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The Legal Institution of Dual Citizenship as a Means of Dealing with Minority and Migration situations

The legal institution of dual citizenship is considered by a part of international literature, especially legal literature, a controversial solution that, by seeking to identify or correlate national and ethnic affiliation with the dimension of citizenship, may destabilize the rights and responsibilities connected to a given state territory, tax system and administrative, socio-political etc. public distribution system. Another part of literature regards the institution of dual citizenship as the most general (though temporary) way of solving legal inequalities that accumulate because of the varying citizenship classification of the people living within a given state.

Although everybody agrees, and this can be considered a universal principle in European legal practice, that adherence to one's original citizenship can be a reason neither for discrimination nor, on the part of the recipient country, for encumbering the obtainment of the right of citizenship, dual citizenship, which makes the cancelling or bypassing of pre-emptive rights possible, has sparked passionate debates throughout Europe. These especially became manifest during the public debate that accompanied the amendment of Germany's citizenship law.

Prior to discussing the contradictions and the possible consequences of dual citizenship, which is a far-reaching problem even if we do not go beyond Hungary's case, it is expedient, by starting out from the fundamental differences between national and citizenship affiliations, to throw light on the difference between the objectives of Hungarian minority policy (ethno- and identity policy) and Hungarian immigration policy.

National community, ties of citizenship

It is said that nations are communities imagined and described by poets, artists, linguists, and historians that the activity of politicians cannot but circumscribe. As opposed to this, states are clearly held together by constitutional principles and laws framed by lawyers, and their outer and internal borders and rules are controlled by a myriad of political institutions. Naturally, the nation-state constantly attempts to merge these two kinds of entities, here with aspirations of homogenization degenerating into ethnic cleansing, there with tailoring the borders to fit the "body of the nation". The events of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in the 20th century revealed how tragic the outcome of these endeavours can be.

In the dual citizenship issue not so much the nation building and state organising visions of poets, historians, and lawyers clash as the two camps with oppos-

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ing (positive or pessimistic) views on the consequences dual citizenship entails. The well-meaning nation builders see a means of “returning home” and “national unification” in it, and the lawyers who feel positively about it welcome dual citizenship, which offers a temporary status in all respects, as the fastest possible way to emancipate “immigrant minorities” and to integrate refugees who, in cases, arrive from faraway countries. Accordingly, dual citizenship counts as an advantageous solution in both of these approaches.

On the other hand, a significant part of the nation builders – many politicians and advisors of Fidesz Hungarian Civic Party and the leading officials of the Hungarian parties in Slovakia and Romania – believe that dual citizenship provided by Hungary would strengthen the migration potential of Hungarian minority communities, intensify resettlement into Hungary, make tangible the motives for migration that are already present in the strategy of families, and lay the foundation of decisions by younger and more highly qualified groups to migrate. Furthermore, these same people criticise initiatives taken in Vojvodina and Transcarpathia by saying that they are contrary to minority self-government and autonomy efforts and are limited exclusively to nation building in Hungary.

According to the approach of the lawyers and politicians who see a threat in dual citizenship to the present aspects and interests of state and citizenship, it would bring about – in terms of claims encompassing, even without resettlement to Hungary, the whole range of inarticulate, general, historical, and subjective rights of citizenship – the collapse of the entire institution of Hungarian citizenship. This is a vision which the leftist criticism – which, in an effort to oppose the original version of the Status Law, frightened the people with Romanian employees flooding the Hungarian labour market – so effectively confronted with the potential consequences of the Status Law’s nation building logic.

Considering how much the ethno-political processes of the second half of the 20th century changed with respect to the post-WWII situation – analysed by István Bibó and believed to be resolvable through tailoring the state borders to fit ethnic borders –, one has to concede that not even the EU framework can make state and nation coincide in Central Europe, the Baltic region or the Balkans in the early 21st century. In reality, it cannot be in the interest of anybody in the region to have true nation states at the price of serious conflicts and complete international isolation. (For pure nation-states could be only formed in Europe with forced migration, forced assimilation, or the stirring up and tackling of international conflicts.)

The coincidence of the two kinds of entities and the reintegration of Hungarians outside the borders cannot serve as a basis for nation building and state organisation favourable to Hungary. Instead, positive changes can come from regional and autonomy policies: these can ensure the natural relatedness of the region’s Hungarian and non-Hungarian ethnic and national communities, their communal rights and peaceful interethnic relations. Furthermore, Central and Eastern European intercultural models need to be developed that not only respect the diversity

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of languages and cultures but also promote the mutual learning and use of these languages. Naturally, this also requires the enhanced protection of Hungarian culture and language with the munitions provided by EU regulation.

Dual citizenship, common citizenship, EU citizenship

Naturally, this foreign and nation policy approach could entail a **common citizenship** (for the Visegrád countries, Hungarian-Slovenian, Hungarian-Slovak, Hungarian-Austrian etc.) conceivable on the score of the logic of EU citizenship or **temporary dual citizenship** for foreign citizens and their children who arrive in a given state. The migration of the integrating Central and Eastern European region's population will undoubtedly accelerate. In this possible framework, the communities speaking a common language and the interregional economic and cultural relations will ensure enhanced advantages on the labour market and in the preference of schools. Therefore, instead of trying to ignore migration on the labour market and ethnic migration, one has to elaborate appropriate immigration policies for their management. These should ensure advantages for those immigrants who are more receptive, speak the Hungarian language, are competitive at the labour market, are able to arrange their settlement in Hungary, and can quickly integrate thanks to their culture, qualification, and family relations.

Since the territory of states will never coincide with the territory inhabited by a nation, debates will always fork into two directions: toward an emphasis on the absolute priority of the interests of the state and toward a demand on the priority of the interests of the nation. Therefore, we run against the dilemma of sovereignty and national self-determination, which had been proved irresolvable with the logic of the nation-state.

On the other hand, considering that at least six-seven different legal statuses and groups of various affiliation belong to the current Hungarian cultural national or Hungarian linguistic community, the problem becomes even more far-reaching. These groups are as follows:

1. The members of the largest group – those who declare themselves Hungarians and are Hungarian citizens – have gotten used to the present situation, and they see any potential change more as a threat than an advantage. This behaviour could be accounted for by the fear deriving, on the one hand, from the relatively more solid economic and social circumstances as compared to the neighbours and, on the other, from the easily rallied resistance of the neighbouring countries with respect to Hungarian national questions.
2. Besides the Hungarians in Hungary, there are ethnic Hungarians minority communities in the neighbouring seven countries with their legal status varying from state to state and probably continue to vary in the following years. The Slovenian and Croatian cultural autonomy and, in part, territorial autonomy, the still rather shaky cultural autonomy in Vojvodina, the natural autonomy of the Hungarian majority localities in Slovakia (which, however, lack

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equipment and have to put up with legal deficiencies), the community in Transcarpathia left to the discretion of the central government both on the regional and municipal levels, and the Hungarian community in Romania dependent on the actual Hungarian-Romanian relations, comprise altogether of 2.5 million people who can have many different relations with Hungary. The linguistic, cultural and national identities and ties, the family and labour market etc. relations attach minority Hungarians not only to Hungary, while the economic factors of livelihood and the attachment to one's homeland tie them primarily not to Hungary.

3. Another kind of virtual community of different status is formed by those who resettle in Hungary from the seven Hungarian minority communities. Or, as they say, they "come out" from Transylvania, "come home", "come over" from Slovakia and Vojvodina, "come round" from Burgenland and Muravidék. From among the 150–200,000 Hungarians from outside the borders, who lived here, worked here, studied here, and had a residence permit or commuted regularly, at best 3,000–4,000 people granted Hungarian citizenship on the average in the past years.
4. The EU membership of four countries of the region, the possible membership of Romania and Croatia, and the longer outsider role of Serbia and Ukraine further complicate the situation and the legal possibilities of those living in neighbouring countries. Following May 2004, the legal environment of the EU is likely to curb the scope for action of Hungarian minority policy much more than before with respect to its assistance and citizenship policies. Travel and contact opportunities have extremely expanded for the current and future EU minorities, and most of them, by being bi- or multilingual, can become beneficiaries of the integration process. However, the Hungarian minorities of the countries not joining the EU might remain among the losers. Therefore, it is not accidental that the demand for dual citizenship found response in Vojvodina and Transcarpathia in 2003. Yet, there are many other ways to improve the situation of these communities more effectively than with the institution of dual citizenship: with the expansion of cross border trade, the concentration of assistance policy etc.
5. The situation of the members of the Western European, Scandinavian and overseas Hungarian diaspora is fundamentally different. A significant part of them has never actually been a Hungarian citizen because they were born in Transylvania or in Yugoslavia. Most of them belong to the '56 immigrants who, for some reason, have lost their citizenship (or, in the case of their children, never applied for it). They used to be Hungarian citizens and, according to the law, their citizenship could be easily renewed. The issue of the Hungarian diaspora and the introduction of dual citizenship for the Hungarian minorities are not to be confused, just as the demand for citizenship by those who resettle in Hungary and those who stay in their homeland are also separate issues. Still, it is clear that many demand citizenship with the polit-

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ical intention behind the demand also being express. With respect to the of conditions of Hungarian citizenship in lack of a permanent residence in Hungary, the German regulation seems most realistic (although the unveiled cases regarding the abuses of the quite high quality German social care made even the Germans wonder whether the full extension of the rights of citizenship would make sense).

6. The communities of the various, Hungarian-speaking ethnicities of Hungary, who declaredly possess a dual – Hungarian and ethnic – identity, form a separate group: not with respect to Hungarian citizenship but regarding their belonging to the Hungarian national community. And where is the place of the Hungarian-speaking Roma population living outside the borders but within the universal Hungarian nation? And the place of those hundreds of thousands who, at the last census, answered neither about their mother tongue nor about their nationality and, therefore, we have no information on how they classify themselves. Yet, the 21st century Hungarian nation can only be based on self-assessment, collective solidarity, and the acceptance of linguistic and cultural community.

The extension of Hungarian citizenship to the enumerated communities can only happen in conformity with the regulations regarding the present citizenship of the applicants, and by marking out a clear dividing line between permanent settlement and citizenship rights without settlement in Hungary. In this latter case, the state budget should cover the costs associated with the extension of the rights of citizenship.

It is clear that the educational, cultural, public health and social security rights, all included in the sphere of citizenship rights, and the range of various stratum-specific benefits can only be made fully available to those who pay there taxes elsewhere and not to the Hungarian state budget. In this respect, the Status Law's assistance scheme seems a convenient solution: it entails the gradual extension of citizenship rights, especially cultural and educational rights, and stratum-specific benefits, the opening up of bodies and organisations closed for foreign citizens, etc. A second solution could be the extension of citizenship rights made more or less strictly conditional upon the payment of taxes. A third possibility would be to consider the logic of the system of conditions and guarantees of the institution of EU citizenship. However, this would require an even greater level of coordination and agreement with the neighbouring countries than the first two, and so much the more because this would entail transforming citizenship rights in part into common legal standards.

The principles of Hungarian minority policy

The solutions enumerated above only hint at the difficulty the problem. The situation seems even more complex when considered as regards its minority and

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identity policy aspect. There have been seven items present in Hungarian minority policy of which we should not renounce.

- 1) The principle of non-violence, valid since the times of Teleki and Bethlen, has stood the test of every criticism.
- 2) Nobody has questioned the right and principle of belonging to a universal Hungarian national community either. (An approach criticised the certificate issued in accordance with the Status Law for being a new criterion of “Hungarianness” – since the beneficiaries have to be registered. The author believes that this approach is wrong: despite opposition and biased criticism, it has never meant a new self-definition of the national community.)
- 3) Hungarian minority policy has also understood that the impact of the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, unfair with respect to ethnic groups, could be best reduced by guaranteeing the right of minority Hungarians to their homeland, promoting solutions that make staying and securing a livelihood there possible and also ensure equality before the law there. In international law, this principle only becomes relevant with respect to guaranteeing the rights of self-government.
- 4) The principle of guaranteeing Hungarian national identity, as a principle of minority protection, is probably the most persistent item of Hungarian minority policy. (Besides the free use of the Hungarian language, culture and religion, national identity naturally involves solidarity with the universal Hungarian national community, the often denied and prohibited access to the assets of national culture, national self-definition, and the respect for national symbols.)
- 5) The fifth principle, necessary for the Hungarian minority communities and Hungary in complying with the previous ones, is the free, unhindered maintenance of contacts between the national community formed by Hungarians of various citizenship and their communities.
- 6) The Hungarian governments in office are bound – since 1990 it is their constitutional obligation – to financially assist the culture and community life of Hungarian minorities outside the borders and living in diaspora. Due to the Status Law, the extent of this assistance can multiply in the coming years, but, as shown by analyses, its effectiveness and institutional framework are far from being perfect.
- 7) Finally, a principle that evolved on the basis of the lessons learned from the minority policy of earlier eras and was dubbed the Antall doctrine. According to it, the Hungarian governments in office consider the position elaborated by the (majority of) political representatives of Hungarian minority communities normative: it is to be represented internationally with respect to the given country of the minority community in question. In the practice of the past fifteen years this has increasingly come to mean that the Hungarian government seeks to formulate a mutually acceptable common position at negotiations and in the framework of the Permanent Hungarian Conference (MÁÉRT) and other coordination forums.

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The introduction of the institution of dual citizenship may substantially transform these principles of Hungarian minority policy (and, first of all, identity or nation policy), by questioning the priority of communities in the homeland; by confronting the bilingual people of dual attachment, who are attached economically and existentially to their homeland and live within its institutional structures the dilemma of migration; and by jeopardizing the political and personal basis of the efforts of self-government.

What other risks does dual citizenship involve? Let's recall Mečiar's offer! At his negotiations with Gyula Horn in Győr, the Slovak prime minister, founder of his state, sensing the possible consequences of the intensifying will to migrate among ethnic Hungarians, their employment in Hungary, and the free choice of school, proposed to Hungarian prime minister Gyula Horn to mutually facilitate the cumbersome process of resettlement. The nation-state atmosphere and the public mood of the neighbouring country, in so far as dual citizenship would set this process in motion, would be happy to agree to the emigration of masses to Hungary.

Various research projects have been conducted on the consequences of dual citizenship: one by the Ferenc Balázs Institute and the Migration Research Group of the Minority Studies Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences two years ago, another by István Horváth, Valér Veres, researchers in Kolozsvár (Cluj Napoca). The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ) also conducted public opinion polls (Népszabadság, 11 December 2003). These all show that current migration potential is primarily regulated family relations and the situation at the labour market. According to certain opinions, the rather limited receptivity of the Hungarian labour market constitutes the greatest risk factor, while others believe that the already present structural unemployment in Hungary could only be relieved by the easily controllable employment of Hungarians from outside the borders as set out in the Status Law. However, the risk of ethnic emigration continues to seem considerable, especially from the cumulatively disadvantageous situation of Hungarian communities in Transcarpathia and Vojvodina.

Further risk factors are: the size of the minority communities in concern (also recognised internationally); the limited range of Hungary's protective positions and opportunities; persistent tension as regards social and economic policies between Hungary and Ukraine, Hungary and Serbia, and, in part, Hungary and Romania; and, in a sense, the role of generation and qualification factors in the increased migration potential (in so far as the Hungarian communities that stay at home can lose, in a short time, their most highly qualified and productive members who would also ensure demographic reproduction). The consequences of this loss are already perceptible in the Székely land region afflicted by internal migration.

Minority policy or migration policy?

Even the discussion above reveals a great dividing line that could, surprisingly, stay in the background throughout the passionate (and, with respect to Vojvodina,

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campaign-like) debates on the granting of dual citizenship. Is it allowed, is it possible, is it necessary to make a distinction between the Hungarians outside the borders who stay in their homeland, in the country of their current citizenship, and the Hungarians outside the borders who have already taken up residence in Hungary or arrive here with the intent of permanent settlement or commute regularly?

Although emotional engagement in politics usually rejects all kinds of distinctions, this behaviour cannot be relevant in this question. Dual citizenship, in European practice – from France to Finland, from Germany to Spain –, belongs under the instruments of immigration policy and that of integration policy, which helps the integration of foreigners, and not in that of nation or minority policies that aim at assisting fellow nationals abroad. That is, the right of dual citizenship is the due of foreign citizens who reside in the given country for a given length of time (usually ten years) or married a citizen of that state or are the descendants of a citizen. Substantial restrictions apply to preserving one's original citizenship. In Spain, for example, one has to hand in the passport issued by the country of origin, and in Finland only consorts can keep their original citizenship parallel to their second, Finnish citizenship. Accordingly, the institution of dual citizenship primarily serves to maintain neither the citizenship of emigrated Spanish, Germans, or Finnish nor that of minority communities living in the neighbouring countries. This becomes possible only through agreements made with the countries in concern or the legislation of those countries.

The extension of the institution of dual citizenship to include every single Hungarian community outside the borders is a purely theoretical scheme, although this "global solution" lies concealed behind the ideas formulated in Vojvodina, Transcarpathia and by the World Federation of Hungarians (MVSZ) and in an MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) proposal. This approach can be and should be excluded in the Hungarian case for the following reasons:

- a) Due to geographical closeness, social and subsistence differences and, in general, the great migration potential, the institution of dual citizenship can become, as a solution to the minority issue between two or more neighbouring countries, a facilitator and cause of the migration of masses.
- b) On the part of the legislature and public administration of the state in concern, dual citizenship may give rise to discriminative reactions, which are unforeseeable, restrictive, and justifiable by international law.
- c) The majority of the neighbouring countries would consider the emigration of Hungarian minorities a positive development, which means that it is in their interest to encourage migration trends and receptiveness in Hungary.

The institution of dual citizenship serves completely different purposes in the case of immigrant minorities, historical minorities (integrated for centuries) and minorities possessing a strong national identity (and, due to this, partially integrated or not integrated), and in the case of ethnic minorities that do not have a homeland. In the case of immigrant minorities, the purpose is the preservation of

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dual identity in some form or another, the regulation of immigration, and the gradual integration of immigrants into the majority society without the immigrants having to give up their original attachments. The preservation of dual identity is a task equally important in the case of immigrants and national minorities, but it should be guaranteed not by dual citizenship but by identity rights and identity policy. There is no need for dual citizenship if the state wants to satisfy the cultural, linguistic and religious demands of the various types of minorities and consider their contacts with their homeland a prominent task and manage it accordingly.

When original citizenship is kept, the institution of dual citizenship can produce new types of differences, exceptions and special situations, which not necessarily help the strengthening the already shaky national solidarity.

The choices of Hungarian regulation

With respect to citizenship in Hungary, the following five alternatives and their variants can be distinguished in connection with minority Hungarians and diaspora Hungarians:

- a) Hungarians outside the borders should not be granted any advantages in acquiring Hungarian citizenship, irrespective of their knowledge of languages, the Hungarian citizenship of their ascendants, their family relations, and their historical and national attachments
- b) the benefit offered by the Citizenship Act in force is sufficient to deal with a particular historical, linguistic and identity policy situation
- c) only the emigrated, diaspora Hungarians should have their lost citizenship back if the legislation of their current country also allows for this
- d) minority Hungarians should receive far more concessions in acquiring Hungarian citizenship. It seems that nobody wants to oppose already effected migration plans, since everybody is aware that we only have one life to toy with. In the case of those who resettled because of better openings, happier and more secure family circumstances, higher quality education and health care, and the demand for the linguistic and cultural community, the following choices can be considered:
 - application for citizenship and proof of settlement in Hungary would be enough
 - they could receive citizenship at once but, beyond residence, they would have to show proof of employment or some other source of income in Hungary
 - no resettlement is necessary, every Hungarian living outside the borders is granted citizenship by inherent right but have to apply for it (the choice supported by MVSZ and József Kasza, president of the Federation of Hungarians in Vojvodina)
 - every Hungarian living outside the borders is collectively granted citizenship by the Hungarian state on the basis of historical right.

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- e) according to the original design of the Status Law, the Hungarian legislature should establish Hungarian status abroad, which for those obtaining the certificate, depending on the possibilities allowed by the budget and international law and the bilateral treaties signed with the given state, would provide for part of the citizenship-like rights associated with the status in their own regions and in Hungary (cultural, educational, stratum-specific rights, etc.)

According to the author, this final alternative is the most appropriate. First, it makes it possible to acquire part of the rights of citizenship without resettlement. Second, it is an open system, which can be further expanded and regulated bilaterally through the agreement and cooperation of the neighbouring countries. Third, it promotes the maintenance of contacts with Hungary but does not hinder the efforts of autonomous national community building. And fourth, it does not produce unnecessary illusions, and ethnic Hungarians would have to fear retaliation less during in case a nationalist government takes office.

Professional analyses – with tentative conclusions

While writing this study, the author compared four substantial, comprehensive, and publicly available analyses. On the connections between legal theory and minority and nation policy relevant to dual citizenship, the compilation in issues 2-3 of 1999 of periodical *Magyar Kisebbség* (Hungarian Minority) contained useful references. The studies by István Benyhe, Imre Borbély, József I. Csapó, Gábor Harrach, Gábor Zsolt Pataki, Attila Varga, and Judit Tóth were the first professional analyses of the topic in the early preparatory stage of the Status Law. Besides an intermediary solution by Imre Borbély on the Hungarian legal status abroad, the analysts close to MVSZ urged a global solution and assumed that the notion of dual citizenship was extendable to all Hungarians. In her study, Judit Tóth clearly argued and, in her further writings on this subject continued to argue in favour of maintaining the strict regulation of the rights of citizenship.

The visa requirement Hungary introduced towards Ukraine and Serbia-Montenegro induced debates among Hungarian parties in Vojvodina. Their initiative during their election campaign set in motion the second wave of debates in autumn 2003. Then, the work of Budapest Analysis shed light primarily on the contradictions involved in the question. The written opinion of the group of experts who looked at the issue at the request of President of the Republic Ferenc Mádl also took a rather cautious approach. At the same time, they indicated that “the decision to facilitate acquiring citizenship can only be sensible if it contemporaneously promotes the idea that the Hungarians living in neighbouring countries also belong to the Hungarian nation, promotes their prosperity in their homeland and strengthens their Hungarian national identity.” In his position statement, the president delegated the decision to MÁÉRT.

Most recently, Boldizsár Nagy, by analysing the contradictions in the contexts of state-citizen-civilian, and national community and community of citizens,

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arrived at the conclusion that complementing Hungarian citizenship with the original citizenship is more likely to entail undesired conflicts and contradictions than a desired strengthening of national identity and solidarity.

In sum, the lessons of the four professional analysis materials can be formulated in four concluding remarks.

- 1) The institution of dual citizenship, imagined as an easier way of acquiring Hungarian citizenship than the current method, transcends and rewrites the logic of the Status Law, which is also considered fundamentally important by the initiators: instead of the plans helping prosperity in one's homeland by providing assistance, benefits and easier contacts, the approach diverted to the level of citizenship rights can only lead to a dead-end solution or the replacement of minority and nation policies with immigration policy instruments.
- 2) This is especially true for countries outside the EU: the granting of Hungarian citizenship to a large number of applicants living outside the EU Member States is sure to run into massive international resistance. The ruling of 20 April 2004 by the German Constitutional Court clearly indicated this. Naturally, the Hungarian government and legislature can bring sovereign decisions concerning the majority of citizenship rights, but it cannot adopt anything contrary to European citizenship and the effect of the Schengen Treaty.
- 3) Intensifying resettlement and immigration (which are likely to happen despite any regulation), and the effective administration of the consequent, increasingly gloomy, protracted citizenship affairs could be probably managed by a rational and practical implementation of the current law in force. The offensive condescension to and lecturing of immigrants, who have once made the difficult decisions to emigrate and resettle, can involve, through their family members who stayed at home, not just the abandonment of resettlement plans but emotional estrangement and preference of other target countries.
- 4) Although ethnic Hungarian minority communities can have different legal statuses and the neighbouring countries have different relations with the EU, Hungary shall aim at making international public opinion understand that despite its 20th century divisions, the awareness of Hungarian cultural and linguistic unity and national community has survived and Hungarian national identity is a basic reflex of identification and self-definition of the members of Hungarian minority communities. Therefore, the cultural, linguistic and identity policy unity of the Hungarian nation is a unique ethnopolitical and cultural phenomenon in Europe that requires special protection and consideration. Furthermore, in Hungarian-Hungarian relations, the logic of the "cooperation agreements" concluded with the minority communities should be emphasized so that a constant, predictable strategic course could prevail in the policies towards Hungarians outside the borders.

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As regards Hungarian citizenship, its benefits should more clearly and transparently come across to ethnic Hungarians who settled in Hungary. On the other hand, it is better to treat dual citizenship as a temporary solution that can last until the EU membership of the country of origin and can only become full-fledged with resettlement to Hungary. Its actual content can be determined by the number of applicants and the extent of budgetary resources. However, this solution would, in effect, entail the same possibilities inherent in the cultural and educational rights, rights to maintain contacts, and benefits guaranteed by the Hungarian legal status, which, in essence, could also be achieved through the amendment of the Status Law.

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