

RESUMES

KÁLMÁN ÁRPÁD KOVÁCS

EXTRACTS FROM THE PROTESTANTS AND THE SUPREME PATRONAL RIGHT OF HUNGARIAN KINGS

This study is the only edited and footnoted version of my presentation *Franz Joseph the Apostolic King* given at the *From "Usurper of the Throne" to Constitutional King* conference organized by the VERITAS Research Institute for History, the Institute and Museum of Military History and the History Institute of Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary on December 13th, 2016. In a few words I scrutinized the relationship among four legal institutions: the right of the supreme patron; the autonomy of the Church; the equality among religious denominations and the obligation of the state. The study determined that supreme patronage was a feudal institution whose essence could be felt throughout Hungarian history until 1945. At heart it was an endeavor that organized, maintained, led and oversaw the Church. Although less known, the Protestant Church, too, had its own variation. Supreme patronage referred to external issues only, not those of a dogmatic or non-moral nature. Supreme patronage was a state sovereignty right from which all the other patrons in the country originated and over which its authority spanned. As it related to Church policy of the Dualist Era, *supremus patronatus* was mostly associated with Catholic aspirations of autonomy. As such, its significance would lie on the pivotal determination of the state – church dynamic, where it would have simultaneously necessitated a positive definition of Hungarian Catholic Church independence from the Holy See, the Hungarian State and questions related to national minorities which posed a danger to the principle of Hungarian statehood. Despite a Catholic numerical majority, Hungarian society at the time was religiously diverse along ethnic lines. In general, one's religious belief corresponded to his ethnicity. Because of Hungarian Catholicism's status as state religion and society's paramount interest in inter-confessional matters, Protestant public opinion paid close attention to the Hungarian kings' actions as they related to supreme patronage Church policy. The Hungarian State of the Dualist Era failed to take necessary legislative action concerning wealth management, the most significant element of *supremus patronatus*. Political will went missing, so much so that certain interests benefited from the issue remaining legally unresolved. Thus supreme patronage's positive and fostering attributes were ultimately

overshadowed by negative, restrictive and supervisory ones. As a result the legal standing of the other established and recognized denominations in the country could not be accommodated. Supreme patronage thus remained an element of a disaffected political system (*wohl temperierte Unzufriedenheiten*).

ÁDÁM SCHWARCZWÖLDER
ON THE LEADING EDGE OF FRANZ JOSEPH'S PERSONALIZED
EMPIRE

Franz Joseph passed away at Schönbrunn Palace on November 21st, 1916, after ruling for sixty-eight years. In the minds of nearly everyone his name is synonymous with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Austrian writer and poet Karl Kraus asked in his 1920 poem *Franz Joseph* whether the emperor had shaped the country, or rather the country him.

It is generally accepted that Franz Joseph – among other reasons – agreed to the 1867 Compromise and that given form of Dualism because he was able to maintain absolute control of foreign policy and the military thanks to his extensive authority as the sovereign; moreover, in reality he enjoyed supreme political power in both Austria and Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy consisted – in theory – of two sovereign states, with two capitals and two governments. But with one ruler. Franz Joseph could not be “divided and separated”; he himself personified the strongest link between Hungary and Austria.

The ruler exercised power via the Cabinet Chancellery (*Kabinettskanzlei*), which acted as a liaison among the Austrian, Hungarian and common state bureaus. Various imperial documents were sent to the Cabinet Chancellery, which then relayed the decisions and orders of the ruler. The leadership of the Cabinet Chancellery and the heads of department responsible for Hungary were made up of the ruler's consultants. In numerous cases, Franz Joseph had final say; his ministers would send him four thousand memorandums on average per year. He worked from early morning to night, all hours of the day devoted to state affairs.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including the working mechanism of Hungary, bore the traits of his personality. To deal with a multiplicity of mundane issues required a leader like Franz Joseph, who had a deep sense of vocation, diligence and workmanship, and desired to actively participate in state affairs. Although in his old age he often complained about fatigue and his large quantity of work, he had been the one who had purposely designed the dualist system to function in that very manner, and he was in no way inclined to change it thereafter. Strictly speaking the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was Franz Joseph's personalized empire.

TIBOR KLESTENITZ
FROM ZEALOUS LOYALTY TO ROYAL DISPARAGEMENT:
THE DEPICTION OF FRANZ JOSEPH BY THE HUNGARIAN PRESS
DURING THE ERA OF THE DUAL MONARCHY

The objective of the study was twofold: to determine to what extent the Hungarian press deviated from the officially sanctioned conception of Franz Joseph as the “most constitutional king” during the Era of the Dual Monarchy, when freedom of speech made it possible in practice; and to identify the means by which critical opinion was shared with the public.

For a long time the press enjoyed significant flexibility in how it covered the king and his policies, the main guarantor of which was trial by jury. Criticism of Franz Joseph could be aired publicly, even in the form of sarcastic caricature. The legal environment changed, however, in 1913, when trial by jury was removed as the means for deciding a so-called royal defamation lawsuit.

The press portrayal of Franz Joseph was in no way static. The representation of a pro-Hungary and constitutional ruler that best typified most press products was not a consequence of fear of authoritative oppression or criminal charges. On the other hand, it stemmed from the king more or less honoring the Compromise between the two sides. However, if it seemed that the king would renege on his constitutional responsibilities and change his demeanor, like, for example, in the case of the army declaration of Chlopy in 1903, then the opinion of the press likewise changed, often voicing sharp criticism. Juries valued freedom of the press over and above censorship of royal disparagement. So the idea of fealty to the king shown in the press did not mean a spiritual double standard and a denial of national traditions. Newspaper publishers only wished to align the idea of fealty to the king, which they considered a state interest, with the grassroots tradition of independence in which so many Hungarians believed.

RÓBERT HERMANN
THIRTY-FIVE YEARS LATER – THE REHABILITATING DOCUMENT
OF GENERAL ARTÚR GÖRGEI, MAY 30TH, 1884

In 1884 Artúr Görgei, the onetime commander of the Hungarian Revolutionary Army in the 1848-1849 Hungarian Revolution and the Minister of War during the Szemere administration, turned 66 years old. Over the course of that spring several former Army officers began a movement to rehabilitate General Görgei's reputation. Out of their meetings came an official statement in which the officers insisted that the surrender at Világos on August 13th, 1849, was not an act of treason, but rather an inevitable consequence of the situation on the ground. The officers then agreed to seek out as many of their brother in arms as they could and have them sign the statement, which was crafted on May 30th, 1884. News of the officers' movement quickly spread, and the pro-Independence Party press aggressively agitated to hamper its efforts. In almost every edition the newspaper *Függetlenség* (Independence) wrote about the movement, readily allowing detractors to pen articles. Simultaneously some *Honvéd* veterans associations crafted an anti-rehabilitation statement.

By the time the pro-rehabilitation statement was handed over, 207 individuals had signed the statement, including György Klapka and András Gáspár, two former generals of the 1848-1849 Hungarian Revolution. Several other high-ranking Army officers had also been among the signatories. Following the turnover of the statement, an additional thirty signatures were collected. The statement itself appeared in the press on November 23rd. German and French translations were also prepared. Also on November 23rd, a delegation called on Görgei, who took possession of the statement and thanked his supporters in a speech.

The movement, however, was only a partial success. Part of the public could not be swayed, and ultimately, at the national meeting of *Honvéd* veterans associations on March 9th, 1885, Görgei's rehabilitation was rejected. This also marked the last great debate in the press on the merits of the general's endeavors. In the ensuing years anti-Görgei manifestations became less common.

ÁKOS KÁRBIN

THE ROLE OF AUSTRIAN FINANCE MINISTERS IN THE 1892
CURRENCY REFORM OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY
JULIAN DUNAJEWSKI VS. EMIL STEINBACH

The Monarchy used a silver monetary system whose obsolescence had already been officially acknowledged at the time of the signing of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Initially there was no consensus between the experts of the Austrian and Hungarian finance ministries on the specifics of how to regulate the currency. We are quite well informed about reform preparation by the Hungarian side; however, the role of the Austrian side was equally as important, if not more so, since the Monarchy used a unified and common currency. The Austrian grand coalition government led by Eduard von Taaffe held the upper hand on the “Iron Ring” political parties and implemented policies favored by the Crown. Thus our study focuses on the role that Austrian finance ministers played in reform preparation.

The Hungarian Ministry of Finance had a consensus point of view regarding currency regulation, mainly thanks to the efforts of Minister of Finance Sándor Wekerle. His Austrian counterpart Julian Dunajewski, on the other hand, did not support the plan to reform the outdated silver monetary system, which was in reality paper-based. This led to numerous difficulties. Dunajewski concentrated on federalization and politics rather than on monetary affairs. The emperor, however, had certain expectations that, if Dunajewski remained in power, were not guaranteed to be fulfilled. The government, pressed for solutions, was in need of a non-confrontational individual who focused on finance. Thus in January 1891, succession planning came to the fore: Franz Joseph, on the recommendation of Friedrich von Schönborn, the Minister of Justice in the Taaffe administration, appointed Emil Steinbach as Minister of Finance instead of Dunajewski. Our work wishes to examine this process.

LÁSZLÓ ANKA

WHY IS THE LABORER ACT OF 1907 REFERRED TO AS THE “DERES LAW”?

The law that set guidelines for estate owner – laborer relations was Act XLV of 1907, the famous (or infamous) “Deres* Law”, also known as the Laborer Act. Based on the work of Marxist historians István Dolmányos and Péter Simon, during the Communist Era the origins and essence of this law were portrayed as the means by which the Hungarian ruling class had oppressed the poor, landless and servile peasant class.

In the study the author makes no attempt to support or refute that conjecture. Instead he shares the background story of how the *deres* law moniker arose during the formative stages of the act and examines whether use of such a name was justified, i.e. physically punishing a laborer for mistakes committed and/or in what form the act limited such punishment.

The author discloses answers that would otherwise remain obscured to the reader unfamiliar with legalese or the ways of the law. While earlier versions of the law (Act XIII of 1876 and Act II of 1898) enabled the estate owner to physically abuse any of his laborers in the interests of maintaining domestic discipline, the 1907 “Deres Law” laid down restrictions: Only laborers under the age of 18 years could be corporally punished. Even as several representatives (agrarian socialists and national minority legislators) reminded the governing majority that modern pedagogy had earlier rejected corporeal punishment, supporters similarly invoked pedagogical studies in favor of the act.

Thus the study also shines a light on the prevailing attitude of Hungarian parliamentary representatives – of “we Hungarian estate owners” (as the Minister of Agriculture referred to them during the debates surrounding the bill) – in regard to the issue of corporeal punishment.

* A *deres* was a wooden bench-like structure on which the laborer lay as he was being whipped.

LÁSZLÓ L. LAJTAI

ONE THOUSAND YEARS: A LATE DUALIST ERA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOK AND STATE-INSPIRED PATRIOTISM

In 1908-1909 six editions of an elementary school history textbook and a history reader were published by Elek Benedek, an already well-known writer, publicist and collector of folktales. Albert Apponyi, Minister of Religion and Public Education, personally requested Benedek to write a textbook that would be translated into the native tongue of each of Hungary's largest ethnic minorities. Benedek, a Protestant of humble Szekler origins, was not only a trusted confidante of Apponyi, the scholarly and polyglot Catholic aristocrat who had led the political opposition before 1906, but had also been a fellow party member. Even after the conclusion of Benedek's political phase, Apponyi would remain his role model, both in life and in politics, until the end of Benedek's life. Behind Apponyi's preliminary request to Benedek to assist in implementing his new public education laws ("Lex Apponyi"), we may presume were professional considerations, for despite his not being a qualified historian, Benedek had nonetheless earned the respect of both the historian profession and the educated readership of Hungary with his monumental monograph of the history of the Hungarian people, published on the fiftieth anniversary of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution. With this work, Benedek specifically regarded the strengthening of *national unity*, which was dearly coveted, as his objective. He presented the political emancipatory aspirations of the people (specifically the lower social classes) without whitewashing social conflicts, and put it in proper historical perspective, portraying social reconciliation in the interests of national unity. Regarding textbooks from that period, Benedek, like many others, was unsatisfied with their quality, overabundance and licensing practices. To popularize historical knowledge, he wanted to put a major emphasis on domestic constitutional endeavors and patriotic spirit. Thus in his new textbook he gave the notions of *national independence*, *unity* and *assimilatory results* pronounced positions, while composing in such a way as to portray Magyar and non-Magyar interaction in a positive light (of course with the former always in the dominant role) at every historical turning point. Although his history reader was soon banned due to its anti-dynastic tone, his textbook remained and had a significant influence on the text of the readers intended for use in ethnic minority schools. Although the "Lex Apponyi" language requirements were unrealistic, the textbook's bilingualism and its receptiveness of a new historical narrative on the historical role of Hungary's ethnic minorities proved to be experimental tools for education policy in the late stages of the Era of Dualism.

DÁVID LIGETI

THE PRINCES OF PEACE? FRANZ JOSEPH I, CHARLES I
AND THEIR THOUGHTS ON WAR

In my study I examine how the two last Austro-Hungarian monarchs felt and thought about war. Both Franz Joseph I and Charles I were referred to as “princes of peace” or “emperors of peace” since their expressed goal was to avoid war and make peace.

In the first part of my work, I dwell on the historical background of the phenomenon of the “prince of peace”, from the antecedents of the Bible to the New Era. I point out that the Habsburg rulers wanted to rule in peace, which originated from their Catholicism.

In the second part I analyze Franz Joseph from that perspective. Between 1848 and 1866 the emperor fought many wars, but subsequently ruled in peace for half a century. His mentality was strongly influenced by the 1848 Hungarian Revolution. In that critical situation his main and ultimate support was the Imperial-Royal Army. Nevertheless, he had a great but not exclusive role in the unleashing of WWI. In that one conflagration, he waged war for the same number of months (until his death on November 21st, 1916) as he had in all of his earlier wars together. However, the combined casualties of his 19th century wars were dwarfed by his WWI losses.

In the third part, I examine the role of Charles I in WWI. In his case the use of the “prince of peace” appellation is more appropriate than in case of his predecessor. I present in detail his humane acts and the history of his most important peace-making intention, the so-called “Sixtus Affair”. Despite Charles I wanting to end the war with a separate peace, the Entente dealt with him as a war criminal.

In addition to articles by the Austro-Hungarian press, I rely on personal accounts and recollections from the period. After rethinking the possible aspects of the last two emperors of the Monarchy, I see the use of the “princes of peace” appellation as valid, even if neither one could be referred to as a pacifist. In crucial situations maintaining the territorial integrity of the Monarchy and preserving their own honor were their ultimate concern.

ORSOLYA BÜKY
COUNTRY TOWN RESIDENT OR LANDED GENTRY:
BÁLINT HÓMAN AND THE DARÁNYI FAMILY

The objective of the study is to outline the two possible alternatives for Hungarian embourgeoisement in the 19th century, using the maternal side of Bálint Hóman's family, the Darányis, as the example. In the last few decades, no historian has attempted to systematically research Hóman's family background; as a result information that could help us to better understand his career has remained shrouded in mystery; for example, information which could help explain Hóman's obvious ambivalence towards his various scope of activities.

Although his persona, primarily of course his role as politician, has been the focus of heated political debates now and again, Hóman the individual has been but a symbolic aspect in these. The discourse that revolves around the anti-Semitism of the Horthy Era is in actuality about the professional assessment of the problems associated with 19th century Hungarian modernization and embourgeoisement. In my study I wish to contribute to a better understanding of a question that still remains with us today by familiarizing the reader with the markedly different life strategies of Ignác Darány Sr. and his son Ignác Darány Jr.

LÁSZLÓ OROSZ

“[...] THE OLD GERMAN SPIRIT OF MORALITY WITHOUT THE NEW GERMAN MISTAKES.” THE BUDAPEST SCHOOL OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE DURING THE INTERWAR ERA

A popular and distinguished school during the Interwar Era was the Budapest-based *Reichsdeutsche Schule* (School of the German Empire), which the distinguished writer Frigyes Karinthy appraised as seen in the title snippet above in one of his *Pesti Napló* writings. Originally founded as a school for the children of German citizens temporarily based in Hungary for business or diplomatic reasons, children of other nationalities were soon allowed to enroll, including Hungarian children from the beginning of the 1920's. The school became extremely popular among the bourgeois families of Budapest, and the Jewish residents of the city also preferred sending their children there. The institution, which was characterized by its international atmosphere, tolerant spirit and complete lack of political extremism, taught its students European perspectives and ways of thinking, in addition to providing an acknowledged high quality Hungarian education. The numerous graduates who would go on to leave their mark in a variety of fields were a fitting testament to the high educational standards of the school. The teaching staff consisted mainly of open-minded and tolerant pedagogues (according to later descriptions by students), so much so that when education reforms were introduced following Hitler's transition to power, German teachers requested transfer to the Budapest-based school, where they would enjoy greater academic freedom and try to stay until better times. Moreover, they consciously sought to avoid acting and behaving as point men for the German Reich. Their treatment of Jewish students provided the best testimony to what degree their thinking did not conform to circumstances in Germany. On more than one occasion the school found itself in open conflict with the leadership of Nazi Germany. For example, in 1944, on the heels of the German occupation of Hungary, the school bravely stood up in defense of its Jewish students (by administering matriculation exams early and by hiding students in the basement of the school building). Such conduct had contradicted the smear campaigns that occurred after WWII. The 2004 Hungarian Film Festival awarding-winning documentary film about the school was a step in rehabilitating its reputation [Gábor Zsigmond Papp: *The School of the Empire* (2003, 57 minutes)].

ZOLTÁN DÉVAVÁRI

“WE BARELY DARED TO BREATHE, FOR FEAR OF FURTHER CRIMINAL ACCUSATIONS...” THE RECONSTRUCTION OF A YUGOSLAV HUNGARIAN SPY (SHOW) TRIAL (1922–1924)

The study puts the so-called “spy trials” under the microscope. These legal proceedings were one of the long-lasting reprisals, a tool of psychological warfare from the period, that was employed against the Hungarians of the *Délvidék* (Southlands), who went into minority status during the 1918–1920 handover of the region to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The study focuses on the most well-known such case, which would come to be known as the Varga-György and Associates Spy Trial.

The study uses the drawn-out multiyear legal case against lawyer György Varga and his associates as a tangible representation of the proceedings and deliberations that these cases involved while also providing a sense of the public mood at the time. Although their case may have been the most publicized, there were many other similar spy trials taking place.

Yugoslav authorities accused Varga and his associates of spying for Hungary and of laying the groundwork for an insurrection. During the lengthy trial, however, no actual, factual evidence was brought against them, so the first-instance verdict was based on the testimony of the accused, which had been coerced through merciless brutality. Shortly after the verdict, both György Varga and Gyula Ignác died as a result of brutal torture and merciless prison conditions.

Although the first-instance verdict in Szabadka (Subotica) was nullified by the Novi Sad Appeals Court a few months later, the Yugoslav Court of Cassation – primarily because of political considerations – reversed the appeals court and upheld the first-instance verdict.

Although the *monstre* trial made use of the accessories and techniques of a show trial, to this day it is impossible to ascertain the validity of the accusations. However, what is certain is that this trial and the others like it were one of the most effective psychological weapons employed against the minority Hungarians in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and provided the means of demonstrating the accusation of collective Hungarian irredentism to Slavic society.

MÁTÉ GALI

“THE GRAND OLD MAN” OF CULTURAL LIFE IN THE HORTHY ERA:
ALBERT BERZEVICZY

Albert Berzeviczy (1853–1936) was one of the leading figures in the culturally diverse and rich Horthy Era. He led the Hungarian Academy of Sciences from 1905 until his death; he was the founding president of the Mátyás Corvin Hungarian–Italian Scientific, Literary, Artistic and Social Association in 1920; and he also became head of the Kisfaludy Society, a prestigious literary association, in 1923.

In the interests of defending his generally conservative literary and esthetic values, Berzeviczy came forth with an interpretation of Hungarian poet Sándor Petőfi’s politically-themed poems following the fall of the Republic of Councils in Hungary. The (political-ideological) objective of his line of thinking was to prove that the great Hungarian poet neither believed in revolutionism nor held radical leftwing beliefs. In the 1920’s he spoke about the division in Hungarian literature and about the works of poet Endre Ady. He was convinced that a “definite break” existed in Hungarian literature, consisting of a conservative-patriotic side and a liberal-international one. According to Berzeviczy, Ady Endre was undoubtedly the most outstanding representative of the latter. Although leftwing writers attacked Berzeviczy for this opinion, as president of the Kisfaludy Society he endeavored to fix the rift between the two sides.

Berzeviczy led the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in a conservative spirit. During the Interwar Era, academic awards and the prestigious Greguss Award of the Kisfaludy Society were almost always given to conservative writers, with only a few exceptions. For a long time during his tenure, the role of deputy director was filled by conservative academics exclusively.

Berzeviczy was considered as a genuine polymath who, over the course of his long life, wrote important works on Queen Beatrix of Aragon, the Italian Renaissance, and between 1922 and 1937, a four-volume set on the Neoabsolutist Era. For a long time, this latter series of books was considered as a foundational canonical work, and to this day experts on the era refer to it as a definitive work.

That Albert Berzeviczy was one of the first recipients of the prestigious Corvin Chain (awarded by Regent Miklós Horthy) in October 1930 shows that his roles as both an academic and academic promoter were greatly appreciated during the Horthy Era. For the Corvin Chain was so prestigious an award that only writers, artists and scientists whose contributions to Hungarian art or science were of the highest merit were considered.

GÁBOR HOLLÓSI
THE PERFECT ELECTORAL LAW:
SÁNDOR BEREZCZ'S 1932 ELECTORAL LAW DRAFT

At the beginning of the 1930's, the Bethlen, Károlyi and Gömbös administrations all included electoral law reform in their programs. Writers from all over the political spectrum and various social organizations produced numerous electoral law drafts, one of which was a remarkable model springing from the pen of Sándor Berecz, one of the preeminent thinkers on electoral law of the era. The focus of our study is this model, which was made public in 1932.

As an introduction we provide a brief but comprehensive look at the life and works of Berecz, whose name – unfortunately – is little known today. Before familiarizing the reader with a given essential element of his draft, we examine corresponding parts in the 1925 Electoral Law Act in order to better understand what points Berecz's draft wished to improve. After breaking down a given thematic unit of the draft, we jump ahead to 1938 (and 1937, to a modification of nomination rules) to see how it was implemented in the new electoral law act. Finally we discuss a few electoral law issues that Berecz partially or wholly addressed outside of his draft. In the concluding chapter, we analyze the authenticity of Berecz's ideas and try to determine his place on the political palette of the era.

LÁSZLÓ BERNÁT VESZPRÉMY
NEVER-BEFORE-READ LETTERS FROM THE COLLECTION
OF ISTVÁN LENDVAI.

In the following work, we shine a light on nine never-before-read letters from the collection of István Lendvai, who was a racist writer, politician, poet and, according to one account, martyr executed by the Arrow Cross. All of the letters were in the possession of the Lendvai family, and we have published them with the permission of the family, above all that of Klára Lendvai, the daughter of István Lendvai. In regard to the publication of sources, we consider Peter Sipos' 20th century guide as authoritative. The sentences contain numerous grammatical errors and archaic spelling, which we have left unchanged. In almost every instance, any editing of the sentences has been indicated; in-text citations have been footnoted. For biographical information on the individuals in the letters, the reader should check János Gyurgyák's related work. For information on their relationship to Lendvai, the reader should see historian Ákos Bartha's study and my earlier writings.

MIHÁLY NOSZKÓ-HORVÁTH

THE INSTITUTION OF MILITARY LABOR CONSCRIPTS DURING
WWII IN THE LIGHT OF HUNGARIAN RESTITUTION LAW /
RESTITUTIONARY DOCUMENTS ON MILITARY FORCED LABOR

In the wake of the System Changeover, providing legal (both ethical and monetary) restitution to the victims and / or the heirs of the victims of the earlier dictatorial regime became a possibility in the newly democratic Hungary. Eligible for restitution were individuals whose property had been seized, whose personal freedoms had been curtailed or who had lost a loved one at the hands of the political system. Although many cases qualifying for restitution – including of individuals conscripted to military labor service because of their political / religious beliefs or their ethnicity during WWII – have already been processed and looked at, their stories cannot, for the time being, be presented on a case-by-case basis (only spoken of in generalities) due to the torpid pace of the restitutionary process itself and information privacy laws. In addition to describing the characteristics of restitution as it relates to WWII-era military labor conscripts, the study examines the history of personal injury restitution legislation.

DÁVID KISS

THE FORMATION OF THE “WORKERS’ MILITIA”, THE ORGANIZING GUARD, OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN 1945

In Soviet-occupied Hungary in 1945, the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) was the political power that the occupiers favored. From the beginning, the HCP considered it crucial to seize as many positions of power as possible, especially in the armed organizations. Nonetheless these moves proved insufficient for the needs of the party, so using earlier international and Hungarian organizational designs, the party formed its own militia, the so-called Organizing Guard (OG). Working together with the Allied Commission, which was dominated by the Soviets, the party strived to increase membership in the OG while simultaneously working to decrease the number of soldiers in the army, discarding anyone who did not maximally serve the interests of the party.

By 1947 the process had led to the point that if the HCP had been so inclined, it could have seized control of the entire country with its own fighting force! In Bulgaria, the communists had indeed utilized their militia, which was similar to the OG, when they took over the country. During the preliminary negotiations at the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties, the Western powers sought a Soviet withdrawal from the Eastern European countries, so it was no coincidence that the formation of the OG advanced at an increased pace throughout 1946. Due to space constraints, the study does not go through the history of the HCP Organizing Guard beyond the beginning of 1946, but does analyze the formation of the foundation of the unit in detail.

JÁNOS RÁCZ

MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE
AND NEGOTIATIONS IN 1946 AND 1947

In June 1946, as in 1919, France played host to the victors of the world war. Several French scientists feared that poor decisions would be repeated. The Anglo-American media had not anticipated that the number of great powers would be halved, that the Soviet Union and the United States of America alone would decide the fate of the smaller states. Instead of referring to the two great powers, or superpowers as they would be known, the Anglo-American media were more inclined to report on France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States working together. They suggested that those four countries were equally responsible for the post-WWII arrangement. Moreover, they reported that the Soviet Union rebuffed attempts by the smaller powers to modify preliminary arrangements at the Paris conference. Australian Minister of External Affairs Herbert Vere Evatt, referred to as the spokesman for the “small victors” in the media, was treated sympathetically by the Anglo-American great powers, but the Soviet *Pravda* and the Hungarian *Szabad Nép* communist dailies gave him the role of anti-peace imperialist reactionary. All Evatt had asked for was to use a simple majority voting system at the conference, which would have given the smaller nations greater say on the proceedings.

Among Hungarian correspondents, Iván Boldizsár considered the greatest accomplishment of the peace conference to be that war had been avoided between the superpowers. The two sides had been able to cooperate. Boldizsár’s thinking was in line with Anglo-American opinions. Communist overrepresentation prevailed in Hungarian newsreels. Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, who had traveled to the Soviet Union but had also met with the leaders of the Western powers prior to the start of the conference, was shown only a few times. Of particular interest was that upon the return of the Hungarian delegation, which had been led by Nagy, from Moscow in April 1946, Nagy gave a speech with optimistic and convincing overtones; nonetheless his rhetoric made a contradictory impression. Thus it seemed that Josef Vissarionovich Stalin had not misled the Hungarian politician. For the sake of appearances, Nagy had simply played the role of a politician who had put his trust in Moscow.

Hungarian Communist Party ideologue József Révai published a piece on May 15th, 1947, that crushed the illusions of the Smallholders Party. He implied that Soviet troops would not be withdrawing from Hungary even after the ratification of the peace treaty. In other words, the Soviet Union would continue building “democracy” in Hungary.

TIBOR ZINNER
ZIONISM BEFORE THE LAW IN HUNGARY, 1945–53

By March 1945, the newly organized secret police had assumed control over much of Hungarian economic life, infiltrating high levels of the newly established parties of the coalition and becoming interested in various international relief organizations like, for example, the JOINT. It considered these organizations partly as legal supporters of democracy and partly as sources of intelligence for American capitalist circles. The last troops of the Wehrmacht and the SS were still fighting on Hungarian soil when a half-page report was drafted on April 5th “on the phenomena observed in connection with the JOINT”. This was the beginning of intelligence work concerning Hungarian Jewish representatives of political and economic life as well as representatives of foreign relief organizations that practically lasted until the 1956 Hungarian Revolution erupted.

The present study deals with the attacks against Zionism as the “outpost of American imperialism”, against leaders of the JOINT, and against certain leading Hungarian Jewish individuals up to summer 1953 when the Rákosi – Gerő regime was at least partially eliminated by Moscow. Following the end of the war, the persons accused of collaboration were the first to be put to trial. While in 1946 the Hungarian Communist Party, wishing to assume power, declared that the “Jewish question” would be solved automatically in the course of the “people’s democratic revolution”, by 1949–50 its standpoint had changed dramatically. Its leaders considered the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust as potential Zionists, as enemies of the Hungarian people. During the “anti-Zionist” trials of the day, the “Jewish question” was no longer a religious one but had a political and ideological bias, becoming a dominant element of the ideology about an international Jewish conspiracy supporting American imperialism. All this occurred a mere five years after the catastrophe that had befallen hundreds of thousands. The survivors reasonably concluded that anti-Semitism was returning on the state level. The strict legal measures were completed by similarly strict administrative ones like the relocation of families and other measures involving serious financial losses. Thousands of Hungarian Jews were inflicted by them as well.

Following the failure of the JOINT case in late 1949, the Zionist trials of 1953 served to support the scapegoat theory even during the so-called New Phase. The concept of sinful Zionism ended only after Stalin’s death, though not immediately. All in all, these trials exposed the vices not of Zionism but of Stalinism itself.

Translated by Zinnerné Bodó Judit

JÁNOS SÁRINGER

FOREIGN POLICY VS. FOREIGN RELATIONS IN HUNGARY: 1947–1955
ISSUE OUTLINE

Sovereignty has no universally accepted definition. Most experts agree that no state has perfect sovereignty. Some deny that sovereignty exists, while according to others, classical sovereignty and systems of the modern state are incompatible. The various schools of theory of international relations vary in their understanding of sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty starts with the belief that each state enjoys sovereignty.

Looking at the European continent, the Westphalian system, the international structure based on a foundation of sovereignty, evolved from the middle of the 17th century to the 19th century, by which time it had come to define the system of relations among the European states. Following WWII, in parallel on both the victorious and vanquished sides, new unequal relationships (leading, subordinate and aligned) came into existence in the international system. In the new European architecture, even as the theory of international sovereignty among the states remained, the exercising of power over a given territory (the Westphalian principle) nonetheless was curtailed.

From a historical perspective, sovereignty in a certain sense is synonymous with independence, which means that the state (monarchy, democracy and dictatorship, including its various offshoots) freely conducts both its domestic and international affairs. The opposite of independence is subjection, which means that an external power holds political and/or military control over a defined territory.

Moscow conveyed its demands to the Hungarian communist leadership via informal means, often bypassing officially written documentation. In the forefront were tools of intelligence, and the Hungarian leadership often would make a decision after hearing the news from Moscow. On those occasions within (and outside) the bloc ruled by Moscow, the domestic party and the government leadership could not disregard the relevant demands put on them, nor did they wish to. Those individuals toiling in foreign relations were kept within a strictly controlled framework; Hungarian diplomats did not enjoy any meaningful flexibility. The highest level of leadership in the Hungarian Working People's Party – including the available party framework – towed the immutable "line"; there was no leeway.

Foreign relations is the management of relations (political, economic, commercial, scientific and humanitarian) for states and state organizations with other states and state organizations. This system of relations aligns the state and state organizations with the objectives and principles of foreign policy. Foreign relations among states

and state organizations is maintained via diplomacy and within a consulate framework. Perhaps a more accurate word to describe the case of Hungary between 1947 and 1955 would be foreign relations instead of foreign policy.

Closely related to the issue of sovereignty and foreign policy is sending and receiving protocol of ambassadors. Among reviewed diplomatic historical works published in French between the 17th and 20th centuries, sending and receiving protocol for both permanent and ad hoc diplomatic representatives was consistently tied to sovereignty; moreover, not a single author tied it to a state's putative or real status as a great power.

ANDRÁS JOÓ

“PERHAPS HE STILL REMEMBERS ME...”

GENERAL RUDOLF ANDORKA'S 1954 WRITTEN ASSESSMENT
ON FOUR BRITISH DIPLOMATS

The staff officers of the onetime VFK-2 Division, i.e. the Hungarian “Deuxième Bureau”, who were involved in military intelligence and counterintelligence but did not flee Hungary following 1945 could not avoid the watchful eye of the state security organs of the Communist regime. The leaders of state security in the newly established system wished to detail the workings and former network of their earlier counterparts. The officers of state security under the Communist regime were interested in the knowledge and relationships of the previous intelligence and counterintelligence experts; as a result the former officers of the VFK-2 Division were forced to make numerous analyses and shorter reminiscences. These were written under severe duress and/or with fear for one’s own prospects. General Rudolf Andorka’s assessments were written under similar conditions in 1954 and collected in a so-called “research” dossier. Andorka had been the head of Hungarian military intelligence and counterintelligence from August 1937 to May 1939, after which he became the Hungarian minister in Madrid. The general enjoyed the good graces of Prime Minister Pál Teleki, who authorized him to lobby the British and French on behalf of Hungary, and – as Andorka had said about his assignment – “to keep the window to the West open”.

The source material that follows the introduction of the study thus comes from a state security dossier and contains brief bios on four distinguished British diplomats whom Andorka had gotten to know more closely while still in Budapest (as head of intelligence and counterintelligence) or as the Hungarian minister in Madrid. The longest of these bios concerns Sir Samuel Hoare, the distinguished statesman and diplomat who had been sent to Madrid as ambassador during WWII. Andorka wrote a shorter profile on Hoare’s ambassadorial predecessor Sir Maurice Peterson, while also writing tersely on the activities of Sir Geoffrey George Knox, envoy to Budapest. Finally he profiled in some length Alvary Douglas Frederick Gascoigne, First Secretary of the British Legation in Budapest, who had served for a long time in Hungary, where he would be once again commissioned in spring 1945. Only two of General Andorka’s valuable diaries had survived, which were published in 1978. The source material and the dossier that contained it, if only modestly, compensate for some of the missing pages of the lost diaries

PATRÍCIA GECSÉNYI

FINDING A WAY OUT TOGETHER: CHANGES IN AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS 1953–1956

Following the conclusion of WWII, Austro-Hungarian relations appeared to be increasingly normalizing, but then bottomed out between 1950 and 1952, a period referred to as the Ice Age of the Cold War. Many months later, tentative signs of change between the two countries began to appear in Budapest, as an aftereffect of easement in the Soviet Union begun following the death of J. V. Stalin. Not only were diplomatic relations restored to the embassy level in 1954, the mention of somehow mending relations between the two countries came up time and again at party and state events.

The Hungarian side was driven by economic interests, i.e. the potential opportunities offered by the West, while the Austrian side was interested in mitigating tensions along their shared border, where the danger of armed conflict was real, and in settling questions related to property law. The breakthrough finally occurred in spring 1955 following the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, when the Hungarian government, on the basis of the decision of the Communist Party leadership, let loose a hodgepodge of token proposals on the Austrian government in the hope that fundamental changes could occur in a short matter of time. These included allowing individuals with either Austrian or dual citizenship (previously illegal) who resided in Hungary the right to leave the country, granting clemency to convicted Austrian citizens, continuing property law negotiations, strengthening cooperation in transportation and water resource management and bolstering commercial, literary, artistic and scientific ties.

On July 7th, 1955, Hungarian Communist Party leader Mátyás Rákosi met the Austrian ambassador for a lengthy discussion to find solutions to these issues. In the ensuing months, significant progress occurred: entry and exit admittances were issued, Hungarian ministers were invited to Vienna and tensions along the border subsided. All these were but an overture for what was to come after spring 1956, and offered the possibility for the formation of a unique relationship model.

In March 1956 the political committee of the Hungarian Communist Party passed a resolution authorizing the removal of the mine field and barbed wire fence (the “Iron Curtain”) that lay along the two countries’ common border. Two months later, the work was begun. Working at a fast pace, by the middle of September all mines had been cleared away and the border opened, which of course did not mean free travel for all, even as flights were reestablished between the two capitals. Austrian

political leaders observed the changes with caution. In a statement made to a Hungarian newspaper, Federal Chancellor of Austria Julius Raab remarked that the Hungarian measures had significantly contributed to the prevailing favorable mood and advanced the cause of normalization. The events of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, however, would overwrite all earlier initiatives and open a new chapter between the two countries.

JUDIT ANTÓNIA FARKAS

“WHAT THEY WERE ALLOWED TO SAY THEY SAID; THE REST
THEY CENSORED.” THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION THROUGH
THE EYES OF BUDAPEST-BASED CORRESPONDENTS OF ITALIAN
COMMUNIST NEWSPAPERS – PART II

As I pointed out in the first part of this study when analyzing the articles of two Budapest-based correspondents of *l'Unità*, the flagship daily of the Italian Communist Party, the newspaper in no way deviated from the dogmatically anti-revolutionary stance of the Italian communist leadership. Even so, the leadership was not able to prevent the communist media from airing “critical” voices on their other forums: articles and article excerpts that, unlike the official party stance, tried to paint a more objective picture of the events in Hungary. The case of Sergio Perucchi is a good example. The special correspondent for the communist weekly *Vie Nuove* spent almost two weeks in Budapest. Having witnessed the reality of the situation, he wrote about what he had seen instead of parroting the party line, the consequence of which was revision of his articles. Nonetheless, alongside the demonstrably false and extremist depictions and reports, some heterodox details and opinions found their way into *l'Unità*. Three of Perucchi's articles, illustrated with photographs he had taken, on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution were published. Using his notes, photographs and his memoir published forty years later, we have tried to reconstruct how he really felt about the events that had unfolded before him. We look at his writings and compare them to what was published, namely what parts of his reporting were censored. We also look at the methods the Communist Party leadership used to misinform the readers of the weekly. In the next (and concluding) part of the study, I analyze the articles of Giorgio Bontempi, the fourth communist correspondent.

PÉTER MIKLÓS – ESZTER ZSÓFIA TÓTH
HUNGARIAN STATE SECURITY SURVEILLANCE OF CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRAT POLITICIAN LÁSZLÓ VARGA IN THE UNITED STATES
IN THE 1960'S

Using heretofore concealed state security sources, we analyze the life of László Varga, a distinguished Christian Democrat politician and one of the prominent figures of the Hungarian Diaspora, in the United States. He became president of the Józsefváros Christian Youth Workers Association in 1937. Having participated in the anti-German resistance in 1944, he was arrested by the Arrow Cross State Audit Office. In the confines of his flat the Democratic People's Party had been founded, and between 1947 and 1948, he served in the National Assembly as their MP, where the Hungarian Communist Party attacked him relentlessly. Anticipating his imminent arrest, he emigrated in 1948.

Hungarian State Security (HSS) kept László Varga under surveillance and monitored his letters. The surviving documents are a rich source of information on the everyday life of the politician. HSS tried to recruit Varga when he lived in the United States, but the attempt was unsuccessful. That Varga had declined to work with HSS was proof of his integrity and allegiance. Unfortunately the same could not be said of Varga's childhood friend in Hungary, who was turned. Through Varga's letters, his life in the United States unfolds: we read about his travel adventures, his thoughts on technological advancements, domestic life and travel weariness. Even from thousands of miles away, he tried to tend to the needs of his loved ones. We also learn new information about such Hungarian émigrés as Lajos Zilahy and Katalin Karády.