Summaries

JÁNOS TŐZSÉR
The Limit of Self-Knowledge

Here is an argument for the disjunctive theory of perception. (1) According to the disjunctive theory hallucinations are a different type of mental events than the veridical perceptual experiences which are indistinguishable from them from a subjective perspecptive. (2) If two perceptual experiences are indistinguishable from one another from a subjective perspective, then the two perceptual experiences have the same phenomenal properties. (3) If two perceptual experiences have the same phenomenal properties, even though they are different types of mental events, then self-knowledge will be seriously damaged: the factors determining the type of the mental events in question are inaccessible to introspection.

In the first part of my paper I reconstruct the problem of self-knowledge, in the way it arises from the perspective of the disjunctive theory, then in the second part I show that the above argument which alludes to the limit of self-knowledge does not work against the disjunctive theory. The key point will be this: contrary to what premise (2) says, the indistinguishability of a hallucination from an appropriate veridical perceptual experience should not be understood in such a way that the two mental events have the same phenomenal properties.

ANNA RÉZ
Recalcitrant Emotions and Moral Responsibility

Recalcitrant emotions pose a major challenge for theories of emotions and theories of moral responsibility as well. On the one hand, unified theories of emotions have difficulties with explaining the assumed irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. On the other hand, even those rare accounts of moral responsibility which can admit to responsibility for emotions, cannot explain how we can be responsible for such emotions which go strictly against the agent's beliefs. In this paper I defend two theses. First, I argue that so-called attributionist accounts, defended by Thomas Scanlon and Angela Smith, provide the most feasible way to explain and justify responsibility-attribution for emotions. Secondly, I present D'Arms and Jacobson's solution for the problem of recalcitrant emotions and argue that only a non-unified account of emotions supplemented with an attributionist theory can provide answers for the discussed difficulties.

FERENC HUORANSZKI
Practical Rationality and Weakness of the Will

The paper argues that the capacity of practical rationality can be best captured by investigating the conditions under which we would regard human behavior irrational. Akrasia occurs when agents act against a judgment which is the consequence of their practical reasoning. The paper claims that this view of akrasia can help to explain what we mean by practical rationality as a capacity to control behavior by forming judgments about the value of an action in concrete situations. Practical rationality does not require that agents do what they judge best, since in many cases such a judgement is not available. Rather, practical rationality requires that if judgments based on practical reasoning were available, the agent's actual behavior wouldn't contradict its content. Contrary to some recent opinions, actions not controlled by the agents' judgements cannot be practicaly rational because they fail to satisfy the control requirement. Finally, we must understand weakness of the will as some failure of practical rationality because agents are weak-willed only if they revise their intentions without having sufficient reasons for such revision.

JUDIT SZALAI
Parallel Deception

This paper proposes a new way of understanding the relationship between interpersonal deception and self-deception. The type of scenario in focus is called "parallel deception", viz. when self-deception and and interpersonal deception occur at the same time, regarding the same issue. The analysis of parallel deception reveals a possible mechanism of interpersonal deception that has gone unnoticed in the literature.

JÓZSEF KOLLÁR
Be Spontaneous. The Logic of Double Bind

The term double bind and other terms of deutero-learning closely related to it play a significant role in different social and behavioural sciences such as psychiatry, psychotherapy, organisational and political sciences. In my paper, I am investigating double bind or more particularly, one of its specific cases, i.e. 'Be spontaneous', with the devices of analytic philosophy. As a starting-point, I accept Davidson's idea that the reason of a given act is at the same time its cause. In my interpretation, while a person A, causing double bind, requires that the reason caused by his/her reason should not become the cause of the act of victim B, he/she expects B to act as if the reasons caused by A's reasons had caused B's act. The second result is that the person's inconsistency does not itself create a pathological situation as for this, the loss (not temporary as that is often fruitful) of the illusion of conscious will is needed. The third important insight is that trust, which, in my interpretation, is one of the paradigmatic forms of 'Be spontaneous', is, among others, an exciting learning situation which may likewise become 'pathological' or real deutero-learning. Finally, the fourth message, which seems

to be significant, is that the interpretation of trust given by me shakes although does not destroy Davidson's theory on internal consistency, put forward in his *Paradoxes of Irrationality*.

GÁBOR FORRAI
Logical Conventionalism

The paper offers a defence of conventionalism about logic. It argues first that the core of conventionalism can be retained without commitment to the view that logic is completely independent of non-linguistic facts, which renders some standard criticisms of conventionalism irrelevant. It then goes on to suggest that conventionalism can be substantiated by showing that it alone explains two central features of logic, that it is a priori and that it is a matter of choice. The argument for these features proceeds in two steps. First it is argued by assuming the method of reflexive equilibrium that logic is a matter of choice, i. e. neither reality nor our criteria for assessment of logical theories select a single right logic theory. Then it takes up Quine's view and claims that his alleged empirical justification of logic shows neither that logic is empirical nor that there is only one right logic.

FERENC TALLÁR
'Reality of the Soul' and Novel – On the young Lukács's understanding
of Dostoyevsky

The subject of this essay is the view of the young Lukács on Dostoyevsky and his central idea: the 'reality of the soul' (Seelenwirklichkeit), which implies direct personal relations free of alienation. However, in *The Theory of the Novel* both the narrative form applied by Dostoyevsky and the idea of the reality of the soul rose historical expectations: Lukács regarded them as indications of the time to come, as the sign of future social redemption. Taken, on the one hand, the failure of Lukács's philosophyco-historical prediction and, on the other, the interpretative relevance of the idea of the soul's reality, I suggest to give to the latter a suprahistorical, mythological significance. This would allow to grasp the mythological tenor of Dostoyevsky's novels in purely conceptual terms.