

SUMMARY

T. Hajdu: The Start of Mihály Károlyi's Political Career (1901—1909)

Although in his memoirs Mihály Károlyi marks 1909 as the actual beginning of his political career, he entered political life as early as 1899, when he was appointed member of the Table of Magnates, and when in 1901 he stood for election, even if he did not get into Parliament then. He plunged deep into politics during the crisis of 1905. He joined the Independence Party as a follower of Albert Apponyi, and was elected member of the shortlived House of Commons for his own estate.

In 1905 Károlyi belonged to the so called „agrarian” group of landed aristocracy, fought for their unity and cherished good relations with other politicians outside his party e. g. with the „dissident liberal” followers of Gyula Andrassy and Sándor Károlyi. At that time he stood further from the radical wing of the Independence Party, but often expressed his disagreement with István Tisza's followers and the Fejérváry government.

During the Fejérváry government and in the period of national resistance he showed little, but unambiguous activity. Making use of his journey to America, he avoided participation in the 1906 elections, and did everything to evade the attempts at bringing him back to the field of politics. Although he remained throughout a supporter of the coalition, he watched its activity with criticism. From his objections we can conclude that he still found the slogans of national struggle exaggerated, propaganda-like, but at the same time he demanded more social measures from the Wekerle government in the spirit of Sándor Károlyi. His recorded views even show that he studied socialism with ever growing interest already in those days.

During the coalition government Károlyi pursued social activity partly as the member of the directorial board of a consumers' co-operative „Hangya”, partly as chairman of various nationalistic cultural societies. Much more important than this was his election for the presidency of OMGE (National Association of Hungarian Landowners) in February and April 1909. He was elected twice, because he rejected the post for the first time. The essay calls attention to the political significance of this event: the candidacy of Count Zelenski as a rival of Aurél Dessewffy was part of István Tisza's careful preparations to regain power. Károlyi, as a man supported by all political groups in the coalition was to prevent the OMGE getting into the hands of Tisza and Zelenski.

L. Arday: Anglo-Hungarian Relations during the Hungarian Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution (October 1918—March 1919)

This topic — as well as the foreign policy, as a whole, of the Károlyi-Government — has so far been dealt with mainly on the basis of Hungarian and American documents. (A. Low, Zs. L. Nagy, T. Hajdu). This study tries to give a more detailed account, making use of the documents, recently opened for the public in the Public Record Office, London.

One of the basic events which decisively influenced the future of East-Central-Europe was the historic decision of the British War Cabinet in the second half of November, rejecting the French proposal to occupy the two revolutionary capitals, Vienna and Budapest. The representatives of the old „balance of power” policy (Curzon, Sir E. Geddes) had to accept the arguments of Barnes, a man of the Labour, who warned them of the unfavourable consequences among the working masses and those of the „Empire-minded” Balfour, Milner and Sir H. Wilson, who easily „wrote off” this region.]

The biased pro-Slav and pro-Roumanian line of the Foreign Office — Crowe, Nicolson, Namier, Leeper — was actually backed by these „imperialists”, and they were given a free hand at the Paris Peace Conference.

At the beginning they regarded Károlyi as a „more palatable” representative of the old, oppressive Hungarian aristocracy, who insisted on the integrity of the historic Hungary. Later on — partly under the influence of such Hungarian emissaries and politicians as Count Bánffy, Bethlen and Esterházy — Károlyi and his regime became in the Allied capitals more and more suspicious as „extremely radical” and „half-Bolshevik”.

The British — like the French — treated the new, democratic Hungary as an enemy state under the pretext of their German alliance — but in fact as a consequence of their commitment to satisfy all demands of the nationalistic Roumanian, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav governments.

This is why the British officials turned a deaf ear to a long series of official and semi-official attempts to make the Hungarian — generally different — views heard, as they were submitted by several statesmen and public personalities, from Bárczy to Archduke Joseph and from Károlyi to the Protestant bishops, although the Centre-Left Coalition led by Károlyi persisted in following their staunch pro-Allied foreign policy up to the very end.

Some of the more far-sighted British economic and military representatives (Sir W. Beveridge, Sir T. Cuninghame — their views were even shared by Gen. Thwaites and Curzon) — as well as the Americans — tried to work out schemes for maintaining at least the economic unity of the late Danubian Monarchy, but their efforts were thwarted by Crowe at Paris.

Gy. Litván: Documents of a Friendship: the Correspondence of Mihály Károlyi and Oszkár Jászi

The posthumous papers of Mihály Károlyi in Budapest, and those of Oszkár Jászi at the Columbia University in New York were opened for research recently, nearly at the same time. The material includes their correspondence between 1919 and 1949, very significant both in extent and in content. The present essay covers the history of the friendship, the personal as well as the political relationship of the two politicians primarily on the basis of the several hundred letters and also of other written or printed sources.

Beyond the fact that they were both born in 1875 and died in 1955 and 1957 resp., their lives were closely connected in many ways showing remarkable similarities and edifying conflicts of ideas, and finally taking different course as the two men gave dissimilar answers to the vital questions of the age, i. e. democracy and socialism in Hungary and in the rest of the world.

Károlyi, the big landowner aristocrat began as politically conservative and got as far as the acceptance of the ideas and demands of democracy and socialism in Hungary. In his development Jászi, who had been one of the leaders of the Hungarian democratic movements in cultural and political life since the very beginning of the century, played an important role. He was among the first in the progressive bloc to take notice of Károlyi's potential significance. In the 1910s they actually established relationship on the common platform of national independence and democratic transformation. This was the basis of their lasting friendship and close collaboration that existed not only during the bourgeois democratic revolution and era (October 1918 — March 1919) led by them, but also in the following five years, when they stood at the head of the group of Hungarian emigrants fighting against the counterrevolutionary regime at home. Nevertheless, from 1920 onwards the letters show repeated and ever sharper debates on the further aims, esp. their attitude to communism, the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party. Károlyi realized that the Soviet Union and the international communist movement formed a natural and indispensable power in the fight for international progress, and against European fascism and the Horthy regime. Jászi, however, was rigidly against the Leninist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and did everything to prevent his friend from collaborating with the communists. During Károlyi's lecture tour in America in 1930 their relationship suffered an open breach as far as politics were concerned. Their friendship and correspondence, however, remained intact, and even their political collaboration revived during the Second World War in the framework of the anti-fascist activity of the Hungarian emigrants in the West. When the war was over, Károlyi returned from his exile in England, and served better international understanding and European progress as the Ambassador of Hungary in Paris until 1949 when he felt he had to protest against the trial of Rajk and went into exile again. Jászi, though he, too, came back home for a short time in 1947, became more and more hostile to the development and regime in Hungary, and towards the beginning of 1949 he even threw up his friendship of thirty years with Károlyi. In 1955, after the death of Károlyi, however, he tried to recompense his faulty and unjust step with all his might, and show Károlyi's historical role and significance through an all-round inquiry sent to several emigrants, and a treatise on Károlyi which he had no time to finish.

J. Jennitz: Károlyi's Political Concepts and Foreign Connections during the Second World War

The changes brought about in Károlyi's life by the outbreak of the Second World War were smaller than those in the lives of the majority of his contemporaries. His political ideas had already been formed, and he urged for democratic reforms in Hungary such as a land reform, the abolition of the feudal political system and the German-oriented foreign policy. At the same time, however, he went beyond this in drawing the outlines of a socialist future with peacefully co-existing peoples in the Danube valley, or even a confederation among them.

Károlyi's foreign relations took shape according to these principles in politics. The outbreak of the war found him in exile in London, where he established closer relationships especially with left-wing Labour politicians such as Laski, Brailford, Bevan, E. Wilkinson and Straus. Naturally, in the course of anti-fascist activities he easily found the ways of collaboration with English intellectuals like B. Russel, J. Huxley, and T. S. Eliot in a later phase of the war, to say nothing of his relations with the representatives of the press.

As at that time London was a great meeting-place for all emigrants and exiles of Europe, Károlyi could naturally establish relations not only with the English, but also with the French, Czechoslovak (Jan Masaryk), Yugoslav (General Velebit), Spanish (Azcarate), and German politicians. It is noteworthy that inter-national antifascist organizations, like the Union of Democratic Control or the Fabian Society, also contacted him regularly, invited him to take part in their activities, asked information on the political developments in Hungary, and, what is more, they wanted to rely on him in the outlining of their plans for post-war Europe. Again, Károlyi's suggestions were given in due time, pointing towards the left, towards the socialist transformation of Europe.

These aspirations and plans had conceived in Károlyi's mind years earlier. Still we can see growing dynamism especially in his foreign connections during the war. While in the first two years of the war his activity and personal relations seem less vivid owing to the shock of 1938 and 1939, in 1941 and mainly in 1942 his relations expanded and quickened. He never evaded unambiguity and the debates following from this, e. g. with the BBC-men, who sympathized with Horthy's followers. It was just this consistency to his principles that made Western democrats and socialist honour him so much, as we can read in a letter of Laski from 1944.

J. Gerics: Defence of the Sovereignty of State and the Application of the „Two Laws” in Hungarian Chronicles of the 12th and 13th Centuries

Research of diplomatics and legal history found important proofs of the knowledge and application of the Roman and ecclesiastical law in thirteenth-century Hungarian charters.

Their statements are fully supported by the famous thirteenth-century canonist Cardinal Hostiensis. He says that the arguments of Roman law are generally quoted also in Hungary when the Hungarian unwritten law does not suffice.

The pioneers of Roman and canonical law in Hungary were the legal expert 'clerici regis'. The knowledge of Roman law was facilitated by the study of ecclesiastical law also in Hungary as in the whole of Europe. The elements of Roman law were conveyed primarily through the canon law, of which civil law can be considered almost an auxiliary science.

The study of Roman law and the application of its arguments in secular life as subsidiary sources all over Europe caused significant difficulties to the defenders of sovereignty in several states. Namely the emperors Stauf had incorporated their own laws into the Corpus Iustinianae as Authenticae since the legislation of Emperor Barbarossa at Roncaglia, and began to apply the renewed dogmas of Roman law as compulsory to the inhabitants of all territories that had formerly belonged to the Roman Empire. On the other hand the lawyers of the Staufs tried to declare parts of the empire all territories which fell under the application of Roman law.

The other universal power, the papacy, also referred to the Roman conquest and Roman law as evidences of its power over the states in worldly matters, similarly to the emperors Stauf. The paper surveys the application, teaching, and authorization of Roman law in the twelfth and thirteenth-century European „national” monarchies from this aspect, and this is the background against which the opinion of the Hungarian nobility, put into words by the Church-intelligentsia, is examined. Our chronicles provide valuable data for this.

It is important to stress that Lukács, Archbishop of Esztergom, who had been educated in France, and his circle were very much against Barbarossa's claims to exercise his „imperialis auctoritas” in Hungary, and identified themselves with the cause of Pope Alexander III in alliance with the King of France. Lukács' steps show similarities with the activity of his contemporary Archbishop Eskil of Lund in the ecclesiastical and political life of Denmark. The chronicler of

the midtwelfth century seems to have belonged to Lukács' circle. The opinions of the chroniclers of the 13th century, i. e. those of Master P. working between 1270 and 1272, and Simon Kézai, who worked between 1282 and 1285 is that the Hungarian king and nobility are not subordinated either to the emperor, or the pope *in temporalibus*. Their arguments are based also on the independence of the Hun-Magyar unwritten law, and support their views by that the Scythians, considered to have been the ancestors of the Magyars and Huns, were never defeated by anyone, but conquered Pannonia and ousted the Romans.

The armed conquest of Pannonia was brought up again by one of the circles of the Hungarian nobility after the death of King Ladislas IV (1290) not in literature but in a political debate to defend their right of electing the king against the Pope.

L. Kerekes: The Road of the Austrian Republic to the Geneva Minutes

At the end of 1921 the plebiscite of Sopron put an end to the Burgenland conflict exerting a very harmful influence on the Austro-Hungarian relations. The relationship of the two countries, however, was still far from being settled. The Austrian Schober government tried to find new allies in foreign policy and started a policy of rapprochement towards Czechoslovakia at the end of 1921. This country enjoyed both the political and economic support of the Entente Powers, which made the rapprochement very advantageous for Austria. Economically this was justified by the unsuccessfulness of the Portorose conference on economic matters on Austria's part. After careful preparations the Austrian—Czechoslovakian talks took place in Lana near Prague in December, and ended in the signing of an agreement granting significant economic advantages to Austria without questioning the Central European status quo created by the peace treaty.

The German and Hungarian governments were mistrustful concerning the agreement, saying that Austria had joined the Little Entente by signing it. This view was expressed by Count István Bethlen, Prime Minister of Hungary in Vienna in January 1922.

After the Prague agreement the Schober government took further steps towards securing economic aid from abroad. These efforts were, however, unsuccessful.

The fall of the Schober government was the result of a number of factors in domestic and foreign policy. The new government was formed by the Christian Socialist Ignaz Seipel.

The increasing economic difficulties — in the summer of 1922 — led to the revival of the Anschluss movement. This tendency was strengthened also by the unsuccessfulness of the London Conference. Inflation, unemployment, and the structural problems of Austrian economy made the situation so frightening that the Seipel government called the attention of the Great Powers to the threat of collapse in a series of notes. As the notices to the Great Powers and the League of Nations remained ineffective, Seipel turned directly to those countries which were the most interested in the security of Austria's future. In his talks in Berlin, Prague, and Verona he aroused the interests of the German, Czechoslovakian and Italian governments towards his country, and with the help of these countries he managed to persuade the League of Nations to take up the question of the economic rehabilitation of Austria.

On 4 October 1922 the Geneva Minutes were signed, where Austria restated the programme of national independence first settled in the peace treaty, and the League of Nations guaranteed the rehabilitation of the country from economic point of view. The Geneva Minutes settled the troubled period after the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, and the new country was to progress on the road of international and inner consolidation.

M. Ormos: The Security Problem and the Annexation of Austria

The author examines the problem of the annexation of Austria to Germany from the point of view of the French concept of security. Her chain of thoughts goes as follows.

When the French government forced the decision at the peace conference that the Anschluss be prohibited to Germany, they wanted to secure by this a stronger barrier against German expansion in Central Europe, should Germany regain her power in the future. The prerogatives of this were an independent Austria and her integration into a more or less harmonious economic unit in the Danube valley.

In the 1920s the French government treated the problem of Austria primarily as an economic one closely linked with the problem of the co-operation of the successor states. Accordingly, they thought that the problem of the Anschluss was to be settled not in Berlin, but in Vienna.

The French attempts at economic reconciliation in this territory were, however, not successful. This was mainly due to the fact that France could not secure actual economic influence and administration in the region owing to the structure of her own economy. Another cause of the failure was that the other Powers hindered the French aspirations either in a direct or in an indirect way. The programmes of the successor states to create an independent national economy at the very beginning was the third factor working against the success of France. Naturally, these states did not want to collaborate with one another to the slightest extent, and the resistance of Austria was reinforced by memories of the past. Beneš, the only politician of the region who was at times aware of the danger of particularism, could not make the Czechoslovakian parliament, and not even the government accept his views. The governments of the other countries did never think seriously of an economic collaboration with Austria.

The final defeat of the French efforts in the economic and financial field was the failure of the Tardieu plan in 1932. Not long after this the decision over the Anschluss was already in the hands of Berlin. This made it obvious that the new, political type of guarantee was to be sought outside the belt as it was unable and also unwilling to give it itself.

From 1932 onwards the French efforts regarding the problem of the Anschluss, or perhaps the problems of the whole Central and Eastern Europe, were characterized by a demand for political guarantees. This can be seen in that the idea of making Italy more and more interested in the future of the region, raised also by Briand earlier, took a different form. Finally France gave considerable territories to Italy in Africa in return for the preservation of the status quo around Austria. Another sign of the new concept was the rapprochement of France to the Soviet Union, the aim of which was again the stabilization of the situation in Central Europe, especially in Austria. While in the first case the French hopes failed to materialize because of the Abyssinian crisis and the turn of Italy towards Germany, the second line was abandoned by the French government itself.

At the same time the attempt at the organization of the anti-German forces in the region to take a common ground in the problem of the Anschluss, i. e. the Danube pact, was also doomed to failure. The Yugoslavian government deemed the German rule in Austria more favourable than the Italian one; the Hungarians regarded the Anschluss an accomplished fact, and the only thing they demanded for this from the Germans was certain compensation, the Polish government thought it was better if the Germans dealt with Austria and not with Danzig; and the Roumanians thought they were not closely concerned in these matters. Beneš, who was rather isolated even at home, could not do much. Apart from political considerations, these countries were very much influenced by their dependence on the German market and the hostility or indifference at best towards the future of Austria coming from the past historical experience of these peoples.

Thus the Anschluss, that represented the absolute failure of twenty years of French political activity in Central Europe, was carried out without any significant protest. After continued retreat France had to withdraw finally and bury the hopes and possibilities regarding Central Europe that had been given her in 1918.

Gy. Ember: The Central Government Offices of the Hapsburg Empire 1711—1765

The paper gives a comprehensive picture of the central governmental offices of the Hapsburg Empire. It points out the dichotomy of the absolutistic power of the ruler and the feudal character of the empire, and the contradiction following from this. Then we get the classification of the government offices. The author distinguished advisory and executive ones, regional general authorities and specialized ones, which were more in the trend of development.

The second part of the paper gives a survey of the advisory bodies of the ruler, the various conferences and deputations taking the place of the aulic councils and privy councils of the past, and above all the State Council or Staatsrat set up in 1761 working on a quite new principle. The author states that the setting up of the State Council can be considered as the beginning of the enlightened phase of absolutism.

In the third part of his paper the author discusses the court offices of political character, above all the chancelleries. The State Chancellery, or Staatskanzlei, set up in 1742, gradually took over all foreign affairs in the court. Here the author speaks also of the various specialized authorities that got separated from the chancelleries, primarily legal, commercial and transportation ones. The temporary suspension of the Austrian and Czech court chancelleries between 1749 and 1761 is also touched upon.

The fourth part of the paper is the most detailed. It deals with the eventful history of the financial authorities in the court, namely with the reforms of Charles III and Maria Theresa in 1740, 1740 and 1760 resp. They eventually proved unsuccessful. The most standing of the financial authorities was the Hofkammer with its history of several centuries.

The fifth part of the paper deals with the court offices of commerce and transport, with the Kommerzdirektorium and the Commercial Council, the activity of which was very harmful to Hungarian economic development.

In the sixth part of the paper we get acquainted with the history of two military authorities, viz. the Hofkriegsrat and the Kommissariat.

In the shortest seventh part of the paper various specialized authorities are dealt with, especially those concerned in Hungarian affairs, too.

In the final chapter the author states that the central governmental authorities of the Austrian Empire played an important part also in the affairs of Hungary, though Hungarian laws did not allow this. Their activity is another proof of the fact that the relations between Hungary and the rest of the Austrian Empire went beyond a mere personal union.

L. Benczédi: Archbishop Szelepcsényi's Case and how the Foundations of Leopold's Absolutism were Layed in the Autumn of 1670

The political atmosphere in Hungary in the Autumn of 1670 was characterized by fear and terror caused by the punitive measures of Vienna after the suppression of the rising of the Estates in the region of river Tisza. Above all, the arrest of Ferenc Nádasdy, Lord Chief Justice caused extreme anxiety in the Hungarian ruling class. The Hungarian aristocracy and nobility had every reason for being afraid of another wave of arrest. Under these circumstances the case of György Szelepcsényi, Archbishop of Esztergom got special significance. He was accused by a political group in the court — namely by Tamás Pálffy, Bishop of Nitra, Chancellor of Hungary and his circle — of having participated in the rising himself. The archbishop went to Vienna early October 1670 to establish his innocence and measure his strength with his enemies. The paper reveals this contest resulting the victory of the primate, on the basis of newly found sources. Szelepcsényi's victory was partly due to the fact that the leading office-holders of the Hungarian feudal system trusted him, and partly to the support of Duke Lobkowitz, the first minister of the Vienna court, who has chosen the head of the Catholic Church to be the chief supporter of absolutism in Hungary. The victory of the archbishop went beyond its personal implications as far as it led to the moderation of the policy of the court towards Hungary. It made way for the introduction of absolutism in the country, but at the same time it restricted its course.

The political struggle in the Autumn of 1670 meant also that Archbishop Szelepcsényi became the Hungarian representative of Leopold's absolutism, and his contradictory figure reflected well the irresolvable dichotomy, of the Vienna court and the Hungarian aristocracy, their co-operation and conflicts. It was all in vain that the court was in possession of power, and absolutism was on the gain in the whole of Europe. In Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary, social circumstances and power relations were not at all hopeless for feudalism or the system of the Estates, even if they had been suppressed by armed force. In contrast to the unsatisfactory conditions of absolutism, feudalism still had deep roots in the economic and social development of the country.