

SUMMARY

Zs. P. Pach: Széchenyi and the regulation of the Lower Danube in 1830—32

The idea of Széchenyi regarding the regulation of the lower reaches of the Danube conceived upon the influence of the consequences of the 1828—29 Russian—Turkish war. Namely, the Peace of Adrianople in September 1829 reflected another important step towards the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and raised the problem of the opening of navigable water before ships along the Danube quite to the Black Sea. Széchenyi formed his ideas into a system on his voyage on the Lower Danube in the Summer of 1830. Its main points were the following: an effective preparation in the field of foreign policy as the background of the enterprise, building of roads along the banks of the river, the regulation of the Moldova—Orsova stretch, and the blowing up of the rocks in the Iron Gates. This would be the order of the events. Its form of organization would be a Royal Commissariat for the Lower Danube, and the financial support would come from the subsidies from all landowners. This latter was based upon the expert opinion of József Beszédes, water-engineer, who thought, the regulation would cause significant fall of the water level along the Danube throughout Hungary, limiting the danger of floods in the country.

It was in September 1830 that the first steamer plied its way along the Danube. It belonged to the Dunagőzhajózási Társulat (Danube Steamer Company). Széchenyi at first had reservations towards this joint stock company with Austrian interest, but he gave them up in the course of 1831, mainly after Pál Vásárhelyi, water-engineer, proved that Beszédes was wrong questioning by this the planned subsidy form all landlords, i. e. the solution of the regulation of the waterways on the basis of the equal sacrifice theory. Thus Széchenyi turned to the Company in early 1832 wanting to use the financial means of the Company also for the purposes of the regulation of the Danube. On receiving the answer of the Directorial Board, however, he had to recognize that the joint solution of the problems of steam shipping and the regulation might have been advisable in theory, but was impossible in practice. Consequently, he developed his theory as follows: the two causes must be separate on the organizational level, shipping as a joint stock company, regulation as a state enterprise. But the two enterprises must be linked in as many ways as possible: on the one hand by that the representatives of the state buy shares at the Company and ensure many kinds of advantages for it, and on the other hand by that the Company adjusts its business policy to the demands of the state's foreign policy. Last but not least, it must be ensured that in the cooperation of the state and the big capitalists the Hungarian big landowners as the actual leading elements of economic reform, should get an ever growing role, i. e. that the Hungarian aristocrats should have an ever growing share in the Company.

In accordance with this idea the Directorial Board of the Company drew up a petition and presented it to Great Prince Joseph, Palatine of Hungary in April 1833. The positive attitude of the Palatine took shape in governmental measures in two months: the ruler appointed Széchenyi Commissioner of the Lower Danube on 26 June 1833, and the Palatine made Pál Vásárhelyi director-engineer beside the Royal Commissioner on the same day, and appointed his technical staff, too.

The idea of equal sacrifice, discarded here, was later applied by Széchenyi at another great enterprise of his: the building of the stone bridge between Pest and Buda, which was one of his earlier plans, but the first steps towards its realization were taken in those days. In contrast to the earlier opinions, English engineers established in those days that it was possible to build a safe chainbridge there which could resist ice and would not cause floods. The building of the bridge could not wait until the regulation of the Danube was over.

P. Sándor: The trial for the redistribution of landed property at Bogdány as reflected by the classification process

The knowledge of the redistribution processes in connection with landed property following the emancipation of the serfs is indispensable to the examination of the bourgeois transformation of Hungarian economic life and society. This paper is the continuation of a series of the author's former works on this subject. It is primarily of *methodical* character as far as the application of sources is concerned, it shows us one of the most crucial stages of the redistribution process: the surveying of the former lands of the landowners and villeins according to *quality* and the *modes* of their redistribution. None of the works on this subject has examined this aspect so far, or at least not with the critical method necessary to this, though it has special significance in this case.

The parties to the action fight for ever bigger and ever better lands as to position and quality, and their free possession after 1848 with the help of the court. The classification of the arable lands progresses in a certain order as the legal class struggle of the parties under the leadership of a surveyor paid by the landlord. This procedure is one of the indispensable prerequisites of the separation of the former manorial and villeins' lands dictated also by capitalist development.

The qualitative evaluation of the land, the classification of its various parts, and the establishing of the measurements to be applied — which determined also the size of the measured land — gave possibility to any kind of manipulations on the part of the surveyors. The paper shows this complicated process through the case of the Bogdány trial, showing also the consequences of a typical form of manipulation.

The real purpose of the author, however, goes beyond the introduction of this interesting case. He wants to illustrate by this example that the quantitative results can be applied to illustrate reality only in the knowledge of the whole historical process, within its framework. This is his methodical principle. Figures do not speak in themselves, but rather tempt the historian to a mystification of the qualitative method. Figures can be made useful in interpreting history only through the knowledge of the historical process in question.

T. I. Berend—Gy. Ránki: Contribution to the problems of East-European economic development between the two world wars

The paper sums up some new aspects of the subject raised recently. Its starting point is that if we examine the traditional factors of production (labour force, capital, i. e. land and technology) in Eastern Europe in this period, we have to modify the earlier approaches regarding the manpower utilization. It is true that the extensive utilization of manpower is basically a negative factor in economic life, and it was so in those times, too, but at the same time it made a more intensive economy possible at certain places just by this overutilization of manpower under the East-European, not clearly capitalistic conditions.

Later the authors point out that it was possible in Hungary even in those times to extend the territory under cultivation to a certain extent, and establish that there can little progress be observed in the modernization of the structure of production. There was little progress also in the cultivation of plants demanding more labour power. As far as industrial development is concerned, the authors examine mainly those factors in post-war world economy which determined the slowness of development between the two world wars. They mention those economic and political factors in consequence of which industrialization came to the forefront of economic policy, and show that this industrialization was in fact one aiming at import-substitution, which, *ceteris paribus*, involved its limits. In the case of the totally underdeveloped Balkan states this import substitution was of greater significance than in that of the moderately developed states like Poland or Hungary, but it meant anyway a technically backward, consumers' industry-oriented industrialization in both cases.

Traffic and transport and the other social services developed very slowly in the mid-war period, partly owing to the continuous deficiency of the budget, partly to the smaller volume of foreign loans and their unfavourable utilization. According to the view of the authors, foreign capital did not fulfil its role in stimulating development even to the extent it did before 1914, and the foreign trade of the region had to struggle with relatively serious difficulties owing to the terms of trade, the lack of market, and the onesidedness of the structure of the exports. There are few signs of modernization in economic life (for example the greater share of industry in the national income); taking all together, backwardness became deeper in many respects, the inner contradictions between the developing and the stagnating, the backward and the modernized sectors became still sharper in the examined period.

T. Csató: Some major features of the development of Hungarian home trade in the capitalist era

The paper outlines some important features of the same development of home trade showing them at the same time against the European background, illustrating the effects of the general European tendencies in Hungary primarily on the basis of the Hungarian census returns, occupational and factory statistics.

The most important prerogative of making domestic trade more intensive was the abolition of the impeding feudal conditions and the revolutionization of traffic and transport.

The most influential factor in the conditions of home trade was the ever smaller extent of self-sufficiency, which followed mainly from the smaller per cent of the agricultural population and the growing population of the towns. The relationship of urbanization and trade is also shown by an analysis by types of settlements on the basis of the data of Hungary from the years 1910 and 1930. It can be seen from this that the concentration of the industrial population in the towns is approximatively twice as great as that of the total population, while the concentration of the workers of trade and finance is almost one and a half times as big as that of those working in industry.

In the first phase of the development of home trade under capitalist conditions, the pre-capitalist forms of trade, i. e. faires, market-places, and huckstery, and the small trade of small-scale producers did not only survive, but were more and more extending their activity. The first to fall into the background was huckstery, but the first town market-halls were built only as late as the 19th century. At the same time the actual trade in the shops had just begun developing. New commercial occupations appear, the most numerous of which is that of the salesmen or sales agents.

In the second phase of development industrial revolution became more extensive, urbanization began, and actual trade developed significantly, generating specialized fields of commerce. In the villages we find grocer's shops in growing numbers, in the towns the number of specialized shops is growing with an ever bigger proportion of shops selling industrial products. On the basis of the data of the period between 1890 and 1930 we get a detailed picture of the concentration of trade in the cities, the changes in its sectoral structure, the distribution of the employees, and the specific growth of the number of the employees as compared to the total population.

In the third phase we can witness the spread of the new forms of commerce, i. e. warehouses, cooperatives, companies with subsidiaries, etc., which were in a very elementary state in the previous phase, if at all. By these means and by the changes in technology and structure, home trade strove to adapt to the demands of mass production and mass consumption. In consequence of the fact that self-sufficiency did in fact not exist any more and trade gathered speed, new trends developed, which — in contrast with the former ones — pointed towards despecialization.

Concentration was significant in the first two phases only in wholesale trade, while small-scale trade remained basically fragmented; more than three fifths of the shops had only one man working in them without an assistant in Hungary in the mid-war period. In the third phase concentration became stronger even in the small-scale trade within the framework of big enterprises.

R. Berthold: The German farm machine and artificial fertilizer industry and its formation from the aspect of national economy, 1850—1870

The first part of the paper examines the causes of the fact that the agricultural machine and artificial fertilizer industry was brought about just around the middle of the 19th century. The author considers the development of industry (iron casting and machine industry), the consequences of the elimination of serfdom, the relative providedness of the landowners with capital, the emigration of the farm labourers, and the favourable changes in the possibilities of marketing as the stimulating factors of this development.

Agricultural development was further stimulated also by the existence of the German customs union, the development of traffic and transportation, and the liberal economic policy. As a consequence of the latter the agricultural machines were imported mainly from England, and German machine industry lagged behind the English and the American ones. In contrast with this, Germany was in the forefront in the field of agrochemistry. The scientific foundations of fertilizer industry were laid by Liebig and other German chemists.

The agricultural machines and the artificial fertilizers were mainly used with special plant cultures: in vegetable gardens, and in fruit and vine cultures. The economically forward territories took the lead in the application of these new methods also in the later years.

The formation of the agricultural machine industry in Germany took place by the period between the eighteen-fifties and seventies. The rural blacksmiths' and locksmiths' shops or the machine-merchants' repair shops took over the production of agricultural machines, and in some cases existing machine factories or ironworks were specialized for this purpose. Owing to the difficulties in marketing, the production of the traditional agricultural implements prevailed also in the future in spite of the developments in technology and the significant innovations. Agricultural machine industry started to develop only from the eighteen-seventies onwards.

II. J. Schröder: South-Eastern Europe as Germany's informal empire in 1933—1939 with special regard to Yugoslavia

The South-Eastern states can be considered parts of the informal empire of the Third Reich as early as the mid-thirties. The West-German author shows the development of this situation on the example of the Yugoslav—German economic relations, establishing first that Hitler's Germany applied economic relations as means of foreign policy.

The author first points out those factors which made South-East-European expansion possible from within: the getting out of the economic crisis, the inner prosperity and the slackening of the necessity of exports as a consequence, and the Neuer Plan decree in the Autumn of 1934 placing almost the whole of foreign trade under state control.

Germany applied the principle of bilateral concessions and the pressure of a passive trade against Yugoslavia as well as against the other states of the region. This policy — much delayed and at first of forced character — brought success for Germany. On the one hand the clearing system forced Yugoslavia to increase its imports from Germany thus making the passivity of German trade less serious, on the other hand it made Yugoslavia its satellite both economically and politically and tore it out of the sphere of Britain, France and Italy, making French security system weaker.

It is characteristic of the unbalanced state of the economic relations that Germany's share in the Yugoslavian foreign trade in 1938 was around 40—50 per cent, but the exports to and the imports from Yugoslavia amounted to merely 3 per cent of the German foreign trade. The events of the Spring of 1941 show unambiguously that the assumption of some historians that the Yugoslav—German economic relations were based on parity is totally false. Hitlerite Germany, when seeing that its informal influence is not so strong any more, applied formal rule, military occupation.

Finally the author analyses how far this economic policy possessed characteristically national socialist traits or how far it was a continuation of the South-East-European policy of the Weimar Republic. The national socialist policy in connection with this region actually had its roots in the tradition of German foreign policy before 1933, and it realized the aims of the latter. The author sees the specifically national socialist features of this policy in the exceedingly consistent foreign policy in favour of the fulfilment of the German economic needs, and in the oppression of inner opposition.

I. Wellmann: Population and agriculture at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries

As an introduction to the subject the author outlines the unfavourable changes in the population data of Hungary in the 16th and 17th centuries. Owing to the Turkish rule, or rather to the wars and the often accompanying epidemics, which it implies, the number of the inhabitants of Hungary grew from the 4 million of 1500 to 4.2 million by 1680, the eve of the war expelling the Turks for good. Our share in the population of Europe fell from 5.8 per cent to 3.8 per cent. While the population of Europe grew in those eighteen years by 58.7 per cent, that of Hungary grew only by five.

But real destruction came only after this: the wars against the Turks, the Mohamedan and Christian armies brought such misery to the country that viewing things from the point of view of the population, we can hardly find a period more depressing than the eighties and nineties of the 17th century, the author says.

After presenting the destruction of the wars and the data reflecting the diminishing number of localities, the author describes the new increase of population, which was the result partly of inner — mainly spontaneous — migration, partly of immigration of foreigners (Serbs, Roumanians and Germans above all), the latter being partly a conscious policy of the Hapsburgs, partly a spontaneous process.

Further, the author shows us the remarkable duality of the network of settlements, still observable around 1720. According to the 1720 census there was an average of 5.2 per cent

of localities in one hundred square kilometres in „Royal Hungary” without Croatia, and Transylvania. At the same time, in the former occupied territories (the Banat, the would-be Slovenia and the military border zone excepted) desolation was so great that there were only 2.2 localities in one hundred square kilometres. The average density of the population was, however, greater in the Turkish territories, the cause of which was — beside the geographic conditions — the experience of the Turkish rule that in open areas it is safer to live close to the neighbours in bigger communities in the continuous uncertainty of wealth and existence.

The changes in the network of settlements influenced the forms of settlement and the mode of farming.

The vast territories among the scattered villages served mainly as pastures for extensive stock-breeding. The Turkish rule resulted in the loosening of the feudal ties in many places, primarily in the village-towns of the Great Plains, but the standard of agriculture did not develop significantly even after driving out the Turks.