population was composed of minorities<sup>46</sup>. Yet it “contributed to the

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<sup>44</sup> Porter, “Who is a Pole,” 639-653.

<sup>45</sup> Rokkan, “The Structuring of Mass Politics,” 188.

<sup>46</sup> According to the Polish census of 1921 its population amounted to 27 millions, with Poles amounted to 69% (18.7 millions), Ukrainians 14%, Jews 8%, Belarusian 3.9%, and Germans 3.8% of the entire population. Moreover Catholics made up 65% of the population, the Uniats 10%, the Orthodoxes 12%, Jews 10% and Protestants 2.5%. For further data see Eugen Romer, “The

splitting up of political life and to the multiplication of political parties and groups”<sup>47</sup> and strongly increased governmental instability. When it comes to external challenges, the Second Polish Republic was engaged in a number of conflicts with its neighbors as well as with its former “mother country”<sup>48</sup> while it invaded the Vilnius region from 1920 to 1939 in an attempt to re-establish the Commonwealth. John Coakley defines this threat to Lithuanian independence as a failed endeavor to recreate a *reactionary state* modeled after the example of Polish-Lithuanian joint statehood aimed at “preserve[ing] as much as possible the old constitutional order”<sup>49</sup>. Lithuania had to fight two wars against Russian Bolsheviks and bermontians (Freedom wars) in order to preserve its fragile independence.

As in Poland, almost one third of the population of the CSR was composed of national minorities<sup>50</sup>. It is no

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Population of Poland according to the Census of 1921,” *Geographical Review* 13 (3: 1923): 398-412.

<sup>47</sup> Eduard Taborsky, “Czechoslovakia’s experience with P.R.,” *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law* 26 (3/4: 1944): 50.

<sup>48</sup> During its formative years the Polish state was involved in wars against Ukraine, Soviet Russia and Lithuania. To the southwest it encountered border conflicts with CSR and Germany over the free city of Danzig.

<sup>49</sup> Coakley, “Political succession,” 191.

<sup>50</sup> According to the census results of 1921, the population of the CSR amounted to 13 millions, with the two *statotvorné* amounted

surprise, then, “the number of parties competing for votes that oscillated between 16 and 29, of which 7 to 11 were parties of Czechs and Slovaks, while the rest were German and Hungarian”<sup>51</sup>. In both Poland and Czechoslovakia a formerly dominant minority remained within the national borders<sup>52</sup>. Sudeten Germans and Hungarians of Slovakia were incorporated, together with Czech and Slovak constituent (*statotvorné*) peoples<sup>53</sup>. The greatest challenge endeavored by the Czechoslovak elites concerned the functional homogenization of the two units distinct in ethno-cultural, socioeconomic and historical development: Czechs in industrially and economically developed Bohemia and Moravia subject to the Austrian half of the Empire, and Slovaks in the poorer Hungarian half. Unlike in Poland and Lithuania, formal constitutional safeguards were granted to ethnic minorities together with the full freedom to use their language<sup>54</sup>.

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to 66% (8.7 millions), Germans 23%, Hungarians 5.6%, Ruthenians 3%, and Jews 1% of the entire population. Retrieved from: [http://www.czso.cz/sldb/sldb.nsf/i/scitani\\_v\\_roce\\_1921](http://www.czso.cz/sldb/sldb.nsf/i/scitani_v_roce_1921).

<sup>51</sup> Taborsky, “Czechoslovakia’s experience with P.R.,” 50.

<sup>52</sup> Coakley, “Political succession,” 187-206.

<sup>53</sup> Skalnik-Leff and Mikula, “Institutionalizing Party Systems,” 292-314.

<sup>54</sup> In the Constitution of the CSR, Section VI: Protection of National, Religious, and Racial Minorities, Art. 128 (1) it is stated: “All citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic shall be in all respects equal before the law and shall enjoy equal civic and political

Moreover, notwithstanding the centralized structure of the state, local governments benefited from a moderate autonomy, thereby tempering the vigor of ethno-based claims which conveyed through the inclusion of regionalist parties in the republican system, “in the interwar republic, statewide parties competed with regionally based parties”<sup>55</sup>.

Similar to the Czechoslovak experience, in 1919 the Second Polish Republic was established by merging the three territorial units which were formerly partitioned among Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia (together with Lithuania). However, a complete homogenization of the three regions could not be attained. The early years of the Polish state were therefore characterized by a continuous clash between democratic leadership mainly from Wielkopolska and Galicia<sup>56</sup> and

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rights whatever be their race, their language, or their religion.’ Article 128 (2) continues: ‘Difference in religion, belief, confession, or language shall [...] constitute no obstacle to any citizen of the Czechoslovak Republic particularly in regard of entry into the public services and offices [...] or in regard to the exercise of any trade or calling.’ Retrieved from

[www2.tlct.ttu.edu/Kelly/Archive/czslconst1920.html](http://www2.tlct.ttu.edu/Kelly/Archive/czslconst1920.html).

<sup>55</sup> Skalnik-Leff and Mikula, “Institutionalizing Party Systems,” 293.

<sup>56</sup> Largely rural Galicia was characterized by the dispute between the peasants and the landowners directly linked to the imperial centre and provided the electoral basis to the Agrarian Party in the Second Polish Republic.

the authoritarian claims from elites of the East, trained under the Russian autocracy. Needless to say, the systematic exclusion of the national minorities coupled with “the differences between political cultures of the three empires [which] seem to have frozen into the civic make-up of the respective localities”<sup>57</sup> greatly affected the fate of Polish democracy.

Between 1922 and 1926 increasing parliamentary instability and polarized political milieu troubled the immature institutions of both Poland and Lithuania. In addition, the confrontation between the industrialized West and the underdeveloped East undermined a uniform economic course. A number of governmental missteps weakened efforts towards the consolidation of democratic rule and paved the way to a series of military coups. In Poland Marshall Piłsudski’s Sanacja Movement (Polish: *Sanacja*) established a fascist-populist regime in May 1926<sup>58</sup>. Two months later in Lithuania an authoritarian regime led by Smetona came to power, thereby transferring a big slice of legislative power from the Seimas to the government-oriented State Council. The timing of the democratization process in the three cases followed the French model of political enfranchisement. It was carried out in less than 20 years and the four

thresholds were lowered between 1907 and 1920. In particular, Poland and Lithuania moved from absolutist rule to universal suffrage for men and women in one single step respectively in 1917 and 1918. However, unlike most of CEE interwar cases, Czechoslovakia is a valid example of democratic survival since it “remained a functioning parliamentary democracy throughout the interwar period, thus offering a sustained period of party evolution for analysis”<sup>59</sup>.

Why did it occur this way? The Polish-Lithuanian case resembles both Ireland and Finland which “attained independence only after the First World War, when it was hardly possible to maintain restrictions on universal suffrage any longer”<sup>60</sup>. Furthermore, all four experienced a high degree of political violence characterized by parliamentary instability and a troubled political milieu. However – unlike Finland and Ireland – Polish and Lithuanian democracy gave the way to Piłsudski and Smetona’s regimes. The heritage of the long-lasting division and the silent Church opposition to the liberal regime may be identified as major explicative factors of the democratic breakdown. All in all, in the words of Rokkan “national unification via democratization appears to require a certain degree of cultural homogeneity to be successful”<sup>61</sup>. Weak

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<sup>57</sup> Surazska, “Central Europe,” 235.

<sup>58</sup> Leszek L. Garlicki, “The Presidency in the New Polish Constitution,” *East European Constitutional Review* 6 (2/3: 1997): 81-89.

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<sup>59</sup> Skalnik-Leff and Mikula, “Institutionalizing Party Systems,” 292.

<sup>60</sup> Flora, *State Formation*, 26.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

homogenization and the alliance between authoritarian elites and the Church represented the greatest threats to democracy. To conclude, according to Coakley

the more or less forcible seizure of power by a regional counter-elite, bent on establishing a modern, liberal democratic national state, from the rulers of pre- or partly-democratic multinational empires. In each case the new elite was constrained not merely to secure the legitimacy of a new form of government but also to establish the territorial identity of its new state<sup>62</sup>.

On the other hand, the Czechoslovak success seems to stem from a mix of factors which effectively counterbalanced endogenous and exogenous negative dynamics, thereby tempering religious and ethnic disruptive tendencies. Czechoslovak political inclusiveness resembles Belgian *pillarization*. In both countries the democratic regimes fruitfully integrated ethno-cultural cleavages and undertook a structural cooptation of major socio-political elites. In the words of Aarebrot and Berglund “successful completion of state building and clear autonomy from religious authority were not sufficient to make a state safe for democracy in the interwar period. The survival of democracy also requires that the elites of all or most relevant cleavages be integrated into governance or into a position of strong

influence upon the government”<sup>63</sup> through a set of inclusive actions. In line with this point, Linz and Stepan maintain that a democratic transition is complete when a broad agreement on the rules of the game emerges and “the new democracy does not have to share power with bodies de jure”<sup>64</sup>. Accordingly, the placid tradition of secularized Catholicism, the appeasement of most of the relevant cleavages through constitutional safeguards for national minorities, and their selective cooptation may be identified as the major explicative factors of the survival of Czechoslovak democracy.

More specifically, when Slovakia was artificially merged with Moravia and Bohemia in 1918, it encountered the more politically mature Czech elite trained under more inclusive electoral politics granted by Austrian rulers<sup>65</sup>. The establishment of the joint state characterizes as a Czech-led operation facilitated by the Slovak fear of Hungarian revanchism that determined “an alliance of the Czech workers and bourgeoisie against the prospect of pan-German domination and an independent state embracing also the Slovaks of

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<sup>63</sup> Aarebrot and Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation,” 220.

<sup>64</sup> Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan eds., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 1.

<sup>65</sup> Kopstein and Wittenberg, *Ethnic Diversity*, 1-8.

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<sup>62</sup> Coakley, “Political succession,” 203.

Hungary seemed the most viable alternative<sup>66</sup>. Bohemia and Moravia provided most of Czechoslovak administrative, economic and political elites. On the other hand, loyal Slovak personalities (such as, Presidents Tomáš Masaryk, Edvard Beneš, and other “Slovaks of Prague”) were selectively co-opted. Given the high level of party fragmentation of the political system, informal cooperative tools were adopted to preserve the democratic institutions and the effectiveness of governmental authority. The *Pětka* (The group of five) was largely responsible for the political stability of the country. This behind-the-scenes consociative forum composed of the leaders of the five major parties<sup>67</sup> constituted the informal backbone of the government and greatly contributed to the success of democracy in interwar Czechoslovakia. The most relevant asset stemmed from the strict control exerted by the group over the access to power, thereby conditioning political co-optation of junior partners to the acceptance of the new constitutional order<sup>68</sup>. After 1926, German parties that organized along class lines consonant with the Czechoslovak spectrum “won inclusion in governing coalitions, thus acquiring leverage in the allocation of state

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<sup>66</sup> Coakley, “Political succession,” 191.

<sup>67</sup> The *Pětka* included the leaders of the Social Democrats, National Socialists, National Democrats, Agrarians and Catholics.

<sup>68</sup> Skalnik-Leff and Mikula, “Institutionalizing Party Systems,” 292-314 and Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, *Ethnic Diversity*, 1-8

budgetary resources”<sup>69</sup>. By contrast, Hungarian parties influenced by irredentist propaganda from Hungary, never joined the Czechoslovak government but were not overtly hostile.

## CONCLUSIONS

This article attempted an overview of democratic processes originated in the aftermath of WWI in Central and Eastern Europe, through an extended Rokkanian theoretical pattern and a functional adaptation of ETCP analysis with particular emphasis on lowering of the four thresholds. Once I presented Rokkan’s model of democratic development and the characteristics of democratization process in interwar CEE, I focused on three major catholic cases - Poland, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia – which I selected according to Rokkan’s original prescriptions. I investigated the fate of democracy in these countries, trying to highlight the determinants of far different democratic performances, given apparently similar historical traditions. I was looking for an answer to the following question: Why in Poland and Lithuania did the newly-established institutions collapse, while in Czechoslovakia they did not? Actually, they adopted different solutions for common problems. Despite a number of commonalities in the timing of the state-formation process and a comparable degree of

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<sup>69</sup> Skalnik-Leff and Mikula, “Institutionalizing Party Systems,” 302.

ethno-cultural, religious, and political heterogeneity, five major factors emerged as essential for explaining survival of democracy or its failure (See Appendix 2). These may be typified as follows: The democratic attempts characterized by 1) *long-standing tradition of absolutist-autocratic rule*, 2) *social and political exclusion of important portions of the polity* representing major political, ethnic, and religious cleavages, 3) *adversarial style of government*, 4) *strong Counter-reformatory legacy*, 5) *secession from external empires*, appear to have very few chances to survive.

Like Poland and Lithuania, Czechoslovakia had a history of foreign domination and long-standing national divisions, but Czech liberal elites together with the “Slovaks of Prague” were successful in integrating the major societal cleavages through inclusive actions. The selective cooptation of the minorities and a cooperative national clergy did the rest. This leads to the following conclusion:

where the state building was weak and the legacy of the empire strong, or where secular nation building was still impaired by deeply rooted religious sentiments, or where significant segments representing major cleavages were not co-opted into a constitutional compromise, the chances for democratic survival in interwar Europe were slim indeed<sup>70</sup>.

As I stressed from the beginning of this analysis, a number of current problems in several CEE countries date back to century-long dynamics inherited from the past. In this respect, most of the points summarized above still play a role in the full consolidation of liberal-democracy in post-Communist Europe. Notwithstanding the efforts undertaken throughout the last two decades by the national elites and the influence exerted – among others - by the attractive goal of the EU membership, a number of open matters knock on the doors of CEE democracies. The period of Communist rule from the end of WWII to the early 1990s profoundly weakened (and structurally modified) the structure of societal organization in the area. The civil and political life faced drastic transformations along functional lines which, on the one hand, froze many of the peculiar characteristics of the interwar statehoods, and on the other hand, jeopardized the formation of an embryonic civil society and frustrated national aspirations. The democratic revival in the early 1990s appears to be structurally influenced by both these factors. Among others, this implied the rise of widespread nationalistic sentiments, revanchist purposes towards the former dominant country, strong ethno-religious extremism coupled with populist claims that evoke a somewhat romantic nostalgia of the past<sup>71</sup>. New regimes had to face (and to

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<sup>70</sup> Frank Aarebrot and Sten Berglund, “Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation”, 1. 376

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<sup>71</sup> David J. Smith, “Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A

a certain extent are still facing) a number of problems correlated with their past history.

This study, far from being exhaustive and all-encompassing, represents only a preliminary attempt to analyze the fate of interwar democracy in CEE states within an original analytical framework. There is room for future, broader contributions that include a larger number of CEE countries.

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**Appendix 1 - Dependent and independent variables in the study of democratization process**

Thresholds (independent variables)	Related questions (timing)	Independent variables	Hypotheses
Legitimation	From which point in the history of state was there effective recognition of the right of petition, criticism, and demonstration against the regime? From which decade was there regular protection of civil rights, and within what limits?	Continuity of representative traditions (P)	1. The stronger the tradition of representative rule, the greater the chances of early legitimation of opposition and the slower and more continuous the process of enfranchisement.
Incorporation	How long did it take before the potential supporters of rising movements of opposition were given formal rights of participation in the choice of representatives?	Timing of state formation, religious heritage & Status of the “mother country” (T)	2. The longer the history of continuous centre-building, the slower and more continuous the process of enfranchisement. 3. The higher the status of the dominant country, the higher the barrier to legitimation in the dependent territory and the more sudden the process of enfranchisement. 4. The stronger the Counter reformatory legacy, the slower the process of democratization and mass mobilisation
Representation	How high were the original barriers against the representation of new movements and when and in what	Cultural heterogeneity (C)	5. The greater the ethnic and/or religious heterogeneity of the citizenry, the higher the

	ways were the barriers lowered?		pressures for proportional representation
Executive power	How immune were the executive organs against legislative pressures and how long did it take before parliamentary strength could be translated into direct influence on executive decision-making?	Party systems (P) & geopolitical position (T)	6. The likelihood of minority participation in the executive increases with the distance of largest party of majority point and the pressures from the international environment.

Sources: Stein Rokkan, "The Structuring of Mass Politics in the Smaller European Democracies: A Developmental Typology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10 (2: 1968): 173-210; "Nation-building, Cleavage Formation and the Structuring of Mass Politics," in *Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development*, ed. Angus Campbell, Per Torsvik, and Henry Valen, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), chap. 3; Peter Flora, *State Formation, Nation-building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan*, (OUP Oxford University Press, 1999), 345-361.

Appendix 2 - Explicative factors

Explicative factors	P O L I T I C A L   D I M E N S I O N			C U L T U R A L   D I M E N S I O N		T E R R I T O R I A L   D I M E N S I O N		
	Continuity of representative rule	Formal/informal limits to political fragmentation – Style of government	Formal/informal safeguards to ethnic/religious heterogeneity	Religious heritage	Cultural, ethnic, religious heterogeneity	Timing of state formation	Geopolitical dimension (E-W axis)	Status of the “mother country”
Poland – Lithuania	<i>Longer periods of absolutist-autocratic rule (RU, PR, AT)</i>	Proportional representation + Adversarial style	L O W E R	<i>Catholic Counter reformation</i>	H I G H E R	LATE STATE FORMATION	<i>Devolved from External and Eastern Empires</i>	H I G H E R
Czechoslovakia	<i>Longer periods of absolutist rule (AT)</i>	Proportional representation + Consociative style ( <i>Pětka</i> )	H I G H E R	<i>Secularized catholic</i>	H I G H E R	LATE STATE FORMATION	<i>City belt / Charlemagne Heritage</i>	H I G H E R

Explicative factor = similarity Explicative factor = difference